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Abstract
This thesis contains three chapters employing controlled economic experiments. The first
chapter studies to what extent laboratory measures of cheating generalize to the field. I
present a novel measure that allows for individual level observations of cheating, and I re-
late decisions made in this laboratory task with individual choices taken in the field, where
subjects can lie by mis-reporting their experimental earnings. According to this new mea-
sure, no correlation of behaviour between the laboratory and the field is found. The second
chapter contributes to the literature on the ability of financial markets to perfectly aggregate
private information into asset prices. Along with my co-authors, I conduct an experiment
designed to benchmark information aggregation in markets, by randomly assigning sub-
jects to different institutional environments, either a market or a BDM (Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak) mechanism. We find a difference between the two environments that seems to
be driven by price-insensitive traders, who appear to be unable to learn from market prices.
In the third chapter, my co-author and I provide a causal identification of the impact of
income inequality on attribution and social trust. We do so by using a combination of sur-
veys and behavioral lab experiments. Using positional primes we find that a higher relative
position has a positive impact on belief in meritocracy and social trust, which we causally
identify both using a novel incentivized lab task as well as standard survey measures. These
results are in line with correlational associations we find using larger general surveys. They
speak to why inequality can be so socially and economically corrosive while at the same
time remaining largely unaddressed
iv
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CHAPTER 1
Individual Cheating in the Lab: A New Measure and External Validity
1.1 Introduction
Cheating permeates many social and economic interactions of our daily life (DePaulo
et al., 1996; Ariely, 2012). Examples range from corporate scandals (e.g., Dieselgate,
Facebook-Cambridge Analytica), to tax evasion (Slemrod, 2007), and consumers misbe-
haviour (Mazar and Ariely, 2006). To make things worse, endevours to study cheating
in natural contexts are hindered by its secretive nature. Therefore, controlled experiments
represent an attractive instrument to study individual attitudes toward cheating.
The die-roll paradigm (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013) represents the most popular
measure of cheating used in the laboratory. Participants are asked to roll a die in private
and to report the result to the experimenter. Because the true outcome is observed by sub-
jects only, there is a monetary incentive to lie by reporting those outcomes associated with
higher rewards. Despite its simplicity, this type of task presents a considerable limitation:
cheating can only be inferred at the aggregate level by comparing the empirical distribution
of actual reports with its theoretical prediction. Hence, it is not possible to know, by design,
if a particular subject actually lied or not.1
Whether laboratory measures of cheating extend to non-controlled environments, is still
under investigation. For instance, the experimenter scrutiny or the artificiality of the lab
environment might trigger different ethical norms. If this is the case, then laboratory re-
sults on cheating might not generalize to the field (Levitt and List, 2007). Our paper aims
to address these two limitations.
First, we design a novel task that, in contrast to the existing literature, allows to observe
1Other existing laboratory tasks that do allow individual level observation of cheating are sender-receiver
games (Gneezy, 2005), variations of the die-roll task (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2018), and the matrix task (Mazar
et al., 2008). However, sender-receiver games involve strategic interaction and, as the variations of the die-
roll task, require observability of lies to be common knowledge, with obvious consequences on dishonest
behaviour. The matrix task, instead, requires participants to be explicitly deceived in order to collect individ-
ual level observations of cheating.
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cheating at the individual level. In our task subjects have five seconds to choose, in their
mind, one out of sixty colours (e.g. Yellow) from a list displayed on their screen. Once this
list disappears, three new different lists, containing four colours each (e.g. White, Beige,
Milk, Plum), are displayed. Every new list is associated with a different positive payoff.
If subjects claim their chosen colour to be in one of the three new lists, they receive the
payoff associated with that list, otherwise they receive zero. We know that the participant
has cheated if they pick a list of colours on the second screen that does not contain any
colour that was already present in the first larger list.
Second, we use the fact that in our task cheating is observable at the individual level and
ask to what extent cheating in the lab predicts cheating in the field within the same popula-
tion. Participants are not paid immediately after the experiment. Instead, after a few days
they have the opportunity to cheat in the field by self-reporting their earnings. Subjects are
paid according to the amount of money they claim to have earned in the laboratory. We use
two field variations that differ in the degree of anonymity of the field decision. In the first
one, the self-reporting procedure is completely anonymous while the second field variation
requires participants to meet in person with the experimenter.
The main contribution of this paper is twofold: (i) it develops a new laboratory task that
allows for individual level observations of cheating, and (ii) it allows to compare both the
extensive and intensive margin of cheating between the laboratory and a non-controlled
environment.2
In line with previous findings on individual dishonesty, we find that a considerable frac-
tion of subjects cheats in our laboratory task, but some of them do not cheat to the full
extent. However, no significant correlation of dishonest behaviour between lab and field is
observed. Although more than half of the subjects cheat to some extent in our new task,
most of them refrain from over-reporting their experimental earnings. Moreover, for those
who do so, we find no difference in the extent of cheating between subjects that are honest
2The extensive margin corresponds to the fraction of people who lie; the intensive margin corresponds to
the extent of cheating for people who choose to do so.
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in the laboratory and those who are not.
To the best of our knowledge, only few other studies examine the correlation between dis-
honest behaviour in the lab and cheating in the field within the same population.3 Dai et al.
(2018) perform an artefactual field experiment where passengers of public transportation
are asked to play a modified version of the die-roll task. As a main result, the study finds
that fare dodgers, on average, are more likely to report the most profitable outcome than
ticket holders.
Similarly to our study, Potters and Stoop (2016) use a student subject pool to correlate
self-reported performance in a mind game implemented in the lab, with a field measure of
cheating. After the experiment, payments are issued via bank transfer and some subjects
are deliberately overpaid by an amount of e5. A significant correlation of 0.31 between
performance in the mind game and not reporting the overpayment is found. In contrast
to Potters and Stoop (2016), our study allows to observe cheating at the individual level,
measures cheating at both the extensive and intensive margin, provides full anonimity in
the lab and in one of the field tasks, and requires active misreporting in both the lab and the
field. These new features allow to gain a deeper understanding of whether lab measures of
cheating are reliable predictors of dishonesty in other environments.
The extent to which laboratory results on cheating can be generalized to other environments
remains unclear.4 Laboratory evidence shows persistent patterns on dishonesty across sub-
jects. Some individuals are completely honest, while others either lie to the maximum
extent possible, or forfeit part of the monetary gains when they do cheat (Gneezy et al.,
2018; Abeler et al., 2019; Gerlach et al., 2019). Instead, studies that focus on dishonesty in
the field provide mixed results. While some find substantial cheating among subjects (e.g.,
Drupp et al., 2019; Bucciol and Piovesan, 2011), other studies report different findings. For
3Other papers focus on the correlation between a lab measure of cheating with the broader concept of rule
violation in the field: in-prison offences (Cohn et al., 2015), school misconduct (Cohn and Maréchal, 2018)
and work absenteeism (Hanna and Wang, 2017).
4For a broad discussion on the generalizability of experimental results in economics see Levitt and List
(2007); Al-Ubaydli and List (2013); Falk and Heckman (2009); Camerer (2015); Kessler and Vesterlund
(2015); Al-Ubaydli et al. (2017).
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example, Abeler et al. (2014) report no evidence of lying in a randomized field experiment
where subjects are called at home and have a monetary incentive to misreport the outcome
of a privately tossed coin. Similarly, Cohn et al. (2014) show that bankers cheat in a coin-
flip task when they are reminded about their professional identity. However, when such cue
is not emphasized, reported outocmes do not differ from their truthful distribution.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 describes the experimental
design, Section 1.3 presents the main results of the paper, Section 1.4 discusses about the
main findings, and Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Method
1.2.1 Experimental Procedure
The experiment was conducted between November 2017 and July 2019 at EssexLab at
the University of Essex. In total, 249 participants were recruited using hroot (Bock et al.,
2014). Laboratory sessions (twelve in total) lasted about 43 minutes and average total
earnings (inclusive of a £4 show-up fee) were £12.62 (s.d. £4.60). The experiment was
programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007a).
Before the laboratory session, participants acknowledged that the experimental proceedings
were paid after few days (see Figure A.1 in appendix). Any further detail about the payment
procedure was omitted. Subjects entered the lab anonymously and were randomly allocated
to the terminals so that it was impossible to link their identity to a particular workstation.
At the beginning of the experiment each subject was informed that the session consisted
of five parts and a short final questionnaire. Detailed instructions about each part were
displayed on subjects’ screens only upon completion of the previous one (all instructions
are reproduced in Appendix A.1). Where needed, control questions where elicited before
the actual choices were made. Participants were informed that at the end of the experiment
two of the five parts were randomly selected for payment.
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1.2.2 Laboratory Experiment
The laboratory experiment consisted of five different parts, whose order was randomized
at the session level.
Part 1. In the first part of the experiment subjects faced our new so-called mind game
(hereinafter list game).5 The list game consists in a simple decison problem. First, a ran-
dom list of 60 colours names (e.g., Yellow) appears on the computer screen and is displayed
for five seconds only. This ensures that no subject can read all of the colours in the given
time. Before the timer expires, each participant must choose, in their mind, a colour from
the list. After five seconds, the list disappears and three new random lists containing four
colours each are displayed on the screen – e.g., one of the three lists might be White, Beige,
Milk, Plum. Subjects are then asked whether the colour they have in mind appears in one
of the three new lists, each of which is associated with a specific payoff: £1, £3 and £5
respectively. If yes, then they must select the list that contains the colour they thought
of, otherwise they must select the alternative option (“Not in the lists”). Participants who
claim to have found their colour by selecting one of the three lists, earn the correspond-
ing payoff. Instead, subjects who choose the alternative option earn £0. By design, the
colours displayed in the three new lists are never present in the list where subjects actually
choose from. Hence, every positive payoff reported by participants can be classified as a
lie.6 Because the colour choice is made in subject’s mind, individual cheating appears to
be undetectable.7 This is verified via a control question. After the decision on whether to
cheat or not is made, participants answer to the following question:
5Usually, in mind games, subjects have to “predict”, in their mind, the outcome of a random device (e.g.
die-roll). Then, they are asked to report whether their prediction was correct or not. They receive a positive
reward if the answer is yes, zero otherwise. See Jiang (2013), Potters and Stoop (2016) and Kajackaite and
Gneezy (2017) for examples.
6It is unlikely that subjects forget they colour. Even in that case, we would expect participants to random-
ize between the four options but we do not find evidence of this.
7We designed our instructions carefully (see Appendix A.1). Participants are never told neither that the
colours in the three lists are present in the first one, nor otherwise. They simply receive no information on
this matter. Our design is similar in this regard to other laboratory (e.g., Andreoni, 1988; Gächter and Thöni,
2005) and field (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Das et al., 2016) studies that withhold information to
participants.
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“Out of 100 participants, how many do you think successfully choose
a colour in the first list that is also present in one of the three lists?”
Subjects earn an additional £1 if their answer is within five points from the true value – i.e.,
zero. As a consequence, any answer below or equal to five indicates that subjects believe
the colours in the three lists are not present in the first one. Thus, they realize that cheating
could be detected with certainty.8
Part 2. This part consists in a computerized variation of the mind game used in Kajackaite
and Gneezy (2017). Subjects have to roll a virtual five-sided die where each side is associ-
ated to a colour. First, participants must choose one of the five colours in their mind. Then,
the outcome of the die roll is revealed and subjects must report whether the colour they
have in mind corresponds to the actual outcome of the die roll. If the answer is yes they
earn £5, otherwise £0. This task resembles the list game because the decision is made in
subjects’ mind with the difference that cheating cannot be detected at the individual level.
Part 3. In this part subjects are randomly paired and play a dictator game. Each member of
the pair is endowed with £6 and decides how much money to transfer, in steps of £1, to the
other group member. After both decisions are made, one of the two choices is implemented
with equal probability. The dictator game is used as a measure of greed and is elicited as a
proxy for pro-social behaviour.
Part 4. Part four consists in a trust game similar to Burks et al. (2003), where each partic-
ipant knows in advance that they will play both as a sender and as a receiver. Subjects are
randomly paired and after being endowed with £3 they choose whether to send £0, £1, £2
or £3 to their counterpart. Any amount sent is tripled. Without knowing the decision of the
other player, both subjects decide how much to return for any possible transfer they could
receive. After all decisions are made, the computer assigns the roles with equal probabil-
ities and the corresponding decisions are implemented. We measure trust as a control for
8The aim of the question is not to accurately measure subjects’ beliefs. Instead, it represents a rough
measure that verifies whether participants understood lying could be detected and thus, if our new laboratory
task can be interpreted as a mind game. A different and more accurate scoring rule might have emphasized
cheating as the matter of the study undermining subsequent behaviour.
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social preferences. This measure allows us to investigates whether subjects that put more
trust in others (or are more trustworthy) are also less likely to lie.
Part 5. In the last part, risk preferences are elicited using a slightly modified version
of the lottery choice task implemented in Eckel and Grossman (2008). Participants must
choose one out of five virtual boxes. Every box contains two payoffs that are realized
with equal probability (see Table A.1). Starting from a risk free lottery that yields £2,
the expected payoffs of the subsequent lotteries increase so as their variance. Hence, the
higher the expected payoff, the higher the risk. The main advantage of this task resides in its
simplicity and thus, can be easily understood by participants. Nonetheless, it can identify
enough heterogeneity in risk attitudes. It is important to elicit risk attitudes as the decision
to cheat also depends on the risk of being caught lying. Understanding the relation between
individual preferences for honesty and risk attitudes might unveil important insights on
one’s decision to cheat.
Upon completion of the five parts, subjects answer to an incentivized questionnaire col-
lecting socio-demographic information and to a 20-item measure of Big five (Donnellan
et al., 2006). Once participants complete the questionnaire, their own experimental earn-
ings are calculated and displayed on their screen. Subjects are then asked to note their
earnings on a piece of paper (“reminder card”), to fold this into an envelope, and to conceal
their rewards by clicking a button on their screen.9 At this point, participants are the only
ones knowing the amount of money they have earned.10
At the very end of the session, each subject is provided with a paper sheet named “Payment
form” which contains detailed instructions about the payment procedure.11 Note that every
form contains a hidden code that allows it to be associated with the corresponding worksta-
tion.12 Hence, it is possible to uniquely identify behaviour in the lab – but not individual’s
9The role of the “reminder card” is to ensure that subjects do not forget the amount of money they earned
in the experiment.
10Of course earnings where stored in the data, but they could not be linked to a subject’s identity.
11This prevents behaviour in the lab to be affected by the subsequent field task.
12Note that, as in the list game, participants were never told that it was possible to link lab-field choices.
Simply, they received no information on this regard.
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identity – with subsequent choices in the field.
Subjects are then asked to leave the lab without filling in the payment form.
1.2.3 Field Experiment
The field experiment is designed to resemble a variation of the standard payment proce-
dure. Participants are not paid immediately after the laboratory session. Instead, after few
days they can self-report their earnings using the Payment form they were provided with.
Payments are provided, in cash, upon provision of this paper sheet. Subjects are free to
self-report any integer number between the minimum and the maximum possible payoff,
£5 and £26 respectively.13 Thus, there is a monetary incentive to cheat by claiming a higher
payment than the amount of money actually earned in the lab. Note that, at this stage, detec-
tion of lies is not possible. Cheating in the field can only be inferred later on after decoding
each payment form and then, by comparing the self-reported payment with the actual ex-
perimental earnings. Moreover, apart from self-reported earnings and the payment date, no
other personal information is contained on the forms. Hence, it is not possible to link the
Payment forms to individuals’ identities.
We employ two treatment variations so as to investigate possible factors that might
influence cheating outside the laboratory. The first treatment (NoFtF) involves no face-to-
face interaction with the experimenter, resembling the full anonymity condition available in
the lab. In more detail, at the end of the experiment each participant is randomly assigned
to a locker located in a university campus building, and is endowed with the corresponding
key. Subjects must leave the Payment forms, containing their self-reported earnings, into
their assigned locker. The sheets are then collected by the experimenter and replaced with
cash corresponding to the money claimed by subjects. After all payments have been pro-
13The purpose of this interval is twofold: (i) to bound the maximal payoff that a dishonest person could
claim, and (ii) to minimize possible confoundings due to strategic behaviour. For example, a person that earns
£12 in the lab and is tempted to report £15, might question whether this payoff was actually earned by some
other participant. If not, the lie would be caught immediately undermining the decision to cheat. Knowing
that payoffs are bounded and that the subject pool is at least of 100 participants, should minimize this issue.
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vided, participants can then collect their cash earnings.14
In contrast, the second treatment requires participants to meet face-to-face (FtF) with the
experimenter in an office room. Instead of leaving the payment form into a locker, subjects
hand the paper sheet to the experimenter and are paid immediately.15 Besides the personal
interaction, a degree of anonimity is also assured in this phase of the experiment as no
personal information is collected.
1.2.4 Design considerations
The main contribution of this experiment is to allow for individual level observation of
cheating. Moreover, it makes possible to measure both the extensive and intensive margin
of cheating in the lab and in the field.
Despite the fact that the list game and the field tasks differ in their intrinsic nature, the
experimental design still allows to compare behaviour between two similar decision prob-
lems. It is true that the field experiment differs in many aspects from the list game. The
aim of this exercise, however, is to relate a laboratory measure of cheating to dishonesty in
a task that might reflect a real-life situation and thus, not too artificial.
First, it must be noted that both in the lab and in the field participants can only cheat by
commission. This is in contrast with Potters and Stoop (2016) – the study most closest to
our design – where subjects can cheat by just not reporting the payment error to the ex-
perimenter. The difference between cheating by commission and omission might lead to
differences in behaviour indeed. As one might expect, lying by commission is less tempt-
ing when compared to a situation where cheating requires no active choice (Pittarello et al.,
2016).
Another important variable that is kept constant between the two environments is anonymity.
14Upon payment collection, subjects complete the receipt form left in their locker and leave this, along with
the keys, in a separated letterbox along with those of other participants. This procedure allows to maintain
complete anonymity even after subjects are paid for their participation.
15Immediately after a payment is collected, and without supervision, a subject has to complete the receipt
form and leave it in a box along with those of other participants. This procedure guarantees that the payment
forms cannot be linked to participants’ identities afterwards.
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As Gneezy et al. (2018) suggests, the probability of being caught lying highly affects dis-
honesty. In this experiment, despite cheating can be detected at the individual level, sub-
jects’ identity can never be linked to their choices. This feature allows to generate condi-
tions similar to those real-life situations where dishonest actions cannot be associated to
one’s identity, e.g., not returning a lost wallet.16
Finally, the design allows to control for possible confounding variables caused by social
preferences. The consequences that lying might have on other people is known to affect
dishonesty (Gneezy, 2005; Erat and Gneezy, 2012). For this reason, in the lab as well as in
the field, the victim of the lie is always the experimenter.
1.3 Main Results
1.3.1 Laboratory results
The main results presented in this section focus on choices made in the list game and also on
how these correlate with other co-variates elicited in the laboratory. Because the treatment
variation pertains to the field only, laboratory observations are pooled to increase the power
of the analysis.
Figure 1.1 shows the choices made in the list game where each bar represents one of
the options that subjects could choose. The three rightmost bars (£1, £3, £5) represent
the fractions of participants that dishonestly reported to have found the colour they had
in mind in one of the three subsequent lists. Instead, the first column (£0) corresponds
to the percentage of subjects that have been honest in the list game. The figure highlights
significant heterogeneity in lying preferences. In contrast to standard economic predicitons,
41% of the subjects choose to not cheat at all by selecting the option that pays nothing.
Interestingly, although 40% of participants cheat to the maximum extent possible (£5),
a substantial proportion of them forfeits the maximal gains from lying choosing the lists
associated with either the £1 or £3 payoff, 4% and 15% respectively. Hence, dishonest
16As Cohn et al. (2019b) show, returning a wallet is perceived as a civic honest act.
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behaviour seems to be driven by heterogeneity in lying preferences. Some participants are
either always honests or unconditional liars, whilst the remaining subjects fall in between
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Figure 1.1: Proportions for each choice made in the list game. Vertical lines represent 95%
confidence intervals (N=249).
Result 1: The highest fraction of cheaters in the list game report the payoff-maximizing
lie. A significant proportion of liars do not cheat to the maximum extent possible.
Statistical support: When restricting the data to two options, one-sided binomial tests
reject the null hypothesis that these two options occur with probability equal to 0.5.
For the pairs (£1,£3), (£3,£5) and (£1,£5), the conditional probability for the option
with a higher payoff is significantly above 0.5 at 1% level for all pairs.17
Looking at participants’ beliefs, Figure 1.2 presents the answers to the control question
elicited after the list game. This question allows to verify whether participants think their
lies cannot be detected. As the figure shows, only about 6% of the subjects reported a belief
lower or equal to five.18 Thus, almost all of the participants made their decisions as if it
was not possible to detect cheating at the individual level.
One might question whether the new task herein introduced can be related to some
other laboratory measures of cheating that do not allow for individual level observations.
17In detail, N = 48, p< 0.001 for pair (£1,£3), N = 136, p< 0.001 for pair (£3,£5), and N = 110, p< 0.001
for pair (£1,£5).
18We acknowledge that some subjects might have misunderstood the question and reported their belief of
how many participants actually cheated. Because we did not want to emphasize cheating as the matter of the
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Figure 1.2: Beliefs elicited in the control question. Participants earned £1 if their answer was
within 5 points from the correct value (zero). Hence, the vertical dashed line represents the upper
bound for which a subject is thought to believe the colours in the three lists were not present in the
first one. Notably, the highest fraction of answers corresponds to 20. This is consistent with the
belief that the 12 colours in the three lists were randomly drawn, with equal probability, from the
first list containing 60 colours (N=249).
To corroborate our new measure we look at how choices in the list game are correlated with
choices made in the mind game with the die-roll (Part 2). In the latter task the fraction of
positive claims amounts to about 60%, which is very distant from its expected value (20%).
Hence, about 40% of participants cheated in the die-roll task by reporting a “Yes”. If the
two measures are related, then we should expect participants that are dishonest in the list
game to be more likely to report a “Yes” after rolling the die. As can be seen in Figure
1.3, this seems to be the case. Participants who cheat in the list game (right panel), are
more likely to obtain a positive payoff in the other mind game (two-sided Fisher’s exact
test: p = 0.027, N = 225).19 This result is also confirmed in Table 1.1.
As described in Section 1.2, other individual attitudes as risk preferences, individual
greed, and trust were further elicited during the laboratory sessions. Table 1.1 shows how
behaviour in these tasks correlates with cheating. The first three regressions represent
linear average effects on choices in the list game while specifications 4-6, show marginal
effects on a dichotomic variable that takes value one if a subject lied, to some extent,
in the same task. Variable Yes represents the report made in the die-roll game as seen
19Due to a fault of some computers (after playing the list game), in one session choices in the trust game
were not recorded for some subjects. Thus, the observations from that session have been removed when



























Figure 1.3: Correlation between cheating in the list game and choices in the die-roll game. The left
panel represents choices in the latter task for those that have been honest in the list game. The right
panel shows choices in die-roll game for those participants that lied in the list game (N=225).
previously. The variable Risk corresponds to the lottery chosen in Part 5 and can take
integer values starting from one, which corresponds to the safe option, to five, where higher
numbers are associated with higher risk. The two following variables, Transfer dictator and
Transfer trust, correspond to the money sent to the receiver in the dictator and trust game
respectively.20
Similar to what is found in Hübler et al. (2018), it seems that participants who are more
OLS Probit (dy/dx)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Yes (=1) 0.563∗ 0.576∗ 0.574∗ 0.153∗∗ 0.154∗∗ 0.155∗∗
(0.306) (0.299) (0.301) (0.064) (0.063) (0.064)
Risk 0.198∗ 0.181∗ 0.179∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.049∗∗
(0.101) (0.099) (0.101) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Transfer dictator −0.236∗∗ −0.219∗ −0.219∗ −0.028 −0.026 −0.026
(0.115) (0.113) (0.113) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Transfer trust −0.391∗∗ −0.343∗ −0.346∗ −0.091∗∗ −0.085∗∗ −0.085∗∗
(0.189) (0.187) (0.192) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
Constant 1.929∗∗∗ 1.527∗∗∗ 1.560∗∗
(0.560) (0.566) (0.667)
Controls YES YES+ YES++ YES YES+ YES++
Observations 225 225 225 225 225 225
Table 1.1: Cheating in the list game and other laboratory choices.
Note: Specifications 1-3 represent least square estimations on choices made in the list game.
Specifications 4-6 represent marginal effects on a dummy variable indicating whether a subject lied in
the list game or not. Specifications (1) and (4) control whether the list game was played after the other
cheating task involving the virtual die. Specifications (2) and (5) include a dummy for the NoFtF
treatment and regressions (3) and (6) additionally control for gender effects. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
20Table A.2 in Appendix A.2 presents a similar analysis. Instead of using the transfer in the trust game,
the money returned is used as a regressor. This variable is not significant at any conventional statistical level.
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willing to choose risky lotteries are also more likely to lie. As dishonesty highly depends
on the perceived risk of being exposed as a liar (Gneezy et al., 2018), it is reasonable that
individuals more prone to cheat are also more willing to bear the risk associated with it.
Focusing on the variables Transfer dictator and Transfer trust, it is possible to note that both
of them are inversely related with cheating, though the evidence for the dictator game is not
significant in the probability model. This correlation translates into the relation between
social preferences and dishonesty. Participants that are more generous or more trusting
cheat, on average, by a lower amount and less frequently. This suggests that individuals
who value social preferences the most are also those who attribute high value to social
norms or, in this particular case, honesty.
On what concerns how cheating relates to demographic co-variates elicited in the final
questionnaire, no particular effect is found. Tables A.3 and A.4 (Appendix A.2) show no
robust and significant pattern for any of the individual demographics or personality traits.
1.3.2 Field results
In this section, we present results for both the field treatments and their correlation with
laboratory behaviour.21
Because in the payment procedure the maximum amount of money a subject can claim de-
pends on their actual experimental earnings, cheating in the field is standardized as follows
Cheat field =
self-reported earnings− actual earnings
26− actual earnings
21Note that the total number of observations used for the lab-field comparison is lower then the one used
for the laboratory analysis. This is due to the fact that in FtF treatment 15 subjects either forgot to collect
the payment or were not able to participate in the field experiment. In NoFtF instead, because during the
trust game (after playing the list game) some answers were not recorded, participants whose lab payment was
determined by this task, have been removed from the lab-field analysis. Conclusions presented in Section
1.3.1 do not change if these observations are fully removed from the whole analysis.
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Hence, such variable can take values in the interval of [0,1].22 In other words, it measures
how many pounds (£) are over-reported, relative to the maximum amount of money a sub-
ject could claim.
Figure 1.4 presents the results for both field treatments and their relation with choices made
in the list game. The vertical axis measures cheating outside the laboratory as defined in
the previous equation. Thus, any observation above zero represents the extent of cheating
in the field for a particular subject. The horizontal axis, instead, summarizes the choices
made by participants in the laboratory. Thus, from this graph it is possible to relate both the
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Figure 1.4: Comparison of cheating between the lab and the field for the NoFtF (left panel, n=123)
and FtF (right panel, n=103) treatments with weighted markers. The smallest circles represent one
single participant. The y-axis indicates the extent of cheating in the field. The x-axis represents the
choices made in the list game.
As the figure shows, the data do not support generalizability of laboratory results on
cheating in either of the two field variations. First, in both cases, most of the participants
refrain from over-reporting their experimental earnings. The percentage of cheaters drops
from about 66% (54%) in the lab, to slightly below than 19% (5%) in the field in the NoFtF
(FtF) treatment.23 As expected, in the field variation with a weaker degree of anonymity
22Actual lab earnings range between £5 and £19 included. Thus, the variable Cheat field is always defined.
Further, no subject under-reported their earnings. On average, subjects actually earned £11.84 (SD 3.35) and
£11.86 (SD 3.47) in the NoFtF and FtF treatments respectively. A Mann-Whitney U test does not reject the
hypothesis of equality (p = 0.897,N = 226).
23Similar to this result, Gerlach et al. (2019) show in a meta-analysis that dishonesty is significantly more
prevalent in lab experiments than in field studies.
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(FtF), the fraction of participants that do cheat is significantly lower (two-sided Fisher’s
exact test: N = 226, p = 0.002). The face-to-face interaction appears to trigger higher
costs associated with lying and thus, to reduce dishonest behaviour. A similar result is also
found in Conrads and Lotz (2015).
Moreover, it appears there is no significant difference on the extent of cheating in the field
between who cheated in the list game and those who did not. The mean value of Cheat field
is 0.59 for both honest and dishonest participants in the NoFtF treatment. In the FtF varia-
tion this value is 0.37 and 0.69 for honests and cheaters respectively but the low number of
observations does not allow to make any reliable inference.
OLS Probit (dy/dx)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
list game:
1£ −0.035 −0.036 −0.040
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
3£ −0.023 −0.020 −0.020
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
5£ 0.040 0.044 0.043
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
Cheater (= 1) 0.018 0.028 0.023
(0.047) (0.050) (0.050)
Risk 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.011 0.012 0.009
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Transfer dictator 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.028 0.028 0.029
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Transfer trust −0.036∗∗ −0.036∗∗ −0.039∗∗ −0.060∗∗ −0.060∗∗ −0.064∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Constant −0.004 0.015 0.037
(0.051) (0.060) (0.062)
Controls YES YES+ YES++ YES YES+ YES++
Observations 209 209 209 209 209 209
Table 1.2: Laboratory behaviour and cheating in the field with Cheat field as a
dependent variable.
Note: Specifications 1-3 represent least square estimations on the variable Cheat field. Dummies 1£, 3£,
and 5£ represent choices made in the list game (honests are the excluded category). Specifications 4-6
represent marginal effects of cheating in the list game on a dummy variable indicating whether a subject
lied in the field or not. Specifications (1) and (4) include a dummy for the NoFtF treatment, regressions
(2) and (5) further control for actual laboratory earnings and, specifications (3) and (6) additionally
control for gender effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Result 2: There is no significant correlation of cheating betweeen choices in the list game
and in the field.
Statistical support: Cheaters in the lab are not more likely to cheat in the field in both
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treatment variations (two-sided Fisher’s exact test: N = 123, p= 0.809 (NoFtF); N =
103, p = 1.000 (FtF)). The Spearman correlation between choices in the list game
and Cheat field is 0.04 and 0.08 in NoFtF and FtF respectively, and not statistically
significant in either of the two field variations (two-sided test: N = 123, p = 0.658
(NoFtF); N = 103, p = 0.375 (FtF)).
Table 1.2 confirms the results.24 Interestingly, if the above analysis is replicated using
choices in the die-roll task, hence not individual level observations of cheating, different
conclusions are reached. Labelling as cheaters all subjects that answered “Yes” in this
task, we find a weakly significant correlation of cheating in the NoFtF treatment. Partici-
pants who answer “Yes” are more likely to cheat in the field (two-sided Fisher’s exact test:
N = 123, p = 0.088). Furthermore, the Spearman correlation coefficient between Cheat
field and Yes is 0.16 and weakly significant (two-sided test: N = 123, p = 0.070).25 These
numbers are distant from the ones shown in Result 2, and might lead to the opposite con-
clusion.
Hence, individual level observations of cheating appear to be of paramount importance in
understanding such secretive and subtle behaviour. These type of data might then provide
new insights that cannot be inferred using aggregate statistics.
1.4 Discussion
Dishonesty can be very sensitive to personal factors (Rosenbaum et al., 2014; Jacobsen
et al., 2018), and this in turn translates into heterogeneity in lying preferences (Gibson
et al., 2013). The data show that cheating within and across the two environments is sen-
sitive to individual preferences. Moreover, while in the list game both risk and social pref-
erences are correlated with individual dishonesty (Table 1.1), this seems not to be the case
for cheating in the field. Table A.6 and Table 1.2 (Appendix A.2) show that only choices
24A similar analysis is carried out in Table A.5 (Appendix A.2). The OLS estimates are generated using
the amount of over-reported money as a dependent variable and draw the same conclusions.
25In the FtF, obviously, these two variables do not correlate. The Fisher’s exact test delivers p = 0.649
while the Spearman correlation coefficient is 0.08 with p = 0.417, N = 103.
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in the trust game are significantly correlated with dishonesty in the payment procedure.
Apart from heterogeneity in preferences, differences in dishonest behaviour might also
hinge on the experimental paradigm (Gerlach et al., 2019). For example, while Gächter and
Schulz (2016) find a positive correlation between the corruption index on the country level
and reports in die-roll tasks, such effect is not found using coin-flip tasks (Pascual-Ezama
et al., 2015). Hence, another possible source of variability in cheating can be generated by
differences between the laboratory and the field tasks.
First, it should be noted that, although in the lab all decisions are computerized, the self-
reporting procedure adopted in the field requires participants to lie to the experimenter.
Cohn et al. (2019a) indeed find that interacting with a human induces significantly less
cheating when compared to interacting with a machine. Hence, this difference in the com-
munication channel might concur in explaining the results presented in Section 1.3. How-
ever, the data cannot explain why subjects that have been either honest or dishonest in the
list game, are equally likely to lie and to cheat to the same extent (on average), in the field.
Hence, the communication channel, per se, does not seem to fully explain the main find-
ings.
Another difference between the lab and field tasks might rest on the moral costs associated
with cheating. While participants can lie about a random event in the list game, the self-
reporting procedure forces them to cheat in the field by claiming a higher payment, i.e.,
by “stealing” money. In the latter case, it is possible that cheating triggers higher moral
costs compared to lying about an artificial outcome, and this would result in more honest
reports. Hermann and Mußhoff (2019) indeed find that individuals are less willing to steal
than lying in a die-roll experiment. Hence, higher moral costs implied by stealing would
partially explain the low number of subjects that over-reported their experimental earnings.
However, this effect alone cannot fully explain the lack of correlation between the lab and
the field presented in Result 2.
It is also possible that differences in dishonest behaviour depend on the time available to
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make a decision. While in the laboratory choices are made within few minutes, in the field
this is not the case. Subjects can spend few days to think on whether to claim a higher pay-
ment or not. If reflecting more time on the possibility to lie reduces dishonest behaviour,
this might explain why only few subjects lied in the field. To the best of my knowledge,
only Andersen et al. (2018) study the effect of time on cheating within the die-roll paradigm
and find no difference in dishonesty when participants are given an extra day to decide. In
light of this finding, it seems unlikely for Result 2 to be driven by the difference in the time
available to make the decision.
Apart from individual preferences for honesty or differences between experimental paradigms,
another explanation for Result 2 might rest on the experimental design as a whole.
As the reader might have noted, one’s willingness to claim a higher payment could depend
on their actual laboratory choices. Subjects who cheat in the list game are more likely to
obtain higher earnings and in turn, they might refrain from self-reporting a higher payment
because of an income effect. By a similar argument, participants that remain honest in the
lab might be more tempted to cheat in the field due to the higher stakes involved. Thus,
we should expect a negative relation between laboratory earnings and over-reporting in the
payment procedure.26 Althought only two randomly drawn parts where used to determine
each subject’s payment, if the argument above is true, it could explain why no correlation
is found between the two environments.
However, field behaviour seems to not depend on actual laboratory earnings. The coef-
ficient of actual laboratory earnings in Table A.6 and Table 1.2 (Appendix A.2) is not
statistically significant at any conventional level. Although cheaters in the list game have
actually earned, on average, £2.8 (£1.3) more than honests participants in the NoFtF (FtF)
treatment, these differences are relatively small. Therefore, the relative difference in po-
tential gains from over-reporting between honests and liars is little. Moreover, two recent
26Moral licensing or conscious accounting might generate the same effect but are less likely to play a
role in explaining the main results. First, their effect might have been washed out by the dictator and the
trust games. Second, the correlation found between the list game and the dice game works in the opposite
direction.
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meta-analysis find a weak (if none) effect of rewards on dishonesty (Abeler et al., 2019;
Gerlach et al., 2019). Hence, although the lab and field tasks are not perfectly independent,
income effect and stakes size do not seem to explain results found in Section 1.3.2.
This section examined some factors that might have concurred in determining Result 2.
Although some of them can partially account for the main findings, none of them, alone,
can fully explain the lack of correlation of cheating presented in this study.
1.5 Conclusions
Even though laboratory experiments on cheating abound in the economic literature, only
few studies explore their generalizability to the field. This paper aims to relate a labora-
tory measure of cheating with dishonesty in a non-controlled environment within the same
population. To this purpose, we provide a laboratory experiment that employs a new mea-
sure of cheating. As a main novelty, this task allows for individual level observations of
cheating. Behaviour in the lab, is then compared to choices in the field, where subjects
have the possibility to cheat by over-reporting their experimental earnings. Payments are
not issued immediately after the laboratory experiment. Instead, after few days participants
are allowed to self-report their earnings to the experimenter. Subjects are paid according to
the amount of money they claim to have earned in the laboratory.
As shown by the laboratory data, established results as lying aversion and non-payoff-
maximizing lies are replicated. However, no correlation of cheating between the lab and
the field is observed. While more than half of the subjects cheat to some extent in the labo-
ratory, most of the participants truthfully report their experimental earnings. Moreover, we
find no difference in the extent of cheating in the field between those who are honest in the
lab and those who are not.
Although it is not possible to pinpoint the drivers of these results, it appears that only an
interaction between individual preferences and contextual factors can account for the dif-
ference in cheating between the lab and the field.
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Toghether, the findings of this study underline the importance to be very cautious when




Benchmarking Information Aggregation in Experimental Markets
2.1 Introduction
One of the properties of efficient markets that economists have been most fascinated by
is their ability to aggregate private information held by market participants which is re-
vealed in prices. Sometimes markets are even created with the sole purpose of aggregating
information. Such prediction markets have been shown to outperform opinion polls in pre-
dicting the outcome of elections (Forsythe et al., 1992; Berg et al., 2008), expert forecasts
in sports (Spann and Skiera, 2009), or sales forecasts in business (Plott and Chen, 2002). In
other contexts, however, like in financial markets, the evidence on successful information
aggregation is more mixed. While early empirical literature found support for the efficient
market hypothesis (Fama, 1965, 1970; Scholes, 1972), subsequent research produced op-
posite evidence (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Ito et al., 1998).
These mixed results extend to lab experimental studies where some have found evidence of
“good” information aggregation (Plott and Sunder, 1988; Forsythe and Lundholm, 1990;
Forsythe et al., 1992; Camerer and Weigelt, 1991) and some evidence of substantial diver-
gence between market prices and underlying fundamentals (O’Brien and Srivastava, 1991;
Corgnet et al., 2018; Page and Siemroth, 2018; Corgnet et al., 2019). One difficulty in
understanding how well markets aggregate information is that there is no natural alterna-
tive institution to which we can compare the market’s performance. Our paper attempts to
provide one such benchmark.
To this purpose we design a lab experiment where we randomly assign subjects to
different artificial institutional environments.1 In treatments with market interaction (the
market treatments) two assets are in parallel traded via a call auction mechanism (Plott and
1Using a lab experiment allows us to determine exactly the relevant public and private information held
by traders and to assess to what extent, all information is embodied in market prices. It also allows us to
compare our results to existing evidence in directly comparable markets.
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Smith, 2008a). In the non-market treatments we remove the strategic interaction among
traders. Here, prices of assets are determined via a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (hereafter
BDM) mechanism (Becker et al., 1964). Both institutional environments are tested under
two information conditions. Treatments with public information present no information
aggregation problem, while in their counterparts information about asset returns is private.
All treatments are designed in such a way that the information available to participants
across the market and non-market variations is exactly identical. The only difference is
how prices are determined.
We assess information aggregation using two measures. First, we ask whether first-
order stochastic dominance of assets is reflected in the way assets are ranked by their
prices. This is a minimal measure of correct aggregation. Second, we compare prices in
the treatments with private information to prices in treatments that have public information
about asset returns, but are otherwise identical. If information aggregation is perfect, then
prices under the private and public information treatments should be the same. Further,
any difference between the two institutions (market and non-market) that is not related to
information aggregation should appear in the public information treatments as well. This
differences-in-differences design hence allows us to cleanly identify differences in infor-
mation aggregation across the two institutions.
The market and the BDM mechanism rank assets correctly with 95% and 93% probabil-
ity, respectively, under public information and with 65% and 73% probability, respectively,
under private information. Neither of these differences between institutions are statistically
different. However, with respect to our second measure we find that markets do signifi-
cantly worse compared to the non-market institution.2 Prices are further away from the
public information benchmark in the market compared to the BDM mechanism. Hence,
across the two measures, we find that information aggregation is worse in the market than
2We do not find differences in asset prices between the market and the non-market institution in the case
of public information, which is in line with Crockett et al. (2020) where behaviour is found to be invariant to
prices being form exogenous or endogenous.
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in our non-market benchmark.
We then explore several factors that could explain these results and find that the differ-
ence is driven by price-insensitive traders who seem unable to learn from market prices.
Because of this we assume they perceive a wedge between their subjective beliefs and the
market price, which they cannot rationalize by their priors.3 As the fictitious market price
(labelled “group value”) is purely informational and not directly payoff relevant under the
BDM mechanism, it seems intuitive that such traders would ignore it and simply follow
their subjective beliefs. In the market by contrast, the price is harder to ignore (as it has
to be paid) and the wedge between the price and the subjective prior would then lead par-
ticipants to perceive ambiguity and to act accordingly. This is what worsens the market’s
performance in terms of information aggregation. We also show that, in contrast to price-
insensitive traders, price-sensitive traders learn equally well in the market as they do under
the BDM mechanism.
Our research contributes to a long tradition of experimental research on information
aggregation in markets dating back to the 1980s. Plott and Sunder (1982) studied five
experimental markets and found that in all but one prices promptly adjusted to near their
rational-expectation values. Similar results are found in Friedman et al. (1984). Plott and
Sunder (1988) studied the information aggregation properties of an oral double-auction
where, in contrast to the previous literature, the state of nature is unknown to every trader.
They found that in markets where only one asset is traded the rational expectations (RE)
model performs poorly. In contrast, in markets with uniform dividends among traders or
with a complete set of state-contingent assets, the RE model outperforms other compet-
ing models in predicting market prices. Recently, though, Corgnet et al. (2019) failed to
replicate the results by Plott and Sunder (1988).
Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) investigated the role of trading experience and common
3While we do not directly elicit neither priors nor posteriors from traders and hence cannot prove this
point, it seems very unlikely to us that a trader whose bids and asks do not react to the market price would
be making inference on the return distribution from the price. As the price changes over time there must be a
wedge between fixed priors and the changing price.
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knowledge of the set of payoffs. They found that both conditions are jointly, but not sep-
arately, sufficient for prices to converge to the RE equilibrium. Similar results are found
in Copeland and Friedman (1991) where traders receive information either sequentially or
simultaneously in a computerized double-auction. While a model of partial revelation of
information better predicts the allocation of assets in their study, market prices are consis-
tent with the RE predictions. O’Brien and Srivastava (1991) analyze more complex markets
with experienced traders and without common knowledge about the distribution of private
information. In contrast to the results from simpler environments, it is found that markets
are on average inefficient in aggregating all the available information.4 In a meta-study on
experimental double auctions Page and Siemroth (2018) find that while publicly announced
information tends to be well reflected in prices, this is not the case for private information.
There are also some experimental studies on prediction markets. Healy et al. (2010) test
the performance of double-auction prediction markets for different information structures.
Although the double-auction market, when compared with other mechanisms, performs rel-
atively well with a simple information structure, it performs the worst when the information
structure becomes more complex. Ledyard et al. (2009) report that double-auction markets
do not always generate more accurate predictions than other mechanisms (see also Hanson
et al. (2006)). Page and Siemroth (2017) conduct a prediction market experiment with the
possibility of information acquisition and conclude that bidders tendency to over-acquire
information might be part of the explanation why prediction markets tend to aggregate
information well.
The main difference between our work and existing literature is how market perfor-
mance is assessed. Previous literature studied markets in isolation and contrasted out-
comes to theoretical predictions. This approach has the downside that when theoretical
4Plott et al. (2003) study the ability of parimutuel betting systems in aggregating information under two
specific environments. The difference lies on the “precision” of the private information hence, on the diffi-
culty to learn the state of the world. While the simpler environment advocates for the RE equilibrium, in the
more complex situation the most accurate model predicts that individuals decide according to their private
information.
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predictions and market outcomes differ, it is not clear whether this difference is due to the
market failing to aggregate information or to the model using the “wrong” assumptions on
(e.g. risk) preferences. Even if the difference between theory and empirical outcomes can
be unambiguously attributed to an information aggregation failure, it is usually not pos-
sible to assess the extent of failure, as there are no natural benchmarks to assess whether
a mis-pricing is “small” or “large”. In our paper, by contrast, we benchmark information
aggregation in markets against a comparable non-market institution. This approach allows
us to net out the effect of market interaction and to obtain a benchmark against which to
assess the quantitative importance of deviations from perfect aggregation.
To our knowledge there is only one previous paper comparing the Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak mechanism with a market institution, albeit in a different context. Bohm et al.
(1997) examine the sensitivity of the BDM mechanism to the choice of the upper bound
of the randomly generated price and thus, its ability of eliciting reservation prices. They
report that when the upper bound is close to an expected real maximum buying price, the
BDM mechanism generates individual evaluations comparable to a double-auction market.
The experimental market they use is, however, designed such that traders are unable to
influence transaction prices. Unlike us and the literature cited above Bohm et al. (1997) are
not interested in aggregation of private information in the market.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2.1 we describe the experimental design.
Section 2.3 contains our main results, Section 2.4 provides a discussion of mechanisms and
Section 2.5 concludes. Experimental instructions, information about the sample as well as
additional tables and figures can be found in Appendix B.
2.2 Experimental Design
2.2.1 Method
In all treatments of our experiment, groups of five participants trade two separate assets for
three repetitions of ten trading periods each. Starting out with one unit of each asset at the
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beginning of every trading period, participants independently and simultaneously submit
buying and selling prices – i.e., participants indicate for each asset the prices at which they
are willing to sell their unit and they are willing to buy an additional unit. Both assets have
a return of either 50, 100 or 150 and the probability distributions over these three outcomes
are 3/5, 1/5 and 1/5 for one asset (asset L) and 1/5, 1/5 and 3/5 for the other one (asset H)
respectively. Thus, asset H first-order stochastically dominates asset L. Having two assets
allows us to focus on differences in how these two assets are valued on market level and
to test whether they are correctly ranked according to the market price (i.e., whether the
stochastic dominance relation is reflected in the ranking).
Our experiment consists of a 2× 2× 2 between-subjects design, and each participant
is exposed to only one of the eight different treatments as summarised in Table 2.1. Treat-
ments differ according to (i) whether assets are traded in a market or not, (ii) whether there
is public or private information, and (iii) whether feedback on individual bids and asks
is provided via order books. We continue with a detailed description of these treatment
dimensions and variations.
Information condition Public information Private information
Institution BDM Market BDM Market
Bid–Ask without Pub–BDM–NoBAF Pub–Mkt–NoBAF Priv–BDM–NoBAF Priv–Mkt–NoBAF
feedback with Pub–BDM–BAF Pub–Mkt–BAF Priv–BDM–BAF Priv–Mkt–BAF
Table 2.1: Overview of treatments.
Institution (Market vs. BDM).
In order to isolate the effect of market incentives and analyse their implication on informa-
tion aggregation, we implement two different institutional environments. Both have equal
decision frameworks and information conditions. They only differ whether participants
interact via a market mechanism.
In treatments with market interaction (Market), participants trade via a call auction
mechanism (Plott and Smith, 2008b). Assets are traded every time some participant’s buy-
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ing price is above another participant’s selling price. The market price of each asset is
determined to allow all possible simultaneous trades of this asset and is made public after
every trading period. If market clearing can be achieved with a range of prices, then the
midpoint of this range is adopted as the market price (see Appendix B.1 for further details).
In case trade is not feasible – that is, when the lowest selling price is above the highest
buying price – every participant keeps her initial stocks endowment and no market price is
determined.
In treatments without market interaction, participants buy and sell assets via a Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak mechanism (BDM). Every trading period, transactions are determined
according to a price that is a randomly drawn number from an uniform distribution between
50 and 150. Participants with a buying price above this number purchase a stock unit while
those with a selling price below the random number sell their asset. Hence, in the BDM
treatments individual trades do not depend on market prices that result from aggregated
buying and selling prices. In order to make the two institutional environments compara-
ble in the information made available to the participants, a simulated hypothetical market
price (determined from bids and asks in the same way as the market price in the Market
treatment), labelled group value, is communicated after each trading period. This treatment
variation allows us to compare the behaviour induced by the double-auction market with an
institution where strategic interactions are absent but which is informationally equivalent
to the market setting.
Information condition (Public vs. Private information).
We further vary the information available to participants. In the Public information treat-
ments, all participants are publicly informed about both assets’ probability distributions
over return values. Hence, there is no information aggregation problem. By contrast, in
the Private information treatments, participants receive for each asset a private signal that
provides a hint about the assets’ probability distributions over return values. Signals are
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chosen in such a manner that perfect information (on which asset leads to higher expected
returns) is available at the group level.
At the beginning of each repetition participants received two signals: one for each asset.
In some repetitions the distribution of signals over participants was according to
ρ1 = {(150,50),(50,150),(100,50),(150,50),(150,100)},
in other repetitions according to
ρ2 = {(150,50),(50,100),(100,150),(150,50),(150,50)}.
For instance, if the set of signals was ρ2, there would be three participants who would
receive the signal (150,50) (that is, signal 150 for asset H and signal 50 for asset L); one
participant would receive the signal (50,100) and one participant the signal (100,150).
These two signal distributions were carefully designed in order to have some, but not
all, participants start out with signals that are in agreement with the true ranking. They
ensure that private information needs to be aggregated in order for the market to price
correctly, but also that all information relevant to a correct pricing was available on market
level. For instance, for the first asset (in this case asset H), three participants see the value
150, one the value 100 and one the value 50, which perfectly reflects the (3/5,1/5,1/5)
probability distribution.
Participants did not know the signal distributions, so that the information on their sig-
nals would not reveal any information on the signals that others received. Use of the two
signal distributions was varied across repetitions and groups (see Table B.2 for details).
Comparing prices between the Public information and Private information variations
allows us to cleanly identify differences in information aggregation across the institutions,
as any difference between the two institutions that is not related to information aggregation
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should appear in the Public information treatments as well.5
Bid-Ask feedback (with or without).
Our last treatment variation concerns the feedback given to participants after each trading
period. In the first variation (without Bid-Ask feedback), participants can only exploit their
private information about asset prices in order to unveil the state of nature. This setting
mirrors markets in which little information about other traders’ choices and outcomes are
provided and the only available information are the market prices. Under the second feed-
back variation (with Bid-Ask feedback), participants further observe other traders’ bids and
asks (after the trading period). This type of markets resembles more transparent markets
where other traders’ outcomes and information can be inferred from their behaviour. These
two variations allow for comparisons of market and non-market settings in more and less
information-rich environments. They also manipulate the salience of social comparisons,
which is one potential channel through which markets could differentially affect bidding
behaviour.
Procedures.
The experiments were conducted in the experimental laboratory at Maastricht University
between March 2014 and February 2017.6 In total, we recruited 320 undergraduate stu-
dents to participate in the experiment using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Students were evenly
allocated over treatments, such that we have 40 students participating in each of the eight
treatments. Table B.3 provides basic randomisation checks and shows that treatments were
balanced with respect to key variables.
For each treatment, we collected buying and asking prices over three repetitions of ten
trading periods using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007b). Since the participants were operating in
5The impact of information being public or private is also addressed in some of the experimental common-
value auction literature (Brocas et al., 2015; Grosskopf et al., 2018), though there are many differences
between these and our settings.
6We conducted the private information sessions in 2014 and the public information sessions between late
2016 and early 2017.
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fixed groups of five, this gives us eight independent observations per treatment. In order to
avoid income effects and eliminating hedging opportunities between the two markets, final
payments in the experiment were based on the earnings in one randomly chosen market
in one randomly chosen trading period. Since participants were not given a cash budget
during the trading phase, in the event that a trader made a loss on trade (resulting from
buying an asset for a price that exceeded the drawn return value), this loss was covered by
the show-up fee.7
In a post-experimental questionnaire, we elicited information on participants’ charac-
teristics and personalities (see Appendix B.2). A typical session lasted about two hours and
average earnings were about 16.06 Euros, including a 5 Euros show-up fee.
2.2.2 Theoretical Predictions
Before we discuss the results we briefly describe the theoretical predictions concerning
information aggregation properties of our setting. While the purpose of the experiment is
not to test these predictions, it can be useful to have them in mind as a benchmark for how
information aggregation might work in theory in this setting. It is well known that double
auctions with sufficiently many buyers and sellers, who can bid using a sufficiently fine
discrete set of prices, do have an equilibrium that is arbitrarily close to the fully revealing
rational expectations equilibrium (Reny and Perry, 2006). Our setting does not quite fit this
well studied case, but it is easy to show that also in our environment the state of nature is
eventually revealed by the equilibrium price.

















































, i = H,L.
7Hence, technically, the show-up served as an endowment; though, this was not explicitly presented as
such to the participants.
8In Appendix B.3 we derive predictions for the case where agents consider a more general state space and
in particular where they deem it possible that probabilities are defined on a grid finer than 15 .
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Hence, consistent with the assets in our experiment, states are probability distributions over
the three return values 50, 100 and 150.
We focus on the Market treatment with Private information and without bid-ask feed-
back for signal distribution ρ1. Assume agents are risk-neutral and have prior beliefs uni-
formly distributed on all the states contained in Ω.9 It is straightforward to show (Ap-
pendix B.3) that the agent with signal (50,150) will have posterior beliefs that imply an
expected value of 95 for asset H and 105 for asset L, with these values reversed for the
two agents with signal (150,50). The agent with signal (100,50) will have an expected
value for asset H of 100 and an expected value for asset L of 95 and the agents with signal
(150,100) will have an expected value of 105 and 100 for asset H and L respectively. In
the first trading period the ordered bids for asset H will be (105,105,105,100,95) and the
ordered asks will be (95,100,105,105,105), which means that asset H will trade at a price
of 105 (below its expected value of 120). Analogously, asset L will trade at a price of 95,
above its expected value of 80. From these prices agents recognize that at least three agents
have received a signal of 150 for asset H and a signal of 50 for asset L. Thus all private
information will be revealed already in the first period. Under these theoretical assump-
tions, hence, information aggregation is relatively straightforward in our setting and prices
should reflect all private information early on in the experiment.10 We consider a more
general setting in Appendix B.3.1 and a case where traders are strategic in Appendix B.3.2.
2.3 Main Results
The main results presented in this section are focused on comparing how well markets
aggregate information compared to an institution which shares all the same features in
terms of outcomes and information flows, except for the fact that trade is not bilateral (our
9Note that in the experiment we did not provide a prior to participants.
10Under the more general setting presented in Appendix B.3, we find that more than one period of trading
is needed to reveal all private information, but that one period is sufficient for all agents to learn to rank the
assets correctly. Further, note that this results is not particular to the chosen signal distribution ρ1, and would




Figure 2.1 shows the average market prices over time for both assets and both insti-
tutional environments under the two information treatments. Both assets are on average
priced below their expected values (120 and 80 for asset H and L respectively) in the Pub-
lic information treatment where there is no information aggregation problem, and there
does not seem to be a substantial difference between BDM and Market in this information
condition. Under Private information prices differ from their Public information counter-
parts in both treatments. Note first that in both the BDM and the Market treatment, the
prices of the two assets move closer together than when returns are public information.
This is intuitive, since under Private information there is ambiguity regarding the identity
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Figure 2.1: Average prices of both assets by institution.
Note: Treatments are pooled with respect to the bid-ask feedback dimension. All observations from all markets and groups
are included as long as trade was feasible and a market price (group value) determined. The solid and dashed lines represent
stock prices in Public information and Private information treatments respectively. The left panel shows fictitious prices
under the BDM mechanism (group value) and the right panel Market prices.
More specifically, in the BDM treatments asset H is underpriced compared to the public
information case, while the opposite holds for asset L. In the Market treatments both assets
are substantially undervalued and the difference to the public information case seems bigger
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than it is in the BDM treatments. Note also that prices don’t start lower in the Market
treatments compared to the BDM. Hence these lower prices are learned. This suggests that
market interaction is detrimental for information aggregation. We will now investigate this
possibility more formally.
In our statistical analysis, we will use two measures of information aggregation. The
first measure (Correct Ranking) examines whether assets H and L are ranked correctly by
market prices. This is a weak measure of information aggregation simply asking whether
the stochastic dominance relation between assets is correctly reflected by how their mar-
ket prices are ranked. Our second measure (Perfect Aggregation) is more ambitious and
compares, for each institution, asset prices in the Private information treatments with their
counterparts in the Public information treatments where there is no information aggregation
problem. If stock prices under private information are the same as under public informa-
tion, then all private information is revealed in the price. If markets successfully aggregate
information, we should find no differences between the public information and private in-
formation conditions using either of these measures. As in Figure 2.1 we pool data from
the variations with and without bid/ask feedback. Appendices B.4 and B.5 contain tables
and figures where we split them out.
Correct Ranking.
We start with the less demanding measure of information aggregation (Correct Ranking),
which asks how frequently the price for asset H exceeds the price for asset L. Table 2.2
shows results from LPM and Probit estimates of the probability that assets are correctly
ranked depending on our treatment dimensions:
Pr(pH >pL)it = α +β Private infoi + γ Marketi +δ Private infoi×Marketi +Xit + εit ,
(2.1)
where Pr(pH > pL)it is the probability that the market price of asset H exceeds that of asset
L in group i in period t, Private info is a dummy for the treatments with private information
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and Market is a dummy variable for the Market treatments. Xit represents other covariates
such as the signal distribution (ρ1) or the repetition.
LPM Probit (dy/dx)
Prob(Price H > Price L) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.933∗∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗ 0.910∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.034)
Private info (β ) −0.204∗∗∗ −0.237∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗∗ −0.258∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.067) (0.066) (0.063) (0.067) (0.066)
Market (γ) 0.018 0.017 0.023 0.086 0.086 0.093
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.086) (0.086) (0.085)
Private info×Market (δ ) −0.101 −0.099 −0.101 −0.136 −0.133 −0.135
(0.082) (0.117) (0.117) (0.100) (0.113) (0.112)
ρ1 0.069 0.073 0.048 0.061
(0.106) (0.101) (0.074) (0.066)
ρ1×Market −0.007 −0.015 −0.008 −0.021
(0.162) (0.159) (0.110) (0.105)
Repetition 1 0.101∗∗ 0.103∗∗
(0.045) (0.047)
Repetition 2 −0.035 −0.032
(0.049) (0.044)
β +δ −0.305 −0.336 −0.337 −0.372 −0.389 −0.393
p-value test β +δ = 0 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value test |β +δ | ≤ |β | 0.109 0.200 0.194 0.088 0.119 0.113
γ +δ −0.084 −0.081 −0.078 −0.050 −0.047 −0.042
p-value test γ +δ = 0 0.219 0.451 0.468 0.322 0.512 0.554
Observations 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572
Table 2.2: Correct ranking.
Note: LPM (columns (1)-(3)) and probit (columns (4)-(6)) estimates of equation (2.1). Robust standard errors
(clustered at the group level) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The smaller number of
observations is due to the fact that in some rounds at most one asset is traded, such that a price is not properly
specified for at least one of the assets.
The Market and the BDM mechanism rank assets correctly with 95% and 93% probabil-
ity, respectively, under public information and with 65% and 73% probability, respectively,
under private information. We find no significant difference between the two institutions
in the likelihood of ranking assets correctly under Public information: the coefficient γ is
small and not statistically significant in any of the specifications. This result persists also
under Private information. While in both the BDM and the Market private information
decreases the probability to rank correctly – the coefficients β and β + δ are significantly
negative (p < 0.01) –, we find no difference between the two institutions according to this
criterion: the coefficient γ +δ , although negative, is never significantly different from zero
(p > 0.219). This result is robust when we control for additional covariates (columns (2),
(3), (5) and (6)) and is true under both bid-ask feedback variations (see Table B.4).
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Result 1 (Correct Ranking): There is no significant difference between the Market and the
BDM mechanism in terms of the likelihood that assets are ranked correctly.
Perfect Aggregation.
Next, we turn to the more ambitious measure to examine information aggregation. We
estimate for each asset the following model:
MPit = α +β Private infoi + γ Marketi +δ Private infoi×Marketi +Xit + εit , (2.2)
where MPit is the market price in group i in period t, and other variables as introduced
earlier. Table 2.3 reports the results.
Price asset H Price asset L
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 98.328∗∗∗ 98.328∗∗∗ 96.472∗∗∗ 75.834∗∗∗ 75.833∗∗∗ 74.419∗∗∗
(2.676) (2.677) (2.824) (1.514) (1.515) (1.580)
Private info (β ) −8.130∗∗ −9.558∗∗∗ −9.556∗∗∗ 5.634∗∗ 5.641∗ 5.638∗
(3.346) (3.684) (3.550) (2.809) (3.108) (2.976)
Market (γ) 6.369 6.369 6.407 −2.355 −2.356 −2.389
(4.292) (4.295) (4.268) (2.450) (2.451) (2.434)
Private info×Market (δ ) −21.359∗∗∗ −20.683∗∗∗ −20.727∗∗∗ −14.738∗∗∗ −14.615∗∗∗ −14.605∗∗∗
(5.576) (5.878) (5.720) (4.227) (4.782) (4.730)
ρ1 2.783 3.013 −0.010 −0.052
(2.641) (2.457) (2.050) (1.853)
ρ1×Market −1.293 −1.581 −0.246 −0.158
(4.274) (3.986) (2.941) (2.746)
Repetition 1 5.999∗∗∗ 1.549
(1.771) (1.162)
Repetition 2 −0.246 2.719∗∗
(1.225) (1.061)
β +δ −29.489 −30.241 −30.283 −9.104 −8.974 −8.967
p-value test β +δ = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.014 0.015
p-value test |β +δ | ≤ |β | 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.206 0.243 0.241
γ +δ −14.990 −14.314 −14.319 −17.093 −16.971 −16.993
p-value test γ +δ = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 1761 1761 1761 1653 1653 1653
Table 2.3: Perfect aggregation.
Note: GLS regression of equation (2.2). Robust standard errors (clustered at the group level) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
In the absence of an aggregation problem (Public information treatments), prices of
both assets are below their expected values. The intercept, representing BDM treatments
under Public information, in columns (1) and (4) is around 98 and 76 for assets H and
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L respectively. The coefficient γ , which measures the impact of market interactions under
public information, is never statistically different from zero at any conventional significance
level. This implies that we find no statistical difference, in terms of asset prices, between
the two institutions when there is no aggregation problem.
Turning the analysis to the Private information treatments, neither the BDM nor the
Market aggregate information perfectly. The coefficients β and β + δ , representing the
effect of private information in the BDM and Market institutions, respectively, are both
significantly different from zero in all specifications. Prices under private information are,
hence, different from prices under public information. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, while
private information induces a decrease in prices for asset H and an increase for asset L in
BDM (β ), in the Market treatments both assets are undervalued: the coefficient β + δ is
significantly negative in all specifications (p < 0.05).
When we compare the effect of Private information between the two institutions, we
find that in Market treatments the price for asset H presents larger negative departures from
its Public information counterpart – i.e., we do reject the null hypothesis of |β +δ | ≤ |β |.
For asset L we cannot reject this hypothesis (p > 0.2). All these results are robust when
controlling for additional covariates (columns (2), (3), (5) and (6)) and are true for both
bid-ask feedback conditions (see Table B.5).
Result 2 (Perfect Aggregation): Under private information prices for asset H are further
away from the public information benchmark in the Market compared to the BDM mecha-
nism.
Does the worse performance in terms of perfect aggregation in the market decrease or in-
crease prices compared to the BDM? The coefficient γ +δ measures the impact of market
incentives under Private information. We find that market interaction significantly de-
creases prices of both assets when compared to the BDM (p < 0.01) but this effect is not
there when there is no information aggregation problem (γ). Hence, there is no difference
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between the prices in the Market and BDM treatments in the absence of an information ag-
gregation problem.11 With private information, however, we find different results. Markets
as an institution do not perform better than the BDM in aggregating information. While
there is no significant difference on the likelihood of ranking assets correctly, prices in
the market differ more strongly from the public information counterparts compared to the
BDM. In some cases markets lead to considerable mis-pricing.
2.4 Discussion and Additional Results
In this section we discuss possible mechanisms leading to Results 1 and 2. The first thing
to notice is that in the absence of an information aggregation problem, i.e. in the Public
information treatments, there is no difference between the Market and BDM institutions
neither in terms of correct ranking nor in terms of average prices (Tables 2.2 and 2.3). This
suggests that mechanisms where markets affect preferences or beliefs per se are not likely
to be the main driver of our results. In other words any explanation of the differences
identified above must be directly or indirectly linked to the informational structure. In the
following we discuss several such potential mechanisms.
2.4.1 Learning: Price-sensitive and -insensitive Traders
In this section we outline our main explanation for why prices for asset H are further away
from the public information benchmark in the Market compared to the BDM with private
information (Result 2). We should first emphasize that our explanation does not rely on
fundamentally different preferences, nor on different strategies. Such explanations are in-
consistent with our experimental evidence as we will demonstrate in Section 2.4.2. Instead
we start from the observation, demonstrated in this section, that the difference between the
two institutions is driven by price-insensitive traders, who are apparently not able to learn
11This differs from the results obtained in Bohm et al. (1997)’s artificial market, suggesting that the design
of experimental markets is important.
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from the market price.12 We then argue that participants who are not able to learn from
the price are more likely to ignore it and follow their subjective prior in the BDM where
the price is purely informational, but does not actually have to be paid. By contrast, in the
Market they are more likely to perceive ambiguity, which – in the presence of ambiguity
aversion – will lead to lower bids as we formally demonstrate in Appendix B.3.3.
We now outline this explanation in more detail. To empirically classify traders into
price-sensitive and -insensitive we follow the methodology by Asparouhova et al. (2015)
who classify participants based on the slope in an OLS regression where period-by-period
changes in asset holdings are regressed on the difference between the actual asset price in
the experiment and the expected value of the asset using correct (updated) probabilities. A
negative slope means participants decrease their asset holdings when the asset is overpriced,
i.e. they are price-sensitive. A zero slope indicates price-insensitivity and a positive slope
indicates what Asparouhova et al. (2015) call “perverse” price-sensitivity, i.e. participants
increasing their holdings of overpriced assets. Following Asparouhova et al. (2015) we
use cutoffs for the t-statistic of −1.6 and 1.9 to indicate price sensitivity in either direction
and classify participants as price-insensitive whose t-statistic falls in between these cutoff
values.13
This procedure classifies a total of 85 participants (53%) in Market treatments as price-
insensitive to both assets (39 in Public information and 46 in Private information); the
remaining 75 participants (47%) are price-sensitive to at least one asset (41 in Public in-
formation and 34 in Private information). This is in line with Asparouhova et al. (2015)
who find that 69 participants (58%) are price-sensitive and 51 (42%) are price-insensitive.
In the BDM treatments there are 59 price-sensitive and 101 price-insensitive traders (re-
spectively, 35 and 24 in Public information and 45 and 56 in Private information). Given
12In theory it could also be that they are price-insensitive because they have very special preferences.
Any such explanation is essentially ruled out by the evidence from our public information treatments, see
Section 2.3.
13The reason Asparouhova et al. (2015) use asymmetric cutoffs is a well known simultaneous-equation
bias in estimating price-sensitivity. Because total changes in holdings of assets must balance out across
participants, slope coefficients must sum to zero and OLS estimates will be biased upwards.
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the large fraction of price-insensitive traders it is important to understand their role in the
information aggregation process.
Asset H Asset L
Sensitive to H Not sensitive Sensitive to L Not sensitive
Ask Bid Ask Bid Ask Bid Ask Bid
Constant 111.895∗∗∗ 86.141∗∗∗ 113.250∗∗∗ 83.974∗∗∗ 85.981∗∗∗ 69.879∗∗∗ 88.243∗∗∗ 64.348∗∗∗
(5.261) (5.048) (3.011) (2.481) (5.060) (3.662) (1.742) (1.292)
Private info (β ) −14.722∗∗ −14.839∗∗∗ −6.168∗ −6.423∗∗ 15.477∗∗ 4.169 4.206 4.070∗∗
(6.618) (5.180) (3.714) (3.244) (6.472) (6.081) (2.723) (1.919)
Market (γ) −9.070 0.353 5.501 13.467∗∗∗ −5.263 −7.933∗ −8.087∗∗∗ 2.357
(7.068) (7.050) (3.976) (3.927) (6.245) (4.196) (2.346) (1.936)
Private info×Market (δ ) 5.833 −7.797 −25.357∗∗∗ −25.134∗∗∗ −12.635 −6.051 −9.671∗∗ −11.952∗∗∗
(9.292) (7.958) (5.787) (4.899) (8.865) (6.769) (4.387) (2.738)
ρ1 4.085 3.999∗ 2.745 1.755 3.598 1.905 −2.843 −1.988∗
(3.783) (2.337) (2.229) (1.430) (3.855) (2.496) (2.116) (1.121)
Repetition 1 13.354∗∗∗ 7.196∗∗∗ 5.691∗∗∗ 0.270 2.720 −1.557 5.558∗∗∗ 0.153
(2.898) (2.420) (1.618) (1.459) (3.345) (2.122) (1.207) (0.652)
Repetition 2 0.487 1.421 −1.219 −1.336∗ 1.114 −0.679 3.408∗∗∗ 1.565∗∗
(2.586) (1.927) (1.056) (0.798) (2.990) (2.115) (1.219) (0.744)
β +δ −8.889 −22.635 −31.525 −31.557 2.842 −1.882 −5.464 −7.881
p-value test β +δ = 0 0.229 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.680 0.632 0.195 0.001
p-value test |β +δ | ≤ |β | 0.735 0.164 0.000 0.000 0.923 0.617 0.411 0.118
γ +δ −3.237 −7.443 −19.856 −11.667 −17.897 −13.985 −17.758 −9.594
p-value test γ +δ = 0 0.591 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.008 0.000 0.000
Observations 2310 2310 7080 7080 2130 2130 7290 7290
Table 2.4: Bids and asks of price-sensitive and price-insensitive traders for both assets.
Note 1: For asset H the table uses only participants who are price sensitive for asset H. Those are 42 participants for asset H. Hence the “insensitive”
category here includes (i) the 75 participants who are price-insensitive to both assets, but also (ii) 43 participants who are price-insensitive to H, but
price-sensitive to L. Analogously for asset L.
Note 2: Data of 7 (6) participants are missing for asset H (L), since it was not possible to classify their sensitivity for the respective asset due to either
lack of variability in their behaviour/holdings or market prices were missing.
Note 3: Clustered standard errors at the group level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 2.4 shows the results of regressions comparing bids and asks of price-sensitive
and price-insensitive traders across the different settings.14 The table shows that for asset H
information aggregation is not perfect for either type of trader and either type of institution
with both coefficients β and β +δ significantly different from zero.15 When it comes to our
differences-in-differences analysis comparing public and private information in BDM and
the market, we find that there is no statistically significant difference in the public-private
information gap in bids and asks for price-sensitive traders, while there is a substantial
14Reported results do not change if we would classify participants as price-sensitive or price-insensitive
based on their behaviour in Repetition 1, and restrict the regression to their bids and asks in Repetitions 2 and
3.
15Note that it is entirely plausible that some traders who are classified as “price-sensitive” do perceive
some amount of ambiguity and act accordingly.
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gap for price-insensitive traders, which is highly statistically significant. For asset H, in
particular, the coefficient δ is sizeable and the hypothesis |β +δ | ≤ |β | summarily rejected
for price-insensitive traders. All these results are robust when controlling for additional
covariates. The treatment difference we observed in Section 2.3, and in particular the
massive drop in prices for this asset seen in Figure 2.1, seems driven by price-insensitive
traders. For asset L price-sensitive traders’ bids do not differ significantly between the
public and private information cases with particularly the value of β + δ being very close
to zero. For price-insensitive traders there are statistically significant differences between
public and private information also for asset L and also here we reject the hypothesis |β +
δ | ≤ |β |.16
Why do price-insensitive traders behave differently across the two institutions? As the
price (group value) is not directly payoff relevant for participants in the BDM condition
(it affects payoffs only via beliefs), it seems intuitive that traders in the BDM who do not
learn from the price decide to ignore it, i.e. use their subjective priors to determine their
bids and asks. This is also in line with the pattern of roughly constant prices over time seen
in Figure 2.1. In the market, by contrast, it is harder for participants to ignore the price
they have to pay for an asset. Hence, here, when confronted with the dissonance between
subjective priors and the price, it seems intuitive that traders who do not learn correctly
from the price do not ignore it, but instead perceive ambiguity. In Appendix B.3.3 we show
that under weak assumptions agents who perceive ambiguity will place lower bids for an
asset than those who do not.17 This would explain the downward trend in prices in the
Market treatment particularly for asset H (see Figure 2.1).
There is a considerable and diverse body of literature broadly showing that ambiguity
(typically generated exogenously) might affect market outcomes, though the design as well
16Appendix Figure B.2 shows a simulated price path for price-sensitive traders only. The figure shows
that for these traders the difference between prices under public and private information is much smaller
compared to the full sample.
17Essentially these assumptions are that agents who perceive ambiguity entertain at least one posterior that
implies a worse expected asset return than the correct posterior of an agent who does not perceive ambiguity.
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as the direction and the size of the effects differs across studies with some finding negative
effects on prices and some finding no effects (Sarin and Weber, 1993; Bossaerts et al.,
2010; Corgnet et al., 2013; Huber et al., 2014; Ngangoué, 2017).18 In our data we find that
asks/bids for both assets are shifted upwards/downwards for price-insensitive traders (see
Table 2.4) in line with ambiguity aversion. In the next section we consider other possible
mechanisms.
2.4.2 Other Potential Mechanisms
In this subsection we discuss other potential mechanisms and provide evidence why we
believe that they are unlikely to be a key driver of our results. We first study differences
in preferences, then differences in strategic behaviour, and last differences in cognitive
strain between the two environments. It is important to note that we are not denying that
differences in preferences or strategic behaviour may exist. We argue, however, that they
are not the main underlying reason behind the results discussed in Section 2.3.
Differences in Preferences
If the differences observed across institutions would be driven by different preferences over
outcomes across the two institutions, then these differences should also be observed within
the Public information treatments. Table 2.3 shows that – if such differences exist – they
are not translated into market prices. We can hence rule out explanations based on simple
differences between preferences over outcomes.
Still, preferences (even if the same across environments) might play a role in other
ways. One notable difference between the Market treatments and the BDM treatments is
that, because in the Market treatment assets are traded, risks between traders are negatively
correlated in the sense that a favourable realization for a traded asset is benefiting the agent
who bought the asset while it is an implicit loss for the agent who sold the asset. If agents
18Theoretically, in the presence of ambiguity-averse agents equilibrium prices may fail to reflect all the
available information (Caskey, 2009; Condie and Ganguli, 2017). See Epstein and Schneider (2010) and
Guidolin and Rinaldi (2013) for a review of the theoretical literature.
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care about social comparisons this negative correlation could affect their behaviour. More
formally, sensitivity to such implicit losses can be captured by a model of reference depen-
dent preferences (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006) incorporating a social comparison reference
point (Schmidt et al., 2015).
Consider an agent i facing a lottery with K outcomes xk and associated probabilities pk
(k = 1, . . . ,K), and a lottery with L (social comparison) reference points r` (` = 1, . . . ,L)
with qk` being the probability distribution over pairs (xk,r`). In the state (xk,r`), agent i
receives outcome xk while his reference point is r`. We define the agent’s utility V on the
domain of outcomes x and reference points r,





The first term is the expected (consumption) utility of the gamble (asset) held, weighted by
factor η . The parameter ψ in the second term controls the sensitivity to social comparison.
We assume that v(0) = 0 and v′ > 0. In order to understand how social comparison affects
trading prices, it suffices to consider a simple swap between assets H and L between agent i
and j, taking the other’s payoff as ‘reference point’. We show in Appendix B.3.4 that the
more sensitive agent i is to social comparison (everything else equal), the more reluctant
is she to swap assets when she is owning the H asset. That is, the more sensitive she is
to social comparison, the more valuable asset H is relative to asset L. Hence with social
comparison sensitive traders, the difference between the (hypothetical) prices of assets H
and L is expected to increase. For our experiment this means that price differences should
be larger in Market versus BDM. Comparing the mean price difference between Market
(20.26) and BDM (14.09) we do indeed find evidence in line with the former prediction
(Mann-Whitney U test, p < 0.001).
To the extent that bid-ask feedback facilitates social comparisons we should also see a
difference between prices across these variations. However, within the Market treatments
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we do not find a significant effect of bid-ask feedback on mean price differences (NoBAF:
20.43, BAF: 20.08; Mann-Whitney U test: p = 0.596). Figure B.1 splits Figure 2.1 by
the bid-ask feedback dimension and illustrates that such feedback seems to make little
difference, and the regressions reported in Table B.5 confirm this.19 Hence, despite the
fact that adding social comparison information should make the type of considerations
discussed above more salient we do not find significant treatment differences. Based on
this evidence it seems unlikely individuals’ sensitivity to social comparisons is a key driver
of our results.
Differences in Strategic Behaviour
A second class of alternative explanations we discuss are based on differences in strategies.
As we do not see price differences with public information, any explanation based on dif-
ferences in strategic behaviour needs to rely on some assumption as to why strategies are
different enough to cause price differences with private but not public information.
How could strategic behavior affect prices, though? Note first that in the BDM, subjects
have no influence on the price they pay or receive for the asset. If traders are risk neutral this
will lead (as we show in Appendix B.3.1) to an initial price in the interval [103.1,112.5)
for asset H and in the interval (87.5,96.9] for asset L. Further, for each asset, three units
will be traded (hypothetically given bids and asks). Unlike in the BDM, in the call market
traders can influence the price at which they are buying or selling: buyers like to lower
the price and sellers like to increase the price. Subjects in the market, therefore, have an
incentive to shade their bids and asks by bidding a bit lower and asking a bit more than the
expected value. If we assume participants shade their bids and asks, but not by “too much”,
this will lead (as we show in Appendix B.3.2) to a price in the interval [114.0625,118.75)
for asset H and in the interval (93.75,98.4375] for asset L. For both assets, two units will
19For the situation without (with) bid-ask feedback, the differences between the market and the BDM are
in Table B.5 captured by γ (τ) for public information and by γ + δ (φ ) for private information. For both
situations, there is no significant difference with public information and are for both assets prices lower in the
market with private information. Hence, there is no sign of the results reported in Section 2.3 being driven
by one of the bid-ask feedback conditions only.
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be traded.
Based on this, strategic behaviour should lead to higher prices for asset H in the market
relative to the BDM, and fewer units to be traded. Table 2.3 shows our findings in this
regard. In the public information setting we find, consistent with this, a slightly higher
price for asset H, but a slightly lower price for asset L; however, both difference are not
statistical significant (see coefficient β ). For the private information setting we find for
both assets significantly lower prices in the market (see coefficient γ + δ ), which does
not point to strategic behaviour being a dominant factor. In terms of units traded we find
that actually fewer units are traded under the BDM compared to the market treatment (see
Table B.6).20 With strategic behaviour we would expect the opposite result. Taken together
these pieces of evidence suggest to us that it is unlikely that strategic trading causes the
difference between the BDM and market treatment.
Differences in Cognitive Strain
One difference between the BDM setting and the Market setting is that, while in the BDM
the price (group value) has a purely informational role, in the Market it also enters par-
ticipants’ payoff calculations directly. This double role of the price is one way in which
differences in cognitive strain between the two treatments could come about. Similarly,
there could be differences in cognitive strain between the treatments differing in bid-ask
feedback, since in the treatments with bid-ask feedback there is more information available
to process for participants. There are several factors which suggest to us that differences
in cognitive strain are not a key driver of our results. First, note that there is no differ-
ence between the BDM and Market settings in the public information case (see coefficient
γ in Tables 2 and 3). Hence if differences in cognitive strain are behind the differences
observed with private information, they must come from an interaction between the infor-
mational role of the price (which is identical) and the price mechanism. Second, we can
20Of course under the BDM no units are actually traded at all. In Table B.6 we compare the amount of
units that would be traded hypothetically under the BDM given bids and asks with those actually traded in
the market.
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compare noise levels across the two institutions. If cognitive strain is higher under the
Market condition, this could be reflected in higher levels of noise in the Market compared
to the BDM. We do not find evidence for this in the data. In fact, the coefficient of variation
(σ
µ
ratio) for market prices is, if at all, higher in the BDM compared to the Market (0.32
vs. 0.30 for asset H and 0.39 vs. 0.27 for asset L). Third, for those participants who are
price-sensitive there is no difference between the two institutions, suggesting that if cogni-
tive strain matters, it matters only for some participants. Fourth, we do not see a difference
between the treatments with bid-ask feedback and those without, which should arguably
also differ in terms of cognitive strain. While none of these elements by itself constitutes
proof, their combination suggests to us that differences in cognitive strain are not of key
importance in driving our results.
2.5 Conclusions
We conducted a lab experiment to study information aggregation in markets. The inno-
vative aspect of our work is that we assess the quality of information aggregation in the
market relative to a comparable non-market institution. To this purpose participants in our
lab experiment are randomly assigned to different institutional environments. In treatments
with market interaction (the market treatments) assets are traded via a call auction mecha-
nism. In the non-market treatments prices of assets are determined via a Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak (BDM) mechanism. Treatments are designed in such a way that the information
available to participants across the market and non-market variations is exactly identical.
The only difference is how prices are determined.
We find that markets do worse compared to the non-market institution. In particular prices
are further away from the public information benchmark in the market compared to the
BDM mechanism. The difference is driven by price-insensitive traders who seem unable
to learn from market prices. Because of this, they perceive a wedge between their subjec-
tive prior and the market price, which they cannot rationalize. This leads them to perceive
ambiguity in the market which then affects their bids and asks. Price-sensitive traders, by
contrast, learn equally well in the market as they do under the BDM mechanism. They
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seem, hence, able to extract information from the price despite the noise generated by
price-insensitive traders.
There are two obvious directions for future research. First, the robustness of our findings
could be studied more extensively including for settings with more traders and more assets
with positively correlated risk. While we have documented robustness across some infor-
mation conditions, more could be done in this direction as well, both in terms of feedback
structures and initial information available (including asymmetries with informed and un-
informed agents). Second, while our treatments and explorative analysis have suggested
one possible mechanism (and ruled out some others), more research needs to be done to




The Causal Effect of Income Inequality on Attribution and Social Trust.
3.1 Introduction
Economic inequality is on the rise in many countries across the globe, even as global
poverty rates reached all-time lows in 2019 (Morris and Western, 1999; Alvaredo et al.,
2013; Atkinson, 2015; Gould, 2017). Philosophical arguments about the justifiability of
high inequality aside, empirical research from across the social sciences has implicated
inequality in a host of negative social outcomes including a decline in public health and
the health of the environment, an erosion of social cohesion and increase in crime, and a
suppression of social mobility as relative advantage and disadvantage become entrenched
(Stiglitz, 2002; Pickett and Wilkinson, 2010; Currie, 2011; Atkinson, 2015). To understand
how inequality can be so socially and economically corrosive while remaining largely un-
addressed, it is important to understand its impact on people’s psychological perceptions
including social trust and attributional beliefs like a belief in meritocracy.
People have a strong motivation to believe that the world is a just place. Such ‘just
world’ beliefs (Lerner, 1980) are a form of motivated social cognition that can help to
offset the stress and uncertainty inherent in a world that is indifferent to human suffering
(Furnham, 2003). Research spanning several distinct literatures from psychology, eco-
nomics, and political science illustrates how such beliefs can serve palliative functions for
both the relatively advantaged and disadvantaged (Jost et al., 2004; Bullock, 2008). When
applied to the economic domain these beliefs often take the form of meritocratic beliefs,
which incorporate the related set of beliefs that economic status — poverty or affluence
— are earned, as the result of hard work or ability and not due to other factors such as
luck, circumstance, or preexisting personal advantage or connections. Thus, economic sta-
tus is seen as deserved and therefore not subject to recrimination or correction by state
intervention.
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Meritocratic beliefs offer up a set of well-worn attributions for wealth and poverty to
assuage negative psychological states. For the advantaged, meritocratic beliefs can resolve
potential feelings of guilt when exposed to inequality (Jost and Hunyady, 2003; Bullock,
2008). Wealth in this case is viewed as the result of virtuous traits of the wealthy while
poverty is the result of the shortcomings of the poor (Ross and Nisbett, 1991).1 For the
disadvantaged, a belief in meritocracy is a psychological road-map for success — namely
working harder — to the exclusion of other avenues such as collective action, as each
individual is seen as responsible for their inability to improve their own situation. Routine
experiences of failure, often the result of systemic injustice and the psychological weight
of poverty, can lead to passivity and hence an inability to learn that providing effort is
effective (Seligman, 1972).2 In sum, when people are exposed to inequality, such processes
of attribution can be crucial for people’s acceptance of the (unequal) status quo. They can
even deepen inequality by making those with a poor relative position more pessimistic
about their chances to move ahead.
Beyond the palliative functions they serve, meritocratic beliefs are also important be-
cause of their connection with broader socio-economic attitudes, such as trust in institu-
tions (McCoy and Major, 2007) and policy preferences, especially support for redistribu-
tion (Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989; Gilens, 1999; Fong, 2001; Alesina and Ferrara, 2005;
Benabou and Tirole, 2006). Perceptions of systemic unfairness, like low belief in meritoc-
racy can lead to frustration and have been linked to corruption (Charron, 2017) and political
radicalization (van den Bos, 2020).
Inequality has also been associated with declines in generalized social trust (Alesina
1Higher relative socio-economic position can additionally increase inclination to blame if it is linked to
entitlement. Brooks et al. (2018) show, for example, that high-caste men in India are more likely to retaliate
than low-caste men after what they perceive as a “slight”.
2A great deal of medical literature as well as that from health psychology shows that even in developed
societies the poor show worse mental health outcomes and a higher morbidity of a variety of conditions,
including heart disease, and that much of this can be attributed to stress (Muramatsu, 2003; Mitchell and
Popham, 2008; Buttrick and Oishi, 2017). In development economics there is an active research agenda
studying the relation between poverty and cognition, quality of decision-making and worker productivity
(Mani et al., 2013; Haushofer and Fehr, 2014; Kaur et al., 2019).
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and Ferrara, 2002; Uslaner, 2002; Delhey and Newton, 2005; Bjornskov, 2008). (Putnam,
2000) claims that “in virtually all societies have-nots are less trusting than haves”. Social
trust, or a belief in the kindness and fairness of others, is part of a broader syndrome of
personality characteristics that includes optimism and a belief in cooperation, but also el-
ements that relate to just world beliefs, such as trust that we will receive from others what
we deserve (Uslaner, 2002). Social trust is widely seen as a massively important factor in
social and economic interactions (Uslaner, 2018).
Because of the importance of these outcomes, there is a huge interest in the Social
Sciences in understanding the relationship between inequality, attribution and social trust.
Much of the scholarly attention paid to these relationships within economics and political
science is observational and examines the impact of the Gini coefficient and other contex-
tual indicators on public attitudes (Kelly and Enns, 2010; Newman et al., 2015). As levels
of inequality fluctuate across time and geography, co-varying with a host of other factors
it is difficult to establish a strong causal link. Additionally, it is impossible to vary the
causal variable of inequality in natural settings and difficult to do it in a lab setting without
deception or conflating inequality with relative position. The goal of the present study is
to provide strong causal evidence for the relationship between inequality, the attributional
processes of meritocratic belief and blame, and social trust while carefully decomposing
the overall effect of inequality into the effect of inequality exposure per se and that of rela-
tive position. Our design also allows us, for the first time, to measure belief in meritocracy
in an incentivized task.
We focus on three key outcomes contributing to the broader concept of belief in a
just world: (i) belief in meritocracy, (ii) inclination to blame and (iii) social trust. We
use a combination of surveys and lab experiments to identify the causal effect of income
inequality on meritocratic attributions and social trust. First, using non-incentivized survey
responses from a 2019 survey of British youth called Next Steps 8, we find a consistent
impact of relative economic position. Higher relative position is associated with increased
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belief in meritocracy and social trust. Inequality measured by the Gini coefficient has a
moderating effect on belief in meritocracy among wealthy youths living in highly unequal
contexts, but does not impact social trust.
We then designed novel incentivized experiments to provide causal evidence for the
effects of inequality, which we operationalized as a prime prior to the incentivized tasks.
The prime compared participant data to local economic context in two boroughs in Eng-
land, one a great deal wealthier than the other, such that participants were randomly placed
into the position of upward or downward economic comparison. In order to assess belief
in meritocracy, participants completed a real effort task in which their total score was a
function of effort, ability and luck. Then - after seeing their overall rank among their fel-
low participants - participants were asked how much effort and ability contributed to their
overall position. Our results show a causal impact of inequality on belief in meritocracy.
We also find that personal relative position is much more important than inequality expo-
sure by itself in determining belief in meritocracy. While inequality exposure by itself has
no effect on belief in meritocracy, when combined with information on personal relative
position there is a strong positive effect. A higher relative position leads to increased belief
in meritocracy, while a lower relative position leads to rejection of meritocracy. This is true
both for our novel incentivized lab task as well as for the un-incentivized survey measure.
We do not find a statistically significant effect of inequality exposure on blame measured
using a design by Gurdal et al. (2013). In line with Putnam (2000)’s argument social trust is
positively affected by a higher relative position. A lower relative position leads to substan-
tially lower social trust using both an incentivized lab task and standard survey measures.
We also find evidence of a negative impact of inequality exposure by itself on social trust
using the non-incentivized survey measure, but not using the lab task.
Taken as a whole, our results show that even a subtle positional prime can have a causal
impact on belief in meritocracy and social trust. Participants made to feel their economic
position was higher were both more likely to affirm a belief in meritocracy and to trust
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others, though we find little evidence for a hypothesized increase in likelihood to blame
others. As both trust and belief in meritocracy are related to a person’s ability to use the
opportunities the system provides for them, the results also establish a direct link between
outcome equality and equality of opportunities. As such the results underline the promise
of interventions aimed at increasing social trust or belief in meritocracy in poorer com-
munities. They also provide one additional reason for the need to go beyond equality of
opportunities and to focus on reducing inequality of outcomes. Inequality may lead not
only to negative institutional aspects but also a general psychological fraying and loss of
faith, at least among large portions of society.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we discuss related literature across
different subfields in Social Sciences. Section 3.3 discusses evidence from general social
surveys. In Section 3.4 we present our experimental and survey designs. Sections 3.5
and 3.6 contain our main results on attribution and social trust, respectively. Section 3.7
concludes. Appendix C contains details and materials from the experiments as well as
additional tables and figures.
3.2 Literature
Being neither the strongest nor most biologically well-adapted to their environments, hu-
man beings have required social cooperation to survive. Yet cooperation, particularly over
the long-term is dependent on being able to trust that our fellow humans will cooperate
in return. Interpersonal trust is seen as a “social lubricant”, and “an important factor in
economic and social exchange” (Galeotti et al., 2017; Uslaner, 2018). Norms of trust are
closely related to norms of fairness: we cooperate with others, but when we do so success-
fully, we also expect to be rewarded fairly in proportion as a “result of skill plus effort”
(Galeotti et al., 2017). Such meritocratic beliefs are closely related to the psychological
concepts of personal efficacy, agency, and locus of control; our ability to control our own
lives, the events around us, and to improve our circumstances over the long haul. At a
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broader scale, they feed into our perceptions of distributional justice in the world around
us - a ‘belief in a just world’.
There is a large literature in social psychology on how people perceive the world around
them (Ross and Nisbett, 1991; Furnham, 2003; Jost et al., 2004). Social psychologists use
the term “Belief in a just world” (BJW) to refer to a set of more or less articulated beliefs
which underlie the way people orient themselves to their environment. They include the
belief that others can be trusted and are not seeking to harm others as well as a general belief
that we live in a just world where everyone receives what they earn and consequently earns
what they receive (Lerner, 1980). Just world beliefs reflect an innate human psychological
tendency arising from our attempts to attribute causality to the events that involve us as
well as other people. Such causal attribution processes provide a foundation upon which
social interaction can take place. There can be no trust and reputation without the ability
to update such tallies against the actions of others. Indeed personal BJW has been linked
to interpersonal trust (Zuckerman and Gerbasi, 1977; Bgue, 2002) and to work ethic and is
sometimes thought of as reflecting variance in the extent that people are motivated to justify
the economic and social system as fair and legitimate (Jost et al., 2004; Jost and Hunyady,
2005).3 BJW can serve a palliative function if people overestimate to which extent their
successes are due to merit rather than luck (Langer, 1975; Davidai and Gilovich, 2016).4
Political Scientists and Economists have mostly been interested in economic manifes-
tations of just world beliefs, such as belief in meritocracy (Newman et al., 2015; Newman,
2016; Alesina et al., 2018; Mo and Conn, 2018; Wolak and Peterson, 2020). Most research
in these areas documents a negative relationship between inequality and belief in meritoc-
racy either cross-sectionally (Newman et al., 2015) or across time (Wolak and Peterson,
3Personal BJW is often measured by psychologist by using agreement to statements like “I am convinced
that in the long run, people will be compensated for injustices” (general BJW) or “I believe that, by and large,
I deserve what happens to me” (personal BJW). See Furnham (2003) for a survey discussing these and other
measures of BJW.
4Ross and Nisbett (1991) describe this the “fundamental attribution error”, an excessive tendency to ex-
plain the behaviour and outcomes of others and oneself by underlying “dispositions” (personal attributes)
rather than external circumstances or luck.
54
2020). There is, however, disagreement about the interpretation of these effects, largely
due to the difficulty of causal identification. It is unclear, for example, whether inequality
indeed impacts beliefs or whether beliefs allow inequality to persist or both. Further, be-
cause most work is observational, we do not know whether the effect of inequality might
be due to inequality of the distribution itself or due to relative position. There are reasons
to believe that relative position might play a more important role, as people often only have
a tenuous grasp on inequality and are unable to appreciate the scale of it (Xu and Garand,
2010; Trump, 2017). There is further evidence that people’s perceptions of inequality and
other economic indicators are politically malleable (Kuziemko et al., 2015; Bartels, 2016;
Alesina et al., 2018). Newman et al. (2015) show that in unequal contexts, low-income peo-
ple are more likely to identify as ‘have nots’, also suggesting a role for relative position. On
the other hand there is also literature supporting sociotropic concerns over individualistic
ones (Smith and Pettigrew, 2015).
Research on the relationship between inequality and social trust has encountered simi-
lar methodological issues. The cross-country correlation between social trust and national
income equality is well documented. It is often assumed (but not shown) that inequality
leads to lower trust (Alesina and Ferrara, 2002; Uslaner, 2002; Delhey and Newton, 2005;
Bjornskov, 2008) and the theoretical mechanisms involved are still subject to debate (Gus-
tavsson and Jordahl, 2008; Nannestad, 2008). It is also unclear from this literature whether
inequality exposure per se affects social trust or whether it is mainly personal relative po-
sition that affects trust.
Our study contributes to this literature in three ways. First, we provide causal evidence
for a link between inequality, attribution and social trust. Second, we are able to disentan-
gle the effect of inequality exposure from the effect of personal relative position.5 Third,
we measure the main outcomes both using standard survey measures as well as in an in-
5There is research in psychology showing that rank of income matters more than absolute income in
determining happiness and life satisfaction (Boyce et al., 2010) and that there is an interaction between
inequality and effects of income on life satisfaction (Quispe-Torreblanca et al., 2020).
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centivized way in the lab and we introduce a novel incentivized task to measure belief in
meritocracy.
Behavioural Economists have studied various causal impacts of inequality using lab
experiments. In this research inequality is usually manipulated within the lab e.g. by giving
participants different endowments. A number of papers in this area have studied the effect
of exogenous income inequality (created by giving participants different endowments) on
public good contributions with mixed results (Chan et al., 1996; van Dijk et al., 2002;
Ostrom et al., 1994; Sadrieh and Verbon, 2006; Reuben and Riedl, 2013). Gaechter et al.
(2017) found a negative impact of endogenous inequality (created over time by differing
past contributions) on contributions. Nishi et al. (2015) found that inequality per se only has
a small negative effect on welfare, but a poor relative position (visible wealth differences)
has a much more negative effect.6 A number of authors have related inequality and trust
within a lab experiment (Holm and Danielson, 2005; Xiao and Bicchieri, 2010). Greiner
et al. (2011) find that both exogenous and endogenous variation in income affect behaviour
in a trust game and Xiao and Bicchieri (2010) find that inequality concerns can crowd out
trustworthiness.
To our knowledge there are no lab experimental studies measuring belief in meritocracy.
Possibly this is in part due to the absence of incentivized measures of belief in meritocracy
prior to our research. Some researchers study attitudes towards fairness and meritocracy by
allowing people to redistribute earnings in online experiments (Mollerstrom et al., 2015;
Almas et al., 2019). Mollerstrom et al. (2015) ask participants in the role of spectators to
redistribute income between others who had been allocated unequal earnings either due to
luck or due to merit. They found that spectators do not always compensate for uncontrol-
6There is also a substantial literature on the impact of inequality on pro-social behaviour usually focusing
on the effect of relative position as opposed to inequality per se (Piff et al., 2012; Horvath et al., 2012;
Trautmann et al., 2013; Cote et al., 2015; Korndoerfer et al., 2015; Smeets et al., 2015; Andreoni et al., 2017;
Schmukle et al., 2019) find that this difference is more pronounced if there is a high degree of inequality in
the area where the rich or poor person lives. This literature is summarized in detail in Appendix C.4 where
we document a positive impact of relative position and a negative impact of inequality per se on pro-social
behaviour in our data.
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lable luck. Almas et al. (2019) compare spectators from the United States and Norway.
They find that Norwegians in the role of spectators implement less unequal distributions on
average and are less accepting than Americans of unfairness purely due to luck.
There is some literature on how inequality exposure and relative position impacts policy
preferences (Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989; Gilens, 1999; Fong, 2001; Alesina and Ferrara,
2005; Benabou and Tirole, 2006). Karadja et al. (2017) find that most people believe they
are poorer than they actually are and that when informed of their true relative position, in-
dividuals who are richer than they initially thought demand less redistribution. Fehr et al.
(2019) compare the demand for national and global redistribution and find that, while na-
tionally demand for redistribution decreases with income, there is no such relationship for
global redistribution. Other research has focused on the impact of inequality on the demand
for redistribution with mixed results (Jimenez-Jimenez et al., 2020; Roth and Wohlfarth,
2018; Magni, 2020). Several authors suggest that the effect of inequality might operate
via respondents’ fairness views (Karadja et al., 2017; Fehr et al., 2019; Roth and Wohl-
farth, 2018). By establishing a causal link between personal relative position and belief in
meritocracy our research provides support for such a mechanism.
3.3 Correlational Evidence from General Social Surveys
We briefly study correlational evidence from general social surveys before moving on to
causal identification of the effects of inequality on attribution and social trust. We use data
from the Next Steps 8 (Longitudinal Study of Young People in England) survey (UCL,
2018) to see if we can identify a relationship between inequality and belief in meritocracy
and/or social trust. Next Steps 8 is ideally suited for our purposes as its respondents are
young adults in the UK, a similar population to our lab experimental participants. Deter-
mining the effects of inequality on young adults also seems particularly relevant as they
are at a stage of life where belief in meritocracy and social trust can affect many crucial
decisions in terms of education and careers among others. Appendix Table C.1 contains
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some summary statistics for this sample.
3.3.1 Belief in Meritocracy
Next Steps 8 contains three questions that are often used to measure belief in meritocracy7
A If someone is not a success in life, it is usually their own fault.
B How well you get on in this world is mostly a matter of luck.
C If you work hard at something you’ll usually succeed.
Respondents indicated agreement with these statements on four levels (strongly agree,
agree, disagree, strongly disagree). We create a binary variable indicating agreement
(“strongly agree” or “agree”) whereby we reverse-code statement B. Following Newman
et al. (2015) we measure belief in meritocracy with a dummy taking the value 1 if there is
agreement to all three statements A, B and C. The dummy identifies 31 percent of respon-
dents as having high belief in meritocracy. Income takes three values (“low”, “middle”,
“high”) based on annual HH income of less than 25K, 25-45K and greater than 45K. Those
are the same cutoffs as used in our lab experiment, which are calibrated to induce about
equally big income categories in our lab sample. The Gini coefficient is derived based on
the respondent’s residence at the level of the government office region using data from the
ONS (Office for National Statistics).8
Table 3.1 shows the results. As in Newman et al. (2015) higher income is correlated
with higher belief in meritocracy. The Gini coefficient does not have a statistically signifi-
cant effect on those in the lowest income category, but it does have a large negative effect
7These questions are used in a module relating to “locus of control”. The difference is that belief in
meritocracy refers specifically to the relationship between hard work (effort) and good outcomes or one’s
position in society, whereas locus of control refers to a broader sense of being able to control one’s fate and
is not restricted to economic outcomes.
8We use the “Income and tax, by gender, region and county, 2015-2016” table provided by the ONS.
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Belief in Meritocracy Next Steps 8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
medium income 0.403*** 0.396*** 0.390*** 0.398*** 0.446***
(0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.139)
high income 0.700*** 0.684*** 0.687*** 0.675*** 0.813***
(0.193) (0.193) (0.193) (0.193) (0.296)
Gini -0.148 -0.083 0.256 0.344 0.337
(0.241) (0.241) (0.369) (0.370) (0.469)
Gini × med income -1.119*** -1.095*** -1.076*** -1.103*** -1.298***
(0.380) (0.379) (0.378) (0.380) (0.489)
Gini × high income -1.965*** -1.898*** -1.911*** -1.865*** -2.435**
(0.676) (0.675) (0.675) (0.676) (1.037)
Constant 0.336*** 0.263*** -0.024 -0.025 -0.095
(0.067) (0.070) (0.236) (0.238) (0.313)
Individual Controls YES YES+ NO YES+ YES+
Region Controls NO NO YES YES YES
Observations 6,906 6,899 6,962 6,899 4,143
R-squared 0.022 0.025 0.016 0.025 0.021
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.1: Belief in Meritocracy dummy regressed on income categories,
local Gini coefficient and interactions.
Note: Individual controls are gender, religion and ethnicity fixed effects. The larger set of
individual controls (YES+) also includes an indicator for whether the respondent is
unemployed, their level of interest in politics and whether they have a higher education
degree. The region controls are population size, ethnic diversity (share of white population)
and the share of the population living in an urban area. Column (5) is a restricted sample of
people who haven’t moved in the last 2 years.
for those in the middle and higher income categories.9
3.3.2 Social Trust
Next Steps 8 also contains a question measuring social trust, more precisely agreement to
the statement “Most people in life can be trusted” using an 11-point Likert Scale. Table
3.2 shows the results of regressions where the endogenous variable measures the extent
of agreement to this statement. The table shows a positive and statistically significant
relationship between income and social trust. There are also substantial interaction effects
with the Gini coefficient, which are, however, not statistically significant. These results can
be replicated in the UK part of the European Value Survey, a much smaller sample, which
9Hence compared to Newman et al. (2015) different income groups seem to be affected by inequality in
Next Steps 8. Several differences between the surveys (apart from the UK-US country difference) should be
noted, though. First, Next Steps 8 considers young people while Newman et al. (2015)’s sample is represen-
tative in terms of age of the US population. Second, the Gini level is available only at a much coarser level
of aggregation in the UK, making it less clear whether people react to “local” inequality here.
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contains the same question. As Appendix Table C.12 shows also here there is a positive and
statistically significant relationship between income and social trust and also here there are
substantial interaction effects with the Gini coefficient, which are, however, not statistically
significant.
Social Trust Next Steps 8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
medium income 0.423*** 0.669 0.514*** 0.423*** 0.652 0.375
(0.0597) (0.533) (0.0583) (0.0597) (0.534) (0.716)
high income 0.672*** -0.115 0.797*** 0.670*** -0.105 0.083
(0.107) (0.961) (0.105) (0.107) (0.962) (1.521)
Gini 0.419 0.494 -1.926 -1.263 -1.164 -0.249
(0.932) (1.202) (1.668) (1.670) (1.844) (2.415)
Gini × med income -0.874 -0.816 0.0255
(1.889) (1.891) (2.513)
Gini × high income 2.764 2.723 2.507
(3.364) (3.368) (5.333)
Constant 6.285*** 6.261*** 6.565*** 6.862*** 6.829*** 4.879***
(0.279) (0.349) (1.149) (1.160) (1.185) (1.609)
Individual Controls YES YES+ NO YES+ YES+ YES+
Region Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES
Observations 6,899 6,899 6,927 6,899 6,899 4,143
R-squared 0.028 0.029 0.016 0.029 0.029 0.034
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.2: Social Trust in Next Steps 8 survey (“0=not at all
agree”,...,“10=extremely strongly agree”).
Note: Individual controls are gender, religion and ethnicity fixed effects. The larger set of individual
controls (YES+) also includes an indicator for whether the respondent is unemployed, their level of
interest in politics and whether they have a higher education degree. The region controls are
population size, ethnic diversity (share of white population) and the share of the population living in
an urban area. Column (6) is a restricted sample of people who haven’t moved in the last 2 years.
To summarize, we have seen evidence for a possible link from income, relative po-
sition and inequality to belief in meritocracy as well as social trust. Importantly these
relationships can only be interpreted as correlational and there is a strong possibility of
endogeneity, for example, as those with higher belief in meritocracy might be expected to
work harder and hence achieve higher income. This should affect the income distribution
and hence the Gini coefficient as well. High social trust can also lead to higher income or
people with high belief in meritocracy might move to areas where the Gini coefficient is
lower.10 Those are the type of endogeneity issues that make causal interpretation of these
findings difficult. An additional problem with these type of findings is that it is difficult to
10Specification (5) in Table 1 tries to partially address this particular issue.
60
disentangle the effect of inequality from the effect of relative position. The reason is that -
conditional on income - relative position changes as the Gini coefficient changes.
The aim of our experiments discussed in the next Sections is (i) to provide causal
evidence on these relationships and (ii) to disentangle the effect of inequality exposure
per se from that of relative position.
3.4 Experimental Design
Our experiments are designed to identify the causal impact of inequality exposure and
personal relative position on attribution, specifically belief in meritocracy and blame, and
social trust. We now describe the experimental design starting with the treatment structure,
then describing in detail the primes, the outcomes, the sample and the correlation among
our main outcomes.
3.4.1 Design and Procedures
The lab experiment consists of a 2×2×2 between subjects design where we vary two di-
mensions across sessions and one dimension within sessions. Our first treatment dimension
concerns the type of prime. There are two types of primes. In treatments REL we show
participants an income distribution and their own relative position within the distribution.
In treatments INEQ we only show them a distribution. The second treatment dimension
concerns when the prime took place. In treatments MTB (“Merit, Trust, Blame”) the prime
occurs right before we elicit belief in meritocracy to maximize the potential effect of the
prime on that task, whereas in BMT it occurs right before the blame task, again to maxi-
mize the potential effect on that task. Changing the order of tasks allows us to have - for
each of these outcomes - one treatment that cleanly measures the impact of the prime on
that outcome, while at the same time allowing us to study the cross-correlation among the
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different outcomes.11 Figure 3.1 illustrates the timing of the different tasks in the lab ex-
periment.12 Our third treatment dimension takes places within sessions where participants
are randomly assigned to either a “low” or “high” prime.
Figure 3.1: Timeline of the experiment. Treatments differ in order of the Merit task, Social Trust
task and the Blame task. In each treatment we also elicited risk attitude, competitiveness,
demographic covariates and survey based measures of aspirations.
Table 3.3 shows the number of participants in each of the four treatments. We targeted
a sample size of ≈ 100 participants for the MTB treatments and ≈ 200 for the BMT treat-
ments and proceeded by conducting sessions until this threshold was reached. This resulted
in five sessions for each MTB treatment, eleven sessions for REL-BMT and ten sessions
for INEQ-BMT and the number of participants shown in Table 3.3. The reason we col-
lected more observations for the BMT treatments is the fact, that will become clear below,
that inclination to blame can only be measured for a subset of participants in each session.
Table 3.3 also shows the number of respondents across six different online experiments we
fielded that will be discussed in more detail below. In each online experiment we measured
only one outcome.
We now describe in turn first the details of the priming process and then our different
outcomes and how they were elicited.
11Note that for the Social Trust outcome we do not have a treatment where the prime occurs directly before
the relevant task. This could have two undesirable consequences. First, a possible causal effect might not be
detectable as it is diluted by the longer time that passes between the prime and the task. Second, any observed
effect might not be causal but instead be triggered by the differential effect the prime has on prior tasks. We
are not worried too much about the first effect as by aggregating both orders we have substantial power to
detect even a small effect on social trust. We need to address the second concern and will do so in Section
3.4.3.
12Appendix Table C.13 shows the time elapsed between the prime and the start of the task.
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Lab Experiment Online Experiment
INEQ REL INEQ REL
Belief in Meritocracy MTB 114 114 M 185 194
Inclination to Blame BMT 219 221 B 109 107
Social Trust 333 335 T 318 322
Table 3.3: Number of participants in different treatments and
online surveys.
Note: In the lab treatments MTB measure the effect on belief in meritocracy,
treatments BMT on blame and for social trust we pool both lab treatments.
In each online experiment we measure only one outcome.
3.4.1.1 Priming
To study the causal effect of inequality exposure and personal relative position we prime
participants using income distributions of differing degrees of inequality. In the REL treat-
ments we also show participants their own position within a distribution. In order to do so
we first need to elicit some information about their income and social class. Our income
questionnaire elicits information about (i) self-reported social class, (ii) own or (for stu-
dents) parents’ annual gross income, (iii) monthly rent paid by (parents’) household, (iv)
size of (parents’) household, (v) which grocery store the household does their monthly
shopping in, (vi) if and where they go for holidays abroad, (vii) how much (parents’)
household spends on eating out every week and (viii) the type of school (comprehensive,
grammar, private, boarding) they attended. Appendix C.2.2 shows the exact questions and
answer categories for all of these questions.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.2: (a) Downward Prime (b) Upward Prime.The pictures shows the downward and upward
prime used in the REL treatments for those in the medium income category. For those in the low
(high) income category the red person was one bar lower (higher). In the treatments without
relative position the figures were shown without the red person. Appendix Figure C.7 shows all the
eight different pictures used.
Based on the answers to question (ii) we then sort participants into three income cat-
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egories (low, medium or high) corresponding to an annual HH income of less than 25K,
25-45K and greater than 45K. Those cutoffs are calibrated to induce about equally big
income categories in our lab sample.
We then randomly prime participants either downward or upward regarding their po-
sition in terms of relative position using images like the ones shown in Figure 3.2. The
bars on the figure correspond to income categories which match the mean income of the
three categories low, medium, high in the three leftmost bars of distribution (a) used for
the downward prime and in the three rightmost bars of distribution (b) used for the upward
prime. Participants are told that the picture represents the income distribution of a borough
in England and that “based on your answers in the initial questionnaire, we have computed
a rough estimate of your position in the income distribution of the borough”. Their own po-
sition was highlighted by showing one person in red as in Figure 3.2. The UK boroughs the
two distributions represent are Chelsea and Kensington (mean annual income 178K GBP)
and Norwich (mean annual income 26K GBP).13 Upward and downward primes are ran-
domly assigned allowing causal identification of the joint effect of inequality exposure and
relative position on our outcomes. In the INEQ treatments we show them only an income
distribution. The figures used in these treatments are identical to those used in the REL
treatments with the only difference that own position is not highlighted by a red person (see
Appendix Figure C.7). Comparing these two treatments hence allows us to distinguish the
effect of relative position from the effect of inequality exposure in itself.
We pretested the understanding of these pictures in two separate online surveys. In
the first online survey (n = 176) we compared participants’ understanding of these images
with other representations of an income distribution (including e.g. a representation using
quintiles). We chose the representations shown in Figure 3.2 as participants understood
them well and much better than the other representations. The second online survey (n =
108) asked a different set of respondents which of the two distributions they perceive shows
13Images are based on 2015-2016 data from the ONS (Office for National Statistics).
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a more unequal income distribution. 84.26% of respondents found the distribution shown in
Panel (b) more unequal and 7.41% found them “about the same”. This is important for the
interpretation of possible behaviour differences between those primed to either distribution.
Appendix C.1 contains details about both of these surveys.
3.4.1.2 Outcomes
After priming participants we elicited the following incentivized outcomes in the lab: (i)
belief in meritocracy, (ii) social trust and (iii) inclination to blame. We now describe how
we elicited these different outcomes in turn.
“Belief in Meritocracy”
To elicit belief in meritocracy we first had participants complete a task with three compo-
nents: an ability component (consisting of four questions from an IQ test), an effort task
(counting the number of “1” entries in four different 20×20 binary matrices) and a luck
task (coin toss). The total score in the task is S = A+B+C, where A is the number of
correct answers in the ability task (ranging from 0 to 4), B the number of correct answers in
the effort task (ranging from 0 to 4) and C = 2 if the coin falls on “tails” and 0 otherwise.
How S is determined is known to participants and described both in the paper instructions
and on the screen. After completing the task participants are informed about their total
score S, but not about the individual components. Participants receive S GBP if this part is
selected for payment (see paragraph “Other Details”).
Afterwards participants are randomly matched in groups of ten participants and ranked
by their overall score S, where 1 is the best rank (highest score) and 10 the worst rank
(lowest score). Ties are broken randomly. Then participants are asked to guess their rank R.
Guesses are incentivized using the interval scoring rule (Schlag and van der Weele, 2015).









and zero otherwise. Hence participants face a trade-off between making
sure the interval is large enough to contain the true answer, but also small to increase
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Next information is progressively revealed to participants. In Step 1 they are told their
true rank R and asked to guess their rank in the ability task RA and in the effort task RE
as well as to indicate whether they believe they were lucky with the coin toss. The former
two are incentivized in the same way as guesses about R. A correct guess on the luck
component is rewarded by 18 GBP.14 In Step 2 they are told their ability rank RA and asked
to guess again their rank in the effort task RE and whether they were lucky. In Step 3 they
are told whether they were lucky and asked again to guess their effort rank RE .
To measure belief in meritocracy we focus on Step 1 where participants know their







i| the absolute difference between participant i’s average guess of their ability
and effort rank and their true rank Ri. If xi is close to zero, then participant i believes that
their ability and effort rank explain their overall position well. The larger xi the larger is
the gap between i’s belief in their ability/effort rank and their known overall rank Ri.
We denote by F (x) the distribution of this statistic among participants in the same
treatment and denote by x50 the 50th percentile of this distribution. We define belief in
meritocracy (BIM) as follows
BIMi =

1 if xi < x50
0 else.
Hence BIM is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for those participants who perceive






their true overall rank Ri. In other words it takes the value 1 for participants who believe that
effort and ability explain their overall rank well.15 We should emphasize that the weight of
1418 GBP is the maximum payment that can be obtained for the effort/ability rank guesses.
15As there is no natural cutoff for what it means to explain overall rank well, we decided to use a relative
measure, i.e. focus on those who have high BIM compared to others in the experiment. We use a dummy as
this is the standard way to measure belief in meritocracy in surveys (Newman et al., 2015).
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the three components (ability, effort and luck) in determining the score (and hence also Ri)
is known to all participants. We hence think of BIMi not as an evaluation of this specific
task, but rather as a general attitude or mental state.
“Social Trust”
To measure social trust we randomly match participants in groups of three players. In a
random dictator setting they are then (i) shown the sum of scores ∑i Si of the three group
members and asked to distribute it among themselves. Each group member makes this
allocation independently.16 Afterwards (ii) they are asked how much they believe each of
the others allocated to the group members. The second part is the basis of our measure of
social trust. Specifically, we measure social trust as the mean answer to part (ii). If part (i)
is drawn for payment one of the decisions of the three group members is randomly chosen
and implemented. If part (ii) is chosen for payment participants simply receive 2 GBP for
each correct guess.17 While trust is often measured by economists using trust games (Berg
et al., 1995), we are interested in capturing the aspect of social trust that is most closely
related to “belief in a just world” and in particular capture the belief that one is treated by
others in a fair way. A random dictator game preceded by a production stage is one way to
capture these beliefs (Cappelen et al., 2007).
“Attribution of Blame”
To elicit attribution of blame we use a task previously used by Gurdal et al. (2013). In this
task each participant is randomly assigned a role A, B or C. We then randomly match three
participants (one A, B and one C) to play together. Player A then first chooses between
a lottery and a safe asset. The lottery pays 0 with probability p and Z with probability
16Asking them to distribute ∑i Si instead of an arbitrarily chosen “pie from the sky” seems the correct
choice in our context as we are interested in whether people believe they are treated fairly by others and
rewarded accordingly for their efforts (their contribution to Si.)
17The reason that we chose not to use the interval scoring rule for this part is (i) for simplicity and to
save time and (ii) as we are only interested here in how amounts rank across conditions and not in cardinal
differences.
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(1− p). The money earned from the choice goes to player C. Afterwards player C decides
how much of 15 GBP to allocate between agent A and a passive agent B. The process is
ten times repeated for different lotteries and safe outcomes. Blame is measured for player
C. Following Gurdal et al. (2013) we measure blame by the difference between the amount
allocated to player A when the lottery was won and when the lottery was lost conditional
on A having chosen the lottery. Hence the question is whether C blames A for realizations
of a random draw which A has no control over. As blame is measured only for player C we
needed to have a higher overall sample size for this outcome (see above).18
Other measures
We also elicited a measure of risk aversion and a measure of competitiveness that we will
use as control variables in our regressions. See Appendix C.2 for details of how they
were elicited. In a post-experimental questionnaire we also elicited participants’ aspirations
(beliefs about future earnings, GPA etc.) as well as some other covariates (such as gender,
age etc). See Appendix C.2 for details. In Appendix C.4 we discuss how some of these
outcomes are affected by positional primes.
Measures in Online Experiments
In our online experiments we use the same measures used in Next Steps 8 to measure belief
in meritocracy and social trust (see Section 3.3). As there is no established survey measure
of blame we use a hypothetical Gurdal et al. (2013) task. Unlike the measures elicited in
the lab experiment, the measures elicited in the online experiment are not incentivized.
18An alternative would have been to use the strategy method and ask all participants - how would you
decide if you were selected as player C. This has two downsides in our context. First imagining yourself
in other roles than the one ultimately realized can generate empathy which would not be present with fixed
roles, which in turn can affect blame. Second, making decisions in a “hot” situation can be quite different
from a “cold” situation for outcomes like blame, where emotions are likely to be quite relevant. Using the
same method as Gurdal et al. (2013) also allows us to benchmark our results against theirs, which is maybe
particularly relevant for an outcome that has not been measured yet very often.
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Other Details
Participants in the lab experiments are paid for two randomly selected tasks in addition to
a show up fee of 4 GBP and a flat fee for filling in the questionnaire (2 GBP). Average
earnings were 14.86 GBP with a range between 7 GBP and 39 GBP. In the online experi-
ments we paid a flat fee of 1.50 GBP to all participants. 668 people participated in the lab
experiment and 1235 people participated in our online experiments. Ethical approval was
obtained by the University of Essex (Faculty of Social Sciences subcommittee) in October
2018.
3.4.2 Sample Characteristics
Table 3.4 shows summary statistics for some of the characteristics of our participants in our
different experiments. The vast majority of our participants in the lab are students, but there
is a substantial minority of 13-20 % non-students. The share of female participants ranges
between 40-48% across treatments. The average age ranges between 23.7-27.1 years. We
restricted the sample to consist of UK nationals only. In terms of their self-reported social
class about an equal amount of participants classify themselves as working or middle class.
A much smaller fraction (ranging from 8-15%) classify themselves as “upper class”. We
designed income categories (“low”, “middle”, “high”) in such a way that - based on our
expectations from previous experiments in the same lab - we would have around a third of
participants in each category. Table 3.4 shows that this was successful. In each treatment
there is about a third of participants in each income category in the lab.
In the online experiments participants are somewhat older (mean age ranges between
33.4-35.9 years) and only a minority (17-25%) here are students. The share of women
ranges between 63-75%. Participants in the online experiment are also less likely to identify
as upper class and to belong to the high income bracket compared to the lab sample.
Appendix C.3 contains balancing tests where we compare those receiving a “high”
and those receiving a “low” prime based on these and other characteristics. Out of 68
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Lab Experiments Online Experiments
Type of Prime REL INEQ REL INEQ REL INEQ REL INEQ REL INEQ
Outcomes MTB MTB BMT BMT M M B B T T
mean age 27.1 26.6 24.6 23.7 33.4 35.9 35.2 35.6 34.0 35.1
share female 0.48 0.40 0.44 0.48 0.69 0.65 0.64 0.75 0.66 0.63
share students 0.80 0.82 0.87 0.86 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.18 0.19 0.25
share working class 0.49 0.32 0.32 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.44 0.40 0.41 0.40
share middle class 0.40 0.58 0.52 0.48 0.55 0.57 0.50 0.54 0.54 0.55
share upper class 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
share lower income 0.39 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.56 0.61 0.64 0.58 0.51 0.54
share middle income 0.32 0.38 0.36 0.37 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.32
share higher income 0.29 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.14
N 114 114 219 221 194 185 107 109 322 318
Table 3.4: Summary Statistics for participant characteristics across different treatments of the lab
and online experiments.
comparisons 4 are significant at the 5% level. The balancing tests reveal no statistically
significant differences between the two groups in almost all treatments. In INEQ-MTB
those receiving a “high” prime had provided more effort in the counting task and had been
more often lucky in the coin toss. As a result they also had a higher score.
3.4.3 Correlation among outcome measures
Raw Correlation
BIM Social Trust Blame
BIM - -0.0318 0.1470**
Social Trust - - -0.1536***
Blame - - -
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.5: Correlation among outcome
measures.
In this section we study how our main outcome measures correlate among each other.
We find two correlations that are substantial and statistically significant. Those who have
higher belief in meritocracy also have a substantially higher inclination to blame. This is
intuitive as both are measures of people’s inclination to ascribe responsibility for outcomes
to a persons’ actions - in the case of BIM themselves and in the case of blame others -
as opposed to outside forces like luck or the design of the economic and social system.
The second correlation we find is between blame and social trust. Those with lower social
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trust are substantially more likely to blame. There is only a very small and not statistically
significant correlation between social trust and belief in meritocracy.19 Appendix Table
C.14 shows that these correlations also appear in a regression where other covariates are
controlled for.
3.5 Results: Attribution
In this section we present our results on belief in meritocracy and blame.
3.5.1 Belief in Meritocracy
We start by discussing some descriptives and covariates of belief in meritocracy in our lab
experiment (Section 3.5.1.1). We then discuss the causal effect of inequality exposure and
relative position on belief in meritocracy (Section 3.5.1.2) before discussing some alterna-
tive mechanism and additional results (Section 3.5.1.3). In Section 3.5.1.4 we discuss the
results from our online experiments.
3.5.1.1 Descriptives and Covariates of Belief in Meritocracy
The procedure described in Section 2.1 classifies 42% of our participants in both REL-
MTB and INEQ-MTB as having high belief in meritocracy.20 Those with high belief
in meritocracy believe that the absolute difference between their ability/effort rank and
their overall rank xi is on average 0.6 (median 0.5, range [0,1.25]) in REL-MTB and 0.6
(0.5, [0,1.5]) in INEQ-MTB. For those with low belief in meritocracy, by contrast, these
numbers are 2.41 (2.5, [1.5,8]) in REL-MTB and 2.48 (2.5, [1.75,6]) in INEQ-MTB.
We first ask whether high belief in meritocracy is justified in our experiment. Appendix
Figure C.9 shows the difference in the average ability/effort rank and the overall rank across
the rank distribution. The figure shows that high belief in meritocracy is justified in our ex-
19This is true for both orders MTB (ρ =−0.0019) and BMT (ρ =−0.0470).
20The reason that fewer than 50 percent of participants are classified as high belief in meritocracy is that
our definition requires them to be strictly below the 50th percentile. Our treatment effects are robust to slight
changes in this cutoff.
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periment. The average difference xi is almost always below 1.5 across the rank distribution
and hence not enough to justify “low belief in meritocracy”.
We now study demographic as well as experiment based covariates of high belief in
meritocracy in these two treatments. We consider four demographic covariates: age, in-
come, gender and class. Appendix Table C.14 shows that across both REL-MTB and
INEQ-MTB and in line with the correlational evidence found by Newman et al. (2015)
and in the Next Steps 8 survey those with higher income have higher belief in meritocracy.
There is no statistically significant impact of age, gender or self-reported social class. Ap-
pendix Figure C.8 shows that high belief in meritocracy is present across all ranks 1-10
and there are no statistically significant differences in the proportions of those classified as
“high belief in meritocracy” across the rank distribution.
3.5.1.2 The Causal Effect of Inequality Exposure and Relative Position
We are interested in the causal effect of inequality exposure and relative position on belief
in meritocracy. Based on the correlational evidence from the Next Steps 8 survey we would
expect that being primed to a high relative position should increase belief in meritocracy,
while being primed to higher inequality should decrease belief in meritocracy.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.3: (a) REL-MTB, (b) INEQ-MTB. Belief in Meritocracy by whether participants were
primed with high relative position (Panel (a)) and by whether they were primed with the income
distribution only (Panel (b)). Stars are from t-test based on regression in Tables 3.6 and 3.7. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 3.3 shows the share of participants who have high belief in meritocracy (BIM =
1, see Section 3.4.1.2) depending on whether they were primed with a low or high relative
position (REL-MTB, Panel (a)) and depending on whether they were primed to low or
high inequality using only the distribution (INEQ-MTB, Panel (b)). The figure shows that
among those primed to a high relative position a substantially bigger share display high
belief in meritocracy than among those primed to a low relative position. There seems to
be no difference based on inequality exposure alone.
Belief in Meritocracy (BIM)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
high prime (β ) 0.181** 0.180** 0.178** 0.173* 0.224** 0.222*
(0.041) (0.041) (0.045) (0.070) (0.076) (0.084)
med income 0.075 0.088 0.119 0.078 -0.047
(0.041) (0.055) (0.070) (0.062) (0.191)
high income 0.338** 0.331** 0.324* 0.314 0.048
(0.094) (0.118) (0.119) (0.156) (0.163)
Constant 0.327*** 0.206** 0.231 0.0514 0.227 -0.089
(0.055) (0.062) (0.154) (0.261) (0.365) (0.322)
Extra Income Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES+
Other Controls NO NO YES YES+ YES+ YES+
Observations 114 114 114 113 113 113
R-squared 0.034 0.116 0.151 0.180 0.256 0.434
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.6: Belief in Meritocracy (BIM dummy) in treatment REL-MTB.
Note: Extra Income Controls are fixed effects for answers from income questionnaire. The
smaller set includes questions 1 and 4, the larger set (YES+) all questions. Other Controls are
age, gender and student status. The larger set also includes risk aversion, a competitiveness
dummy and overall score S. Standard errors clustered at the session level.
Table 3.6 shows regression analysis for treatment REL-MTB where we regress BIM on
a dummy indicating whether the participant was primed to a high relative position as well
as two income fixed effects. The coefficient of the prime shows the causal effect of relative
position, while the income coefficients show a correlational effect similar to what we saw
in Next Steps 8. The table shows that those who are primed to a high relative position
are 56% more likely to express high belief in meritocracy. The effect is robust when other
demographic as well as additional income controls are included (columns (3)-(6)).
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3.5.1.2.1 Heterogeneity and Persistence of the Effect
We consider a number of sample splits using always regressions analogous to specification
(1) in Table 3.6. We find that the effect of the prime is particularly strong for those in the
highest income category (β = 0.365∗∗∗) and for those who self-identify as upper class (β =
0.692∗∗).21 The prime has a similar effect for men (β = 0.154∗∗) and women (β = 0.214∗∗).
We can also ask how persistent the effect is. Recall that after having guessed their rank in
ability and effort participants are told their rank in the ability task and asked to guess again
their rank in the effort task. The effect of the prime persists when we define BIM based on
this second guess with β = 0.179∗∗. At the third step, however, after participants have also
been told whether they were lucky or not, the effect disappears (β = 0.056). Hence, when
all information has been revealed and there is no longer any uncertainty about the rank in
other components, then the prime does no longer have an effect.
Belief in Meritocracy (BIM)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
high prime (β ) 0.040 0.037 0.025 0.014 -0.069 -0.114
(0.049) (0.049) (0.040) (0.039) (0.066) (0.064)
med income 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.198 0.067
(0.118) (0.119) (0.120) (0.102) (0.054)
high income -0.031 -0.021 -0.025 -0.000 -0.080
(0.125) (0.129) (0.162) (0.175) (0.207)
Constant 0.400*** 0.364*** 0.140 0.074 0.197 0.332
(0.050) (0.030) (0.278) (0.286) (0.595) (0.725)
Extra Income Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES+
Other Controls NO NO YES YES+ YES+ YES+
Observations 114 114 114 114 114 114
R-squared 0.002 0.022 0.049 0.107 0.244 0.407
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.7: Belief in Meritocracy (BIM dummy) in treatment INEQ-MTB.
Note 1:Extra Income Controls are fixed effects from initial income questionnaire. The smaller
set includes questions 1 and 4, the larger set (YES+) all questions. Other Controls are age,
gender and student status. The larger set also includes risk aversion, a competitiveness dummy
and overall score S. Standard errors clustered at session level.
Table 3.7 shows regression analysis for treatment INEQ-MTB where participants were
only primed by the income distribution and were not shown their personal position in the
distribution. In this case the prime seems to have little effect. The coefficient β is sub-
21For those in the lowest income category β = 0.128∗∗ and for those in the middle income category β =
0.072∗.
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stantially smaller compared to REL-MTB, changing in sign and not statistically different
from zero. Hence without information on one’s own relative position inequality exposure
in itself do not seem to affect belief in meritocracy. We now discuss potential mechanisms
behind these results.
3.5.1.3 Alternative Mechanisms
We start by discussing two possible alternative mechanisms which might drive the causal
effect of the prime identified in treatment REL-MTB. Specifically, as we introduce a novel
measure of belief in meritocracy, we first ask whether the prime might affect some other
outcome which is picked up by our BIM measure.
Optimism and (Over-) Confidence
The first possibility we explore is whether being primed to a high relative position increases
confidence and makes participants more optimistic about their performance in terms of the
ability and effort tasks. If that was the case, then our measure of belief in meritocracy
might be picking up some of this effect. We hence, in analogy to our BIM definition,
define confidence using a dummy taking the value “1” for those who believe they are
in the better half of the distribution.
We would like to know whether the prime affects confidence defined in this way. Ta-
ble 3.8 reproduces Table 3.6 using confidence as outcome instead of BIM. The table
shows that there is no effect of the prime on confidence. The coefficient β is small, chang-
ing in sign and not statistically significant. It also has the “wrong” sign in five out of six
specifications suggesting that being primed to a higher relative position would lower confi-
dence. Being primed to a high relative position hence does not seem to make people more
confident on their task performance.
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Confidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
high prime (β ) -0.068 -0.073 -0.083 -0.084 -0.048 0.005
(0.066) (0.066) (0.074) (0.041) (0.056) (0.038)
med income 0.170 0.151 0.039 -0.003 -0.132
(0.101) (0.074) (0.100) (0.123) (0.150)
high income -0.120* -0.120 -0.041 0.008 -0.085
(0.047) (0.070) (0.057) (0.084) (0.188)
Constant 0.509*** 0.491*** 0.105 0.906** 1.349*** 1.411***
(0.052) (0.044) (0.334) (0.292) (0.061) (0.214)
Extra Income Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES+
Other Controls NO NO YES YES+ YES+ YES+
Observations 114 114 114 113 113 113
R-squared 0.005 0.057 0.073 0.368 0.446 0.559
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.8: Confidence in treatment REL-MTB.
Note: Extra Income Controls are fixed effects for answers from income questionnaire. The smaller set
includes questions 1 and 4, the larger set all questions. Other Controls are age, gender and student
status. The larger set also includes risk aversion, a competitiveness dummy and overall score S.
Standard errors clustered at the session level.
Anchoring
The second possibility we explore is that priming people to a “good position” in society
increases their belief that they have a “good” rank in the task. To evaluate the possibility of






and regress it on the same exogenous variables as in Table 3.6.
Anchoring
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
high prime (β ) 0.313 0.298 0.317 0.371 0.317 0.008
(0.344) (0.335) (0.293) (0.234) (0.294) (0.298)
med income 0.403 0.411 0.185 0.210 0.467
(0.422) (0.429) (0.354) (0.390) (0.468)
high income -0.802* -0.740* -0.232 -0.449 -0.204
(0.373) (0.332) (0.219) (0.466) (0.764)
Constant 5.077*** 5.186*** 6.071*** 8.844*** 7.918** 7.449***
(0.243) (0.405) (0.790) (1.180) (1.816) (1.172)
Extra Income Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES+
Other Controls NO NO YES YES+ YES+ YES+
Observations 114 114 114 113 113 113
R-squared 0.007 0.068 0.083 0.446 0.496 0.625
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.9: Anchoring treatment REL-MTB.
Note: Extra Income Controls are fixed effects for answers from income questionnaire. The smaller set
includes questions 1 and 4, the larger set all questions. Other Controls are age, gender and student
status. The larger set also includes risk aversion, a competitiveness dummy and overall score S.
Standard errors clustered at the session level.
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Table 3.9 shows the results. There is no statistically significant effect of the prime on
the average guessed rank. Further, the sign of the coefficient β is not in line with the
anchoring story, as it would imply that those being primed to a “good” position in society
believe that they are ranked worse in the experimental task. Anchoring does not seem to
drive the results.
In sum, being primed to a high relative position neither makes people more confident in
their task performance, nor does it make them believe they have a better rank in these tasks.
It does, however, lead them to perceive a tighter association between their performance
and their overall rank as we have seen above. We interpret this as increased belief in
meritocracy.
3.5.1.4 Online Experiment: Belief in Meritocracy
In this subsection we ask whether the same prime also affects belief in meritocracy when
measured using the standard survey measure of belief in meritocracy. In our online ex-
periment we use the same questionnaire and prime as in the lab and the same outcomes
(measures of belief in meritocracy) as in the Next Steps 8 survey (see Section 3.3). Hence,
as in the lab, we can make causal inference on belief in meritocracy, but unlike in the lab
the outcome measures here are not incentivized. Appendix Table C.1 compares the charac-
teristics of the different samples: our lab sample, our online sample and the Next Steps 8
sample.
We then redo the analysis presented in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 but this time using the survey
measures of belief in meritocracy as outcome variable. Table 3.10 shows the results for
the surveys where people are primed to their relative position. The table again shows a
clear effect of the prime on belief in meritocracy in this case. Participants primed to a high
relative position are 53% more likely to express high belief in meritocracy. By contrast if
participants are only primed using the inequality prime there is no discernible effect (Table
3.11). Hence we obtain very similar results using the established survey based measure of
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Belief in Meritocracy: Survey Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
high prime (β ) 0.175** 0.176** 0.191*** 0.177** 0.158** 0.180**
(0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.069) (0.068) (0.080)
med income 0.180** 0.169** 0.113 0.107 0.091
(0.079) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080) (0.091)
high income 0.043 0.011 0.006 0.061 0.100
(0.102) (0.105) (0.102) (0.114) (0.139)
Constant 0.505*** 0.447*** 0.266* -0.0961 -0.184 -0.398
(0.0493) (0.0579) (0.147) (0.186) (0.229) (0.294)
Extra Income Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES+
Other Controls NO NO YES YES+ YES+ YES+
Observations 194 194 190 189 188 187
R-squared 0.032 0.058 0.098 0.152 0.238 0.302
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.10: Belief in Meritocracy using survey measures and the REL prime.
Note: Extra Income Controls are fixed effects for answers from income questionnaire. The smaller
set includes questions 1 and 4, the larger set all questions. Other Controls are age, gender and student
status. The larger set also includes self-reported measures of risk aversion and competitiveness.
Belief in Meritocracy: Survey measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
high prime (β ) -0.037 -0.038 -0.034 -0.035 -0.048 -0.043
(0.073) (0.073) (0.076) (0.077) (0.082) (0.091)
med income -0.008 0.012 0.016 -0.036 -0.072
(0.081) (0.084) (0.085) (0.089) (0.105)
high income 0.245* 0.239* 0.257* 0.213 0.240
(0.134) (0.136) (0.138) (0.146) (0.169)
Constant 0.543*** 0.525*** 0.404** 0.335 0.109 -0.178
(0.0518) (0.0611) (0.159) (0.208) (0.267) (0.320)
Extra Income Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES+
Other Controls NO NO YES YES+ YES+ YES+
Observations 185 185 181 177 176 174
R-squared 0.001 0.021 0.027 0.032 0.081 0.201
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.11: Belief in Meritocracy using survey measures and the INEQ prime.
Note: Extra Income Controls are fixed effects for answers from income questionnaire. The
smaller set includes questions 1 and 4, the larger set all questions. Other Controls are age, gender
and student status. The larger set also includes self-reported measures of risk aversion and
competitiveness.
belief in meritocracy as we do with our novel incentivized measure in the lab.
The Inequality Prime
We have seen that the inequality prime does not cause changes in belief in meritocracy
neither when measured by using our incentivized lab task nor when measured using the
standard social survey question. On the other hand we have seen that there is a correlational
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effect in large social surveys where inequality is measured by the local Gini coefficient.22
There could be several reasons for this difference. First, it could be that inequality per
se does not affect belief in meritocracy but that the local Gini coefficient correlates with
something else that does. It is also difficult in the field to disentangle relative position from
inequality exposure per se and variation in the Gini coefficient will induce variation in
both. Second, it could be that there is indeed an effect but that our images of distributions
don’t lead people to perceive inequality. Or it could be that the two distributions used
in the experiment display too similar degrees of inequality to induce substantial enough
differences in belief in meritocracy for us to detect.
To address in particular the latter concern we ran an online survey (n = 331) where we
use ten different (hypothetical) societies with levels of inequality ranging from complete
equality to very high inequality (see Appendix Figures C.2). We again prime participants
using one of these distributions (randomly selected) and ask them to indicate belief in
meritocracy using the same measure as in the survey discussed in Section 3.5.1.4 and in
Next Steps 8. At the end of the survey we show them (a different) distribution and ask them
to indicate on a scale from 0,...,10 how unequal they believe this society is.
Figure 3.4 shows the share of respondents for who the belief in meritocracy dummy
takes the value 1 as a function of how unequal the society they were primed with is per-
ceived. The figure shows that there are substantial differences in how unequal societies
are perceived on average with the measure of perceived inequality ranging from 4.2 to
7.6. Also the distributions used in the lab experiment (indicated by red diamonds) differ in
terms of how unequal they are perceived. However, even the more substantial differences
in terms of perceived inequality do not translate into differences in belief in meritocracy.
This evidence suggests that there may not be a direct causal link between inequality
exposure in itself (distribution only) and belief in meritocracy. There are also intuitive
reasons to believe that inequality per se should not have an unambiguous effect on belief in
22In Next Steps 8 the average effect of “Gini” is −0.69∗∗∗ in specification (1) of Table 3.1.
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Figure 3.4: Belief in Meritocracy depending on how unequal society is perceived (on a scale from
0,...,10) by respondents. The red diamonds indicate the two distributions used in the lab experiment
and in the online survey discussed in Section 3.5.1.4.
meritocracy. On the one hand fully equal societies, where everyone has the same income,
are unlikely to be meritocracies as it seems not possible to get ahead of others by providing
effort. On the other hand societies with extreme levels of inequality are also unlikely to be
meritocracies as it is unlikely that extreme differences in earnings are caused by differential
effort or ability within one generation. Hence it seems entirely plausible that societies at
both extremes of the equality spectrum would be associated with a lack of meritocracy
by participants. It seems then likely that the correlational effects found in surveys relate
to other factors associated with inequality that go beyond the income distribution alone,
which includes the possibility that they are entirely driven by relative position. We cannot
rule out, on the other hand, that there is a causal effect and that priming techniques do not
work well enough to capture the impact of inequality per se (distinct from personal relative
position) as it is a more abstract and arguably less ego-relevant measure.23 In sum, we have
identified a clear and robust positive influence of relative position on belief in meritocracy.
Based on the analysis in this Section it is doubtful to us that there is an additional distinct
effect of inequality exposure per se.
23The inequality prime does affect social trust (see Section 3.6), though.
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3.5.2 Blame
We now study inclination to blame. As before we first discuss some descriptives and co-
variates of inclination to blame (Section 3.5.2.1) and then move to the causal effect of
inequality and relative position on inclination to blame (Section 3.5.2.2).
3.5.2.1 Descriptives and Covariates of Blame
Conditional on having chosen the lottery players A are rewarded by 0.67 (0.56) cents if the
lottery outcome was lucky in REL-BMT (INEQ-BMT). The range of blame is substantial,
though, with the minimum amount of blame being −0.30 cents (where players are “pun-
ished” for good lottery outcomes) and the maximum 6 GBP. Appendix Figure C.10 shows
the cumulative distribution of blame. The figure shows that around 25 percent of partic-
ipants do not blame and the vast majority display levels of blame between 0 and 2 GBP.
This is roughly in line with the amount of blame found by Gurdal et al. (2013), who find
an average effect of ≈ 1.2 US-dollars or ≈ 0.9 GBP. As there is no natural conversion of
these monetary amounts into “levels of blame” we standardize these values (to mean zero
and standard deviation of one) for the remainder of this section. Appendix Table C.14 re-
ports demographic covariates of (standardized) blame. There is no systematic relationship
between age, gender, income or class and blame. In terms of experiment-based co-variates
we see a positive relationship between blame and belief in meritocracy and a negative re-
lationship between inclination to blame and social trust. We now study the causal effect of
inequality exposure and relative position on inclination to blame.
3.5.2.2 The Causal Effect of Inequality Exposure and Relative Position
There is no prior empirical research relating inequality exposure and inclination to blame,
but based on the psychological mechanisms involved in attribution we might expect incli-
nation to blame to increase with relative position (Brooks et al., 2018; Magni, 2020). Panel
(a) in Figure 3.3 shows indeed somewhat higher inclination to blame for those primed to a
higher relative position, but the difference is not statistically significant.
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Blame
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
high prime (β ) 0.221 0.226 0.296 0.282 0.274 0.246
(0.160) (0.160) (0.192) (0.210) (0.218) (0.320)
medium income 0.183 0.169 0.116 -0.014 0.237
(0.222) (0.208) (0.207) (0.201) (0.314)
high income 0.191 0.094 0.083 0.018 0.041
(0.165) (0.179) (0.191) (0.270) (0.364)
Constant -0.089 -0.224 -0.784 -0.526 -0.561 -1.117
(0.111) (0.146) (0.541) (0.871) (0.527) (1.315)
Extra Income Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES+
Other Controls NO NO YES YES+ YES+ YES+
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96
R-squared 0.012 0.019 0.084 0.102 0.263 0.425
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.12: Blame Treatment REL-BMT.
Note: Extra Income Controls are fixed effects for answers from income questionnaire. The
smaller set includes questions 1 and 4, the larger set all questions. Other Controls are age,
gender and student status. The larger set also includes risk aversion and a competitiveness
dummy. Standard errors clustered at the session level.
Table 3.12 shows regression results. There is a small positive, but not statistically sig-
nificant effect of relative position on blame. There is also a positive correlational effect of
income which is very imprecisely estimated, though. Note also that the R2 increases sub-
stantially each time we add income controls (columns (5) and (6)) from the initial income
questionnaire. Hence, while we are unable to detect a statistically significant causal effect
of relative position on blame, additional controls from the income questionnaire seem to be
able to explain a substantial share of the variation in blame.24
Table 3.13 shows the results for the inequality prime. The table shows that there is no
statistically significant effect of the inequality prime on blame. The coefficient β is very
close to zero but also not very precisely estimated.
24We note that the causal effect is imprecisely estimated. We did do a power analysis after collecting half
our sample size which suggested that we should detect an effect of the size found in those data (β = 0.331)
with 80 percent probability. Note also that we do get statistical significance in the pooled data from the REL
treatments (β = 0.313∗, p = 0.061), however as there is positive correlation between blame and belief in
meritocracy we do not want to over-interpret these results.
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Blame
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
high prime (β ) 0.047 0.052 0.051 -0.003 -0.072 0.040
(0.245) (0.248) (0.226) (0.215) (0.251) (0.261)
medium income 0.076 0.093 0.134 0.065 0.177
(0.250) (0.261) (0.274) (0.327) (0.387)
high income 0.154 0.155 0.052 0.359 0.245
(0.192) (0.200) (0.199) (0.322) (0.454)
Constant -0.024 -0.012 0.022 0.686 0.037 1.079
(0.148) (0.183) (0.923) (0.980) (1.281) (1.672)
Extra Income Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES+
Other Controls NO NO YES YES+ YES+ YES+
Observations 97 97 97 97 97 97
R-squared 0.001 0.009 0.013 0.077 0.228 0.379
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.13: Blame Treatment INEQ-BMT.
Note: Extra Income Controls are fixed effects for answers from income questionnaire. The
smaller set includes questions 1 and 4, the larger set all questions. Other Controls are age,
gender and student status. The larger set also includes risk aversion and a competitiveness
dummy. Standard errors clustered at the session level.
3.5.2.3 Online Experiment: Blame
As with belief in meritocracy we also collected a non-incentivized survey measure of in-
clination to blame. We described the experimental scenario to participants in the online
survey and then asked them to make hypothetical choices. The income questionnaire and
primes used were again identical to those used in the lab. Power analysis based on specifi-
cation (1) and means and standard errors observed in the lab (REL treatment) suggested to
pick a sample size of 106 to have 80% power to detect an effect of this size in the survey.
We invited as many participants and over-recruited slightly. More details on the survey
procedures and sample characteristics can be found in Appendix C.1 and C.3. Appendix
Tables C.17 and C.18 show the results. They again show no statistically significant effect
of the prime on inclination to blame, though we do again see a positive coefficient when
participants are primed to relative position and a positive correlational effect of income on
inclination to blame.
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3.6 Results: Social Trust
We now study social trust. As before we first discuss some descriptives and covariates of
social trust (3.6.1) and then move to the causal effect of inequality and relative position
on social trust (Section 3.6.2). In Section 3.6.3 we discuss the results from our online
experiment on social trust.
3.6.1 Descriptives and Covariates of Social Trust
On average participants in both the REL and INEQ treatments believe that dictators will
share 46% of the pie with others. There are no statistically significant differences neither by
age, income nor gender. Upper class participants seem to have lower social trust compared
to middle and working class participants.25 In terms of experiment based covariates we find
no statistically significant associations except for the negative relationship with inclination
to blame discussed already above (Appendix Table C.14).
3.6.2 The Causal Effect of Inequality Exposure and Relative Position
We now ask whether being primed to a high relative position or a high degree of inequality
affects social trust. If the survey evidence discussed in Section 3.3 can be interpreted as
causal, then we would expect a positive effect of relative position on social trust.
Panel (a) in Figure 3.5 shows that social trust indeed increases on average when peo-
ple are primed to a high relative position. By contrast priming participants using only the
income distributions with varying degrees of inequality does not induce changes in our
measure of social trust. Table 3.14 shows regression results for the REL treatments. Par-
ticipants who are primed to a high relative position display about 15 percent higher levels
of social trust compared to those primed to a low relative position. They expect dictators
to share around 49 percent of the pie while those primed to a low relative position expect
25One reason why upper class participants might have lower social trust in our sample is that they are the
minority among participants. They hence express low social trust towards a population of participants mostly
coming from a working or lower middle class background. It should also be kept in mind that the sample of
participants self-identifying as upper class is relatively small.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.5: (a) REL, (b) INEQ. Social Trust by whether participants were primed with high relative
position (Panel (a)) and by whether they were primed with the income distribution only (Panel (b)).
Stars are from t-test based on regression in Table 3.14. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
them to share around 43 percent (column (1)). The effect is robust to including additional
demographic, experiment based and income controls across columns (2)-(6). As what is
deemed fair or “what one deserves” is likely to depend on score, columns (3)-(6) also con-
trol for participants’ scores as well as the size of the total pie. Table 3.15 shows the effect
of the inequality prime. Those primed to a high degree of inequality display about 6% less
social trust than others. The effect is not statistically significant, though, in four out of six
specifications and only significant at the 10% level in the remaining two.
Social Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
high prime (β ) 0.064** 0.064** 0.065** 0.067** 0.067** 0.071**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024)
medium income 0.021 0.020 0.032 0.018 0.032
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.058) (0.057)
high income 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.034 0.057
(0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.075) (0.075)
Constant 0.429*** 0.419*** 0.448*** 0.332*** 0.225 0.245
(0.016) (0.028) (0.095) (0.091) (0.155) (0.174)
Extra Income Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES+
Other Controls NO NO YES YES+ YES+ YES+
Observations 335 335 335 334 334 334
R-squared 0.020 0.021 0.024 0.041 0.095 0.150
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.14: Social trust REL treatments.
Note: Extra Income Controls are fixed effects from initial income questionnaire. The smaller set
includes questions 1-4, the larger set all eight questions. Other Controls are age, gender and student




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
high prime (β ) -0.028 -0.028 -0.029 -0.029 -0.033* -0.039*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
medium income 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.025 0.027
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.039) (0.036)
high income 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.021 0.041
(0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.068) (0.061)
Constant 0.487*** 0.483*** 0.487*** 0.486*** 0.425*** 0.409***
(0.016) (0.024) (0.083) (0.101) (0.091) (0.103)
Extra Income Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES+
Other Controls NO NO YES YES+ YES+ YES+
Observations 333 333 333 333 333 333
R-squared 0.004 0.005 0.010 0.012 0.098 0.141
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.15: Social trust INEQ treatments.
Note: Extra Income Controls are fixed effects from initial income questionnaire. The smaller set includes
questions 1-4, the larger set all eight questions. Other Controls are age, gender and student status. The
larger set also includes risk aversion, a competitiveness dummy, the size of the total pie and overall score
S.
3.6.2.0.1 Heterogeneity
The positive effect of own relative position is similarly strong for both genders (β = 0.072
for men and β = 0.056∗∗ for women). It is also similarly strong for high (β = 0.089∗∗) and
low income earners (β = 0.095∗∗), though it is smaller for the middle income category (β =
0.010). We cannot say whether this is a fundamental effect or due to the fact that the prime
is stronger for the former categories compared to the latter. In terms of social class we find
a similar pattern with a strong effect for upper (β = 0.166) and working class (β = 0.087∗)
participants and a smaller effect for middle class participants (β = 0.044∗). Across the
two different orders effect sizes are virtually identical (REL-MTB: β = 0.0632∗∗; INEQ-
MTB: β = 0.0639∗∗ for specification (1)).
3.6.3 Online Experiment: Social Trust
We also used the same income questionnaire and primes in an online experiment where we
measured their effect on answers to the standard survey question “Most people in life can
be trusted”. This question is used in Next Steps 8, the European Value Survey and other
general survey measures of social trust. We aimed for a similar sample size as in the lab
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experiment where we did detect a statistically significant effect of relative position on our
lab based measure of social trust, but we had a small percentage of drop-outs (fewer than
5%). Appendix Table C.3 compares sample characteristics of participants in Next Steps 8,
the lab and the online experiment.
Social Trust: Survey Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
high prime (β ) 0.501** 0.504** 0.529** 0.537** 0.514** 0.521**
(0.233) (0.230) (0.227) (0.227) (0.229) (0.232)
medium income 0.704*** 0.638** 0.671*** 0.649** 0.492*
(0.253) (0.257) (0.258) (0.265) (0.281)
high income 0.887*** 0.867** 0.860** 0.715* 0.539
(0.336) (0.343) (0.342) (0.372) (0.393)
Constant 4.956*** 4.570*** 3.087** 2.511 2.178 2.777
(0.165) (0.200) (1.423) (1.575) (1.657) (1.765)
Extra Income Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES+
Other Controls NO NO YES YES+ YES+ YES+
Observations 322 322 321 321 321 320
R-squared 0.014 0.048 0.079 0.091 0.104 0.188
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.16: Survey measure of social trust REL treatments.
Note: Extra Income Controls are fixed effects from initial income questionnaire. The smaller set
includes questions 1-4, the larger set all eight questions. Other Controls are age, gender and student
status. The larger set also includes risk aversion and a self reported competitiveness measure.
Social Trust: Survey Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
high prime (β ) -0.461** -0.542** -0.595*** -0.548** -0.670*** -0.798***
(0.232) (0.230) (0.222) (0.219) (0.223) (0.232)
medium income 0.561** 0.274 0.203 0.086 0.015
(0.256) (0.254) (0.251) (0.256) (0.268)
high income 1.026*** 0.973*** 0.922*** 0.791** 0.918**
(0.346) (0.336) (0.330) (0.369) (0.390)
Constant 5.790*** 5.511*** 2.968** 0.714 0.883 -0.337
(0.165) (0.188) (1.352) (1.470) (1.574) (1.685)
Extra Income Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES+
Other Controls NO NO YES YES+ YES+ YES+
Observations 318 318 317 317 317 312
R-squared 0.012 0.045 0.119 0.157 0.191 0.274
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.17: Survey measure of social trust INEQ treatments.
Note: Extra Income Controls are fixed effects from initial income questionnaire. The smaller set includes
questions 1-4, the larger set all eight questions. Other Controls are age, gender and student status. The
larger set also includes risk aversion and a competitiveness measure.
Table 3.16 shows the results for the REL prime. Those primed to a higher relative po-
sition express around 10% higher levels of social trust using the survey measure than those
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primed to a lower relative position. The effect size corresponds to about three standard
deviations. The table also shows a substantial correlational effect of income with those
with higher income displaying higher levels of social trust. Table 3.17 shows the results
for the INEQ prime. Respondents primed to a higher degree of inequality subsequently
show lower levels of trust. The effect size here is also substantial corresponding to about
2.8 standard deviations.
To sum up we have identified a positive effect of relative position on social trust and
a negative effect of inequality exposure per se. The effects show up both using our incen-
tivized lab experimental measure as well as the standard survey measure of social trust.
3.7 Conclusions
We provide causal evidence of non-negligible effects of inequality exposure and personal
relative position on attribution and social trust. Our design allows us not only to establish
causality but also to distinguish between the impact of personal relative position and in-
equality exposure per se. We found that a higher personal relative position leads to higher
belief in meritocracy and higher levels of social trust. Inequality exposure by itself de-
creases social trust. These results are evidence for both the palliative and corrosive effect
of inequality. A high relative position leads to an increased belief in meritocracy and in-
creased social trust, while a low relative position leads to rejection of meritocracy and low
levels of social trust.
Those results have important implications for our understanding of the medium and
long run impacts of inequality. They speak to the question of how economic and social
contexts shape people’s beliefs and preferences and they can help us understand, for ex-
ample, why different fairness views persist in different societies (Almas et al., 2019). The
results also have implications for the design of institutions and policies. When designing
policies it is important to have in mind the belief system of those the policy is defined for,
which may not be the same as the belief system of those who design the policy especially
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if they are from different social classes. In this respect one important question is how such
beliefs translate into policy preferences and how they aggregate in the political process.
This paper has identified robust causal effects of inequality on attribution and social
trust. We were also able to distinguish the effect of relative position from that of inequality
exposure per se. We have seen that in terms of attribution inequality exposure in itself has
little or no effect unless it is accompanied with information about relative position in which
case we detect strong and robust effects on belief in meritocracy. An important question
is how the effect of relative position interacts with inequality in the income distribution.
Empirically it is hard to identify the effect of relative position separately from inequality as
relative position cannot be communicated without information on the distribution. In terms
of policy implications we know, however, that differences in relative position will increase
with inequality as long as a cardinal interpretation is given to relative position. Digging
deeper into these interactions seems one avenue for future research. Further, while we
were able to rule out some mechanisms, a fully fledged analysis of the mechanisms driving
the co-evolution of social context, beliefs and preferences is outside the scope of this paper.
Clearly, though, this is a very important avenue for future research. We believe that the new





Appendix for “Individual Cheating in the Lab: A New Measure and External
Validity”
A.1 Experimental Instructions
This section provides the experimental instructions for both the laboratory and the field.
A.1.1 General instructions
Welcome!
You are about to take part in a decision-making experiment. It is important that you do not
talk to any of the other participants during the experiment. If you have a question at any
time, raise your hand and an assistant will come to your desk to answer it. This experiment
consists of five different parts and you will play each of them only once. You will receive
detailed instructions for each part on your computer screen as the experiment progresses.
In each part you will be asked to make one or more decisions. Decisions made in one part
of the experiment will bear no consequences for the other parts of the experiment. During
the experiment your earnings will be calculated in pounds and you will have the chance to
earn an amount of money that can range from 5 to 26. At the end of the main experiment
you will have to complete a brief questionnaire. At the end of the experiment the computer
will randomly select two parts for each participant. The sum of the earnings in these two
selected parts will constitute your payment for this experiment. In addition to this money
we will pay you 4 for showing up today and 1 for completing the questionnaire. Your cash
earnings will not be immediately paid. Instead, payments will be issued within few days
(from 23rd to 30th of November). You will receive further instructions about the payment
procedure at the end of the experiment. If you have a question now, please raise your hand
and a lab assistant will come to your workstation.
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A.1.2 Instructions for the list game
You are about to play an easy game. In the next screen you will see a list of 60 colour
names (e.g. tamarind). Once the list appears, a countdown of 5 seconds will start. This
list will be displayed until the countdown reaches zero. Before the list disappears, you will
have to choose one of the colour names in the list and keep it in your mind. Then, three
random lists containing 4 colour names each (for a total of 12 colours names) will appear.
If the colour you have in mind is in one of the lists, you will win the amount of money
associated to that list, otherwise 0. After you click the OK button the first list containing
60 colour names will be shown and the 5 seconds timer will start. Choose a colour in your
mind before the timer reaches zero. Click the OK button to start.
A.1.3 Instructions for the dice game
In this part you will have to roll a fair die with 5 sides. Every side corresponds to a colour.
Hence, every colour has probability of 1/5 to come up. This means that, in expectation, out
of 100 rolls every colour will come up 20 times. Before rolling the die, you have to choose
a colour in your mind from the ones displayed below. If the outcome of the roll is the same
colour you though of, you will earn 5, otherwise 0.
A.1.4 Instructions for dictator game
In this part the computer will randomly pair you with another participant. You will remain
paired with this person for the whole duration of this part. Once the decisions are made,
the pair will be dissolved. You, as well as the person you are paired with, will never learn
the identity of each other. In this part, both you and the participant you are paired with, will
have to split the same amount of money among you. Each of you simultaneously decides
the amount to transfer to the other participant. Hence, the decision of one subject is not
observable by the other participant. The computer will then choose with equal probability
which one of the two actions will be implemented. Your earnings from this part correspond
to the money that you keep for yourself (in case your choice is implemented) or to the
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money the other participant decides to transfer to you (if his/her choice is implemented).
A.1.5 Instructions for the lottery choice
In this part you will have to choose between five options. You will be paid based on which
option you choose. Each option involves a simple lottery with two possible outcomes that
are equally likely to occur. Hence, every lottery will return each of the two numbers with
50% probability.
A.1.6 Instructions for the trust game
In this part the computer will randomly pair you with another participant. You will remain
paired with this person for the whole duration of this part. Once the decisons are made, the
pair will be dissolved. You, as well as the person you are paired with, will never learn the
identity of each other. There are two types of player in this part, a sender and a receiver.
You will play both roles: at first as a sender and then as a receiver. Each person will be
allocated with the same amount of X. Firstly, each of you will simultaneously decides as
if you were the sender. As a sender you will have the opportunity to send some of the X
to the other person (receiver). Each pound sent to the receiver will be tripled. Thus, if the
sender sends x, the other player will receive 3x. Then, without observing the choice of
the other sender, you will be asked to choose as if you were the receiver. You will have
to decide how much money to send back to the sender for any possible amount of money
that you can receive. Once the decisions are made, the computer will choose with equal
probability which member of the pair is the sender and who is the receiver, implementing
the corresponding choices. The earnings of the sender from this part will correspond to the
amount of the endowment of X he/she keeps for his/herself plus the money returned by the
receiver. The earnings of the receiver from this part will correspond to the endowment of




INFORMED CONSENT FORM   PRODUCED BY UK DATA SERVICE 
 
 
Informed Consent for Study at ESSEXLab 
  
Please tick the appropriate boxes Yes No 
 
1. Taking part in the study 
  
I have read and understood the study information, or it has been read to me. I have been able to ask 
questions about the study and my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. 
  
  
I consent voluntarily to be a participant in this study and understand that I can refuse to answer 




I understand that the study will take approximately 60 minutes and that I am free to leave if I no 
longer wish to participate. 
 
I understand that for my participation I will receive at least 5£. Any additional money will depend on 
my answers and the ones from others. 
 
I understand that the payment will not be issued immediately after the experiment 
 
I understand that, in order to collect my payments, I need to come to campus two times between the 






















2. Use of the information in the study   




I understand that personal information collected about me that can identify me, such as my name, 




3. Future use and reuse of the information by others   
I give permission for the anonymized data that I provide to be deposited in the principal investigator’s 






4. Signatures   
 
_______________________                              ____________________           ______________ 
Name of participant [IN CAPITALS]      Signature                                Date 
  
   
I have accurately read out the information sheet to the potential participant and, to the best of my 
ability, ensured that the participant understands to what they are freely consenting. 
 
_ANDREA ALBERTAZZI___                        ___________________      _    _____________     __    




5. Study contact details for further information  










The purpose of this study is to get an indication on how people take decisions. In this study, you 
will be asked to complete different tasks.  Your participation in this study will take about one 
hour. If you have any questions about the study, they will be answered for you. 
For your participation in the study, you will receive a £4 show up payment, £1 for completing a 
short survey plus additional earnings depending on your choices. Your experimental earnings 
will be paid in cash but not immediately the end of the session. Instead, payments will be 
issued between the 23rd and the 30th of November. You will receive further instructions about 
the payment procedure at the end of the experiment. 
Your participation in this study is purely voluntary, and you may withdraw your participation or 
your data at any time without any penalty to you.  
Your data will be kept completely confidential by the researcher. Your personal information will 
not be stored with the data. Your responses will be stored in a computer database and used 
anonymously only for research purposes. 
If you have any questions, you can contact: _aalber@essex.ac.uk_ 
 
I have read the description of this study, my questions have been answered, and I give my 
consent to participate. 
 





Signature of Individual Obtaining Consent: …………………………………………………… 
Name (printed): ……………………………………………………………… 
Date: ……………………………  
Figure A.1: Consent forms for the NoFtF (left) and FtF (right) treatments. Subjects completed and
handed the forms before entering the lab. The change in the format is due to a change in EssexLab









Payment form          
This experiment will involve more than 100 participants and the experimental earnings can 
range from a minimum of £5 to a maximum of £26 (i.e., every integer number between 5 and 26 
is possible).  
In order to increase your anonymity, payments will not be provided in the lab. Instead, the 
payment procedure has been modified in the following stages: 
 
Stage 1  
While leaving the lab you have to draw one key. Every key corresponds to a locker. Lockers are 
located at ground floor of the LTB building (to the left after the main entrance). 
 
Stage 2 
From 9:00 of Tuesday 25th to 18:00 of Wednesday 26th leave this form, already filled in (date 
and earnings), in the locker with the number corresponding to the key that you have drawn. 
Keep the key with you. 
 
Stage 3 
After the above dates, this form will be collected by the experimenter and cash, corresponding 
to the reported total earnings at the bottom of this form, will be left into the locker. 
Stage 4 
From 9:00 of Thursday 27th to 17:00 of Saturday 29th: 
You can collect your payment from the locker with your key. After collection, please close the 
locker and leave the keys in the letterbox that will be installed just next to the lockers. 
 
Note: Please follow the payment procedure carefully. Remember to fill in this form otherwise it 
would not be possible to issue the payment. Please do not lose the key and remember to 
leave it into the letterbox. 
 
In case you have any question please contact:_aalber@essex.ac.uk__ 
 
Date (stage 2):…………… 
 







Payment form          
This experiment will involve more than 100 participants and the experimental earnings can 
range from a minimum of £5 to a maximum of £26 (i.e., every integer number between 5 and 26 
is possible).  
In order to increase your anonymity, the payments will be issued only when all observations will 
be collected. This will take about four business days and for this reason your payment will not 
be immediately issued. 
You can collect your experimental earnings bringing this form filled with all the relevant 
information (date and earnings) to: 
 
Office: 5B.149 (Department of Economics) 
Dates: from 23rd to 30th of November 
Hours: 9:00-12:00 and 14:00-17:00 
 
Your payment will be immediately issued in cash upon this form is handed to the experimenter.  
 
Note: Failure of providing this form will result in a payment of the £4 show-up fee only. 
 




Total earnings: £…………… 
 
 
Figure A.2: Payment forms for the NoFtF (left) and FtF (right) treatments. The unique and hidden
code that characterizes each form is given by the combination of the number of dots in the
“Payment date” and “Total earnings” fields (subject id), and the lenght of the line below the email
address (session id). In order to prevent copies, an university logo was stamped in the bottom right
corner of the paper sheets.
A.2 Additional tables
Outcome (£)
A (50%) B (50%) Expected value(£) Standard deviation
Lottery 1 2 2 2 0
Lottery 2 1.5 3.5 2.5 1
Lottery 3 1 5 3 2
Lottery 4 0.5 6.5 3.5 3
Lottery 5 0 8 4 4
Table A.1: Part five - Lottery task
Participants did not receive information regarding lottery’s expected value and standard deviations.
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OLS Probit (dy/dx)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Yes (=1) 0.662∗∗ 0.663∗∗ 0.666∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(0.305) (0.297) (0.300) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
Risk 0.185∗ 0.169∗ 0.173∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.049∗∗
(0.101) (0.099) (0.102) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Transfer dictator −0.309∗∗∗ −0.284∗∗ −0.284∗∗ −0.051∗∗ −0.047∗∗ −0.047∗∗
(0.116) (0.114) (0.115) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
Amount returned (trust) 0.010 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.021 0.020
(0.130) (0.131) (0.131) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Constant 1.576∗∗∗ 1.181∗∗ 1.131∗
(0.548) (0.545) (0.630)
Controls YES YES+ YES++ YES YES+ YES++
Observations 225 225 225 225 225 225
Table A.2: Cheating and other individial attitudes.
Note: Specifications 1-3 represent least square estimations on choices made in the list game. Specifications 4-6
represent marginal effects on a dummy variable indicating whether a subject lied in the list game or not.
Specifications (1) and (3) control whether the list game was played after the other cheating task involving the
virtual die. Specifications (2) and (5) include a dummy for the NoFtF treatment and regressions (3) and (6)
additionally control for gender effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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OLS Probit (dy/dx)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.003 −0.004 −0.003 −0.004
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Female (= 1) −0.405 −0.391 −0.172 −0.209 −0.062 −0.061 −0.015 −0.025
(0.308) (0.310) (0.341) (0.346) (0.064) (0.064) (0.069) (0.069)
Religious (= 1) 0.367 0.134 0.313 0.130 0.098 0.047 0.084 0.041
(0.299) (0.314) (0.302) (0.315) (0.062) (0.065) (0.062) (0.064)
Student (= 1) 1.286 1.103 0.912 0.805 0.324∗ 0.263 0.245 0.199
(0.789) (0.794) (0.800) (0.799) (0.169) (0.167) (0.170) (0.167)
Origin:
Africa 0.556 0.528 0.073 0.074
(0.496) (0.510) (0.098) (0.098)
Asia 0.657∗ 0.547 0.153∗ 0.135
(0.380) (0.403) (0.080) (0.083)
N. America 0.676 0.524 0.280∗ 0.260
(0.667) (0.714) (0.167) (0.166)
S. America −1.641∗∗∗ −1.482∗∗∗ −0.341 −0.346
(0.591) (0.528) (0.229) (0.218)
Field of Study/Job:
Biology 0.746 0.643 0.096 0.074
(0.562) (0.571) (0.112) (0.110)
Computer Sc. 1.011∗ 0.854 0.167 0.129
(0.539) (0.545) (0.110) (0.109)
Economics & Business 0.833∗ 0.656 0.183∗ 0.143
(0.486) (0.503) (0.099) (0.100)
Government 0.774 0.783 0.165 0.171∗
(0.491) (0.487) (0.102) (0.101)
Linguistics 0.551 0.557 0.098 0.080
(0.697) (0.715) (0.137) (0.137)
Psychology −0.321 −0.256 −0.027 −0.009
(0.506) (0.494) (0.113) (0.110)
Sociology 0.732 0.795 0.198 0.203
(0.680) (0.656) (0.146) (0.143)
Constant 1.325 1.457 1.032 1.177
(1.191) (1.190) (1.211) (1.205)
Observations 249 249 249 249 249 249 249 249
Table A.3: Cheating and individial demographics.
Note: Specifications 1-4 represent least square estimations on choices made in the list game. Specifications 5-8 represent marginal effects
on a dummy variable indicating whether a subject lied in the list game or not. The baseline for Origin is Europe, while for Field of
Study/Job is represented by Other. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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OLS Probit (dy/dx)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Big-5
Agreebleness 0.104 0.112 0.013 0.015
(0.326) (0.325) (0.072) (0.072)
Consciousness −0.172 −0.167 −0.028 −0.027
(0.306) (0.305) (0.066) (0.066)
Extraversion −0.186 −0.204 −0.016 −0.018
(0.384) (0.380) (0.079) (0.079)
Neuroticism 0.306 0.257 0.055 0.048
(0.206) (0.210) (0.045) (0.046)
Openness −0.053 −0.097 0.011 0.005
(0.210) (0.214) (0.045) (0.046)




Observations 249 249 249 249
Table A.4: Cheating and personality traits.
Note: Specifications 1-2 represent least square estimations on choices
made in the list game. Specifications 3-4 represent marginal effects on a
dummy variable indicating whether a subject lied in the list game or not.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
OLS Probit (dy/dx)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
list game:
1£ −0.579∗ −0.630∗ −0.682∗
(0.324) (0.341) (0.365)
3£ −0.400 −0.268 −0.262
(0.401) (0.397) (0.398)
5£ 0.295 0.455 0.437
(0.489) (0.469) (0.466)
Cheater (= 1) 0.018 0.028 0.023
(0.047) (0.050) (0.050)
Risk 0.146 0.163 0.135 0.011 0.012 0.009
(0.144) (0.148) (0.146) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Transfer dictator 0.299 0.292 0.299 0.028 0.028 0.029
(0.197) (0.194) (0.194) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Transfer trust −0.535∗∗ −0.547∗∗ −0.579∗∗ −0.060∗∗ −0.060∗∗ −0.064∗∗
(0.221) (0.223) (0.230) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Constant 0.006 0.739 1.045
(0.776) (0.950) (1.012)
Controls YES YES+ YES++ YES YES+ YES++
Observations 209 209 209 209 209 209
Table A.5: Laboratory behaviour and cheating in the field with over-reported
money (in pounds) as a dependent variable.
Note: Specifications 1-3 represent least square estimations on the amount of money over-reported in the
field. Dummies 1£, 3£, and 5£ represent choices made in the list game (honests are the excluded
category). Specifications 4-6 represent marginal effects of cheating in the list game on a dummy
variable indicating whether a subject lied in the field or not. Specifications (1) and (4) include a dummy
for the NoFtF treatment, regressions (2) and (5) further control for actual laboratory earnings and,
specifications (3) and (6) additionally control for gender effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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OLS Probit (dy/dx)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Yes (=1) 0.045∗ 0.053∗ 0.050∗ 0.094∗ 0.106∗ 0.101∗
(0.025) (0.030) (0.029) (0.050) (0.056) (0.054)
Risk 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.013 0.015 0.013
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Transfer dictator 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.030 0.029 0.030
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Transfer trust −0.032∗∗ −0.032∗ −0.034∗∗ −0.049∗ −0.049∗ −0.052∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
Constant −0.027 0.001 0.020
(0.056) (0.056) (0.057)
Controls YES YES+ YES++ YES YES+ YES++
Observations 209 209 209 209 209 209
Table A.6: Laboratory behaviour and cheating in the field with Cheat field as a
dependent variable.
Note: Variable Yes is a dummy which is equal to one if the subject reported a positive payoff in the
mind game with the dice. Specifications 1-3 represent least square estimations on the variable Cheat
field. Specifications 4-6 represent marginal effects on a dummy variable indicating whether a subject
lied in the field or not. Specifications (1) and (4) include a dummy for the NoFtF treatment, regressions
(2) and (5) further control for actual laboratory earnings and, specifications (3) and (6) additionally


























Table A.7: Sample statistics
Note: Sample summary statistics from














































Answers in die−roll game
FtF
Figure A.3: Comparison of choices in die-roll mind game and cheating in the field for the NoFtF
(left panel, n=123) and FtF (right panel, n=103) treatments with weighted markers. The y-axis
indicates the extent of cheating in the field relative to the maximum payoff a subject could claim.
The x-axis represents the choices made in the mind game involving the die roll.
A.4 Screenshots
Figure A.4: Colour choice in the list game.
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Appendix for “Benchmarking Information Aggregation in Experimental Markets”
B.1 Experimental Instructions
In the following we provide the experimental instructions for the Market treatment under
Public information without bid-ask feedback and for the BDM treatment under Private
information with bid-ask feedback. All other treatments are a combination of these instruc-
tions.
B.1.1 Market under Public information without bid-ask feedback
Instructions
Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment. Please, read these instructions
carefully. They are identical for all the participants with whom you will interact during this
experiment. If you have a question, please, raise your hand. One of the experimenters will
come to you and answer your questions. From now on communication with other partici-
pants is not allowed. If you do not conform to these rules we are sorry to have to exclude
you from the experiment. Please do also switch off your mobile phone at this moment. At
the end of the experiment you will receive a payment. How much you get depends on your
decisions and those of other participants. During the experiment the earnings are expressed
in ECU (Experimental Currency Units). At the end of the experiment the ECUs collected
are converted into Euros according to the exchange rate 1 ECU = 5 Eurocents. In addition
there is the 5 Euro show up fee. All your decisions will be treated confidentially.
The experiment
There will be two different assets in this experiment, which will be labeled with different
colors. In these instructions we will talk about the BLACK asset and the WHITE asset. In
the experiment, however, different colors will be used.
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Both assets have one of the following three possible returns: 50 ECU, 100 ECU or 150
ECU. The difference between the two assets is the probabilities with which these possible
returns realize. One of the assets returns the values 50, 100 and 150 with probabilities 3/5,
1/5 and 1/5; while the other asset returns these values with probabilities 1/5, 1/5 and 3/5,
respectively.
One way to think about this is that both the BLACK and the WHITE asset represent an
envelope with money containing bills of 50 ECU, 100 ECU and 150 ECU. The difference
is that the BLACK and WHITE envelope might contain different numbers of each of these
bills. One envelope contains 3 bills of 50, 1 bill of 100 and 1 of 150, the other has 1 bill
of 50, 1 bill of 100 and 3 of 150. The value of an asset is determined by randomly picking
one bill from the envelope. In total the experiment consists of three repetitions. In each
repetition there will be different assets. You can buy or sell assets in each repetition for ten
trading periods.
The trading
You will be matched with four other participants in a group. In each trading period, you
have one share of each asset (BLACK and WHITE) in stock. You will tell us two numbers:
(i) your buying price: this is the maximum price at which you are willing to buy one
more share of this asset, and
(ii) your selling price: this is the minimum price at which you are willing to sell your
share of this asset.
Hence, in total you will tell us four numbers, two for each asset.
All group members will tell us their four numbers simultaneously. Afterwards, for each
asset BLACK and WHITE, the buying prices of all group members are ranked highest
to lowest and the selling prices of all group members are ranked lowest to highest. The
market price of each asset is determined as follows:
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1. First we compare the lowest selling price with the highest buying price.
• If this selling price is higher than this buying price, then there is no market price
(which we will mark with xxx).
• Otherwise, we proceed to 2.
2. Compare the second-lowest selling price with the second-highest buying price.
• If this selling price is higher than this buying price, then the market price is the
average of the lowest selling price and the highest buying price.
• Otherwise, we proceed to 3.
3. Compare the third-lowest selling price with the third-highest buying price.
• If this selling price is higher than this buying price, then the market price is the
average of the second-lowest selling price and the second-highest buying price.
• Otherwise, we proceed to 4.
4. Compare the fourth-lowest selling price with the fourth-highest buying price.
• If this selling price is higher than this buying price, then the market price is the
average of the third-lowest selling price and the third-highest buying price.
• Otherwise, we proceed to 5.
5. Compare the fifth-lowest (or highest) selling price with the fifth-highest (or lowest)
buying price.
• If this selling price is higher than this buying price, then the market price is the
average of the fourth-lowest selling price and the fourth-highest buying price.
• Otherwise, the market price is the average of this fifth-lowest selling price and
this fifth-highest buying price.
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For example, assume that, for some asset, the five buying prices are (5400, 100, 21, 7, 1)
and the selling prices are (8, 24, 65, 201, 300). The lowest selling price of 8 is lower than
the highest buying price of 5400. Hence, we proceed to step 2. The second-lowest selling
price of 24 is lower than the second-highest buying price of 100. Hence, we proceed to step
3. The third-lowest selling price of 65 is higher than the third-highest buying price of 21.
Hence, two shares are traded in your group and the market price is the average between the
second-lowest selling price of 24 and the second-highest buying price of 100, which is 62.
Once the market price is determined, all group members with buying prices above the
market price and with selling prices below the market price will trade one share of the asset
(at the market price). In case there is excess demand or excess supply, group members with
higher buying prices and lower selling prices will trade first. In case of ties (equal buying
prices or equal selling prices) between group members, a random selection of these will be
trading.
Information
At the end of each period you will observe for each asset (BLACK and WHITE):
• the market price;
• whether you sold the asset, you bought the asset, or did not make any trade at all.
Your earnings in the experiment
At the end of the experiment one period is randomly drawn. Your earnings in the experi-
ment are based on your payoff from that randomly drawn period.
First the return of the BLACK and the WHITE asset (either 50, 100 or 150) are determined
according to the respective probabilities. In terms of our envelope example you can think
of one bill being randomly drawn from the BLACK and one from the WHITE envelope.
Recall here that one of the assets returns the values 50, 100 and 150 with probabilities 3/5,
1/5 and 1/5; while the other asset returns these values with probabilities 1/5, 1/5 and 3/5,
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respectively. All group members know at any point during the experiment which asset has
which return probabilities.
Your payoff in this period is then computed as follows:
Payoff = Number of shares of BLACK asset×Return of BLACK asset
+Number of shares of WHITE asset×Return of WHITE asset
−Market price BLACK asset if a share of this asset is bought
+Market price BLACK asset if a share of this asset is sold
−Market price WHITE asset if a share of this asset is bought
+Market price WHITE asset if a share of this asset is sold
Questionnaire
At the end of the experiment there will be a short questionnaire for you to fill in.
If you have any questions about these instructions or the experiment, then please raise your
hand now and someone will come and answer them.
Once everyone has finished reading the instructions some control questions will appear on
your screen that will allow you to test your understanding of the instructions.
B.1.2 BDM under Private information with bid-ask feedback
Instructions
Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment. Please, read these instructions
carefully. They are identical for all the participants with whom you will interact during this
experiment. If you have a question, please, raise your hand. One of the experimenters will
come to you and answer your questions. From now on communication with other partici-
pants is not allowed. If you do not conform to these rules we are sorry to have to exclude
you from the experiment. Please do also switch off your mobile phone at this moment. At
the end of the experiment you will receive a payment. How much you get depends on your
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decisions and those of other participants. During the experiment the earnings are expressed
in ECU (Experimental Currency Units). At the end of the experiment the ECUs collected
are converted into Euros according to the exchange rate 1 ECU = 5 Eurocents. In addition
there is the 5 Euro show up fee. All your decisions will be treated confidentially.
The experiment
There will be two different assets in this experiment, which will be labeled with different
colors. In these instructions we will talk about the BLACK asset and the WHITE asset. In
the experiment, however, different colors will be used.
Both assets have one of the following three possible returns: 50 ECU, 100 ECU or 150
ECU. The difference between the two assets is the probabilities with which these possi-
ble returns realize. In other words the chance to get 50 or 100 or 150 is different for the
BLACK compared to the WHITE asset. The only thing you know is that each of these
returns is possible with positive probability for both assets.
One way to think about this is that both the BLACK and the WHITE asset represent an
envelope with money containing bills of 50 ECU, 100 ECU and 150 ECU. The difference
is that the BLACK and WHITE envelope might contain different numbers of each of these
bills. The only thing you know is that in each envelope there is at least one bill of each
kind.
In total the experiment consists of three repetitions. In each repetition there will be differ-
ent assets. You can buy or sell assets in each repetition for ten trading periods.
Signal
At the beginning of each repetition you receive a signal. A signal is a piece of information
for you about each of the assets. You will receive the following signal. For each asset we
will tell you one number 50, 100 or 150. The probability with which we tell you each of
these numbers corresponds to the probability with which the asset has this return. Hence
the higher the probability that the asset has a certain return, the higher the chance that we
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show you this number.
In terms of our envelope example you can think about your signal as follows. We randomly
draw one bill out of each envelope and show it to you. Hence the more bills of a certain
type an envelope contains, the more likely it is that we draw one of these.
In the experiment you will be matched with four other participants in a group. Not only
you, but also all of the other group members will receive a signal in the same manner as
you. Note, however, that different participants might receive different signals.
The trading
In each trading period, you have one share of each asset (BLACK and WHITE) in stock.
You will tell us two numbers:
(i) your buying price: this is the maximum price at which you are willing to buy one
more share of this asset, and
(ii) your selling price: this is the minimum price at which you are willing to sell your
share of this asset.
Hence, in total you will tell us four numbers, two for each asset.
For each asset (BLACK and WHITE), the central computer will draw a random number
between 50 and 150–all numbers in this interval are equally likely to be drawn. The num-
bers drawn are the random price of the assets.
For each asset (BLACK and WHITE):
• you buy one more share at the random price if your buying price is above this random
price;
• you sell your share at the random price if your selling price is below this random
price;
• you will neither buy nor sell if the random price is above your buying price and below
your selling price;
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All group members will tell us their four numbers simultaneously. Afterwards, for each
asset BLACK and WHITE, the buying prices of all group members are ranked highest to
lowest and the selling prices of all group members are ranked lowest to highest.
The group value of each asset is determined as follows:
1. First we compare the lowest selling price with the highest buying price.
• If this selling price is higher than this buying price, then there is no market price
(which we will mark with xxx).
• Otherwise, we proceed to 2.
2. Compare the second-lowest selling price with the second-highest buying price.
• If this selling price is higher than this buying price, then the market price is the
average of the lowest selling price and the highest buying price.
• Otherwise, we proceed to 3.
3. Compare the third-lowest selling price with the third-highest buying price.
• If this selling price is higher than this buying price, then the market price is the
average of the second-lowest selling price and the second-highest buying price.
• Otherwise, we proceed to 4.
4. Compare the fourth-lowest selling price with the fourth-highest buying price.
• If this selling price is higher than this buying price, then the market price is the
average of the third-lowest selling price and the third-highest buying price.
• Otherwise, we proceed to 5.
5. Compare the fifth-lowest (or highest) selling price with the fifth-highest (or lowest)
buying price.
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• If this selling price is higher than this buying price, then the market price is the
average of the fourth-lowest selling price and the fourth-highest buying price.
• Otherwise, the market price is the average of this fifth-lowest selling price and
this fifth-highest buying price.
For example, assume that, for some asset, the five buying prices are (5400, 100, 21, 7, 1)
and the selling prices are (8, 24, 65, 201, 300). The lowest selling price of 8 is lower than
the highest buying price of 5400. Hence, we proceed to step 2. The second-lowest selling
price of 24 is lower than the second-highest buying price of 100. Hence, we proceed to
step 3. The third-lowest selling price of 65 is higher than the third-highest buying price of
21. The group value is hence determined as the average between the second-lowest selling
price of 24 and the second-highest buying price of 100, which is 62. At a price equal to
this group value of 62, two individuals buy a share and two individuals sell a share.
Information
At the end of each period you will observe for each asset (BLACK and WHITE):
• the group value;
• the random price;
• whether you sold the asset, you bought the asset, or did not make any trade at all.
Your earnings in the experiment
At the end of the experiment one period is randomly drawn. Your earnings in the experi-
ment are based on your payoff from that randomly drawn period.
First the return of the BLACK and the WHITE asset (either 50, 100 or 150) are determined
according to the respective probabilities. In terms of our envelope example you can think
of one bill being randomly drawn from the BLACK and one from the WHITE envelope.
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Your payoff in this period is then computed as follows:
Payoff = Number of shares of BLACK asset×Return of BLACK asset
+Number of shares of WHITE asset×Return of WHITE asset
−Market price BLACK asset if a share of this asset is bought
+Market price BLACK asset if a share of this asset is sold
−Market price WHITE asset if a share of this asset is bought
+Market price WHITE asset if a share of this asset is sold
Questionnaire
At the end of the experiment there will be a short questionnaire for you to fill in.
If you have any questions about these instructions or the experiment, then please raise your
hand now and someone will come and answer them.
Once everyone has finished reading the instructions some control questions will appear on
your screen that will allow you to test your understanding of the instructions.
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B.2 Sample Information and Questionnaire
Table B.1 provides some descriptive statistics about our experimental sample that we elicited
in the post-experimental questionnaire. Apart from demographics (Gender, Age, Origin,
Field of studies and years of graduate education), we elicited risk attitudes using a self-
assessed measure as in Dohmen et al. (2011). Participants answered the question “Are you
generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?”
on a ten-point scale ranging between “Not at all willing to take risks” and “Very willing to
take risks”.
We assessed the Machiavellianism score using the Likert-Type Mach Scale (IV) devel-
oped in Christie and Geis (1970). We measure the individual propensity to compete with
others using the Revised Competitiveness Index (RCI) developed in Houston et al. (2002).
This 14-items aggregate index can be subdivided in order to capture the individual “Enjoy-
ment of Competition” and “Contentiousness”. We elicited participants’ degree of optimism
using a revised Life Orientation Test as in Scheier et al. (1994). For each of these three di-
mensions participants indicated how much they personally agreed or disagreed with some
statements using a five-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly
agree”.
Finally, the Big-5 test assesses five personality traits: Openness, Consciousness, Ex-
traversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism. These personality dimensions were elicited
using a 15-item questionnaire evaluated on a five-point Likert scale running from “strongly
disagree” to “strongly agree” (Costa and McCrae, 1992).
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Public information Private information
BDM Market BDM Market
Female 0.50 0.54 0.60 0.56
(0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49)
Age 20.63 20.69 21.94 21.30
(2.46) (3.08) (2.38) (2.15)
Years of study 2.02 2.50 2.57 2.25
(1.22) (1.74) (1.54) (1.18)
Risk 6.05 6.49 6.15 6.20
(1.79) (1.87) (1.97) (1.87)
Machiavellianism 60.76 61.30 59.82 59.50
(7.02) (8.09) (6.14) (7.76)
RCI 50.00 47.40 46.91 46.30
(7.27) (10.06) (8.38) (7.55)
Optimism 20.52 20.32 19.90 20.39
(4.13) (4.23) (3.95) (3.73)
Big-5:
Openness 10.94 11.10 10.95 10.52
(2.26) (2.60) (1.97) (2.25)
Consciousness 10.66 10.64 10.19 10.69
(2.24) (2.07) (2.16) (1.98)
Extraversion 10.85 10.81 10.52 10.68
(2.32) (2.46) (2.41) (2.41)
Agreeableness 11.11 11.54 11.20 11.34
(2.03) (2.21) (1.83) (1.95)
Neuroticism 8.72 9.32 9.40 9.02
(2.99) (2.81) (2.52) (2.39)
Origin:
Africa 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03
Asia 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.05
Dutch 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.21
German 0.39 0.35 0.41 0.35
Middle or South America 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.01
North America 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.00
Oceania 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Other in Europe 0.28 0.29 0.34 0.34
Study:
Econometrics and Op. Research 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.03
Economics and Business Economics 0.17 0.09 0.08 0.09
Exchange Student 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.02
Fiscal Economics 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.03
Infonomics 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
International Business 0.59 0.49 0.34 0.44
Int. Business Economics 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.06
Int. Economic Studies 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.02
Other 0.08 0.27 0.46 0.29
Observations 80 80 80 80
Table B.1: Sample statistics.
Note: Means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of questionnaire variables.
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B.3 Additional Theoretical Background and Proofs
B.3.1 Equilibrium with a More General State Space
In this appendix we reconsider the theoretical predictions derived in Section 2.2.2 for the
case where agents perceive a more general state space. As before we derive the theoretical
predictions for the Market treatment with Private information and without bid-ask feedback
for signal ρ1.1 Let A and B be two assets/urns and assume that all agents have the same
beliefs about the number of balls, k, contained into each urn. Given that every outcome has
positive probability, each urn must contain at least four balls in order for ambiguity to be









































, i = A,B.
Assume agents have prior beliefs uniformly distributed on all NA×NB possible states con-
tained in Ω where Ni =
(k−1)(k−2)
2 .
Let ri ∈ {50,100,150} be the signal received by one agent for asset i and the function
p(·|ri) : ri → Ωi be her posterior beliefs. Then, posterior beliefs for an agent with signal















for `= 2, . . . ,k−1 and α = k(k−1)(k−2)6 . Analogously the posterior beliefs on states ωB can
be computed. This implies that an agent with signal (150,50) will have an expected value









































1Note that as long as both signals ρ1 and ρ2 reflect exactly assets distribution over outcomes, the theoret-












































In the same fashion, agents with signal (50,150) will have posterior beliefs that imply
an expected value of 50 (7k+3)4k for asset A and 150
(3k−1)
4k for asset B. Agents with signal
(100,50) will have an expected value for asset A of 100 and an expected value for asset
B of 50 (7k+3)4k , and agents with signal (150,100) will have an expected value of 150
(3k−1)
4k




Under our setting it is straightforward to show that a fully revealing rational expecta-
tions equilibrium exists and it is unique. Indeed, in the first period the ordered bids for




























which means that asset A will trade at a price of 150(3k−1)4k ∈ [103.125,112.5). Analogously,
asset B will trade at a price of 50(7k+3)4k ∈ (87.5,96.875].
Given these prices agents recognize that at least three agents have received a signal of
150 for asset A (and 50 for asset B), respectively. If further asks and bids are observed
(as in the treatments with bid-ask feedback) then all private information is revealed in
the first round. In this case while the price reveals all private information of each indi-
vidual, it is possible that some residual uncertainty about the state remains as in Radner
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(1979). To eliminate all residual uncertainty we would need an infinite number of traders.
Note, though, that with a uniform prior the posterior will be concentrated on the true state.
Without bid-ask feedback more than one period of trading is needed to reveal all private
information (depending on k), but only one period is needed to rank the assets correctly.
B.3.2 Strategic Behaviour: Shading Bids and Asks
Let relative to the previous section, traders shading their bid and asks by ε . less and ask ε




















































which is in (93.75,98.4375]. For both assets we find two units being traded.
B.3.3 Ambiguity Aversion
Let mA(ω) be the return obtained with asset A in state ω and denote by Ep(mA)=∑ω∈Ω p(ω)mA(ω)
be the expected return given posterior p. Following Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Cer-
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where P is the set of beliefs the ambiguity averse agent entertains. Further, denote by p̂ the
posterior of an agent who does not perceive ambiguity.
Proposition 1. If P includes beliefs p such that Ep(mA) < Ep̂(mA), then the ambiguity
averse agents will bid less for asset A than the agent who does not perceive ambiguity.
Proof: Since there is a belief p∈P such that Ep(mA)<Ep̂(mA), it follows that infp∈P Ep(mA)<
Ep̂(mA). Hence, the agent perceiving ambiguity will perceive asset A as less valuable.
B.3.4 Social Comparison Model from Section 4.2.
We expand here on the model discussed in Section 4.2 and show how a swap affects agent
i’s utility. Before the swap, when agent i holds asset H and agent j holds asset L, agent i’s
utility is given by











where u21 ≡ u(100)−u(50), u32 ≡ u(150)−u(100) and u31 ≡ u(150)−u(50) are all pos-
itive. Agent i’s utility after the swap is given by











Hence, the swap between assets leads to a decrease in utility of
V (H,L)−V (L,H) = η [EU(H)−EU(L) ]
+ 225 ψ [ (v(u21)− v(−u21))+(v(u32)− v(−u32))+4(v(u31)− v(−u31)) ]
for agent i. Since v(y)− v(−y)> 0 for all y > 0, this decrease is increasing in ψ .
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B.4 Additional Tables
Repetition 1 Repetition 2 Repetition 3
Matching group Ranking Signal Ranking Signal Ranking Signal
MG 1–2 Red > Green ρ1 Yellow < Purple ρ2 Blue < Orange ρ1
MG 3–4 Red < Green ρ1 Yellow > Purple ρ1 Blue > Orange ρ2
MG 5–6 Red > Green ρ2 Yellow < Purple ρ1 Blue > Orange ρ2
MG 7–8 Red < Green ρ2 Yellow > Purple ρ2 Blue < Orange ρ1
Table B.2: Composition of repetitions over matching groups.
Ranking of the assets (labelled by colors) and signal distributions for the different matching groups.
Female Age Risk Machiav. Optimism
Constant 0.500∗∗∗ 23.137∗∗∗ 6.050∗∗∗ 60.763∗∗∗ 20.525∗∗∗
(0.056) (1.309) (0.210) (0.816) (0.449)
Private info 0.100 −1.200 0.100 −0.938 −0.625
(0.079) (1.851) (0.297) (1.154) (0.635)
Market 0.037 −2.450 0.437 0.537 −0.200
(0.079) (1.851) (0.297) (1.154) (0.635)
Private info×Market −0.075 1.813 −0.387 −0.862 0.687
(0.112) (2.617) (0.420) (1.631) (0.898)
Observations 320 320 320 320 320
Table B.3: Balancing check.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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LPM Probit (dy/dx)
Prob(Price H > Price L) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.966∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.949∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.030)
Private info (β ) −0.213∗∗∗ −0.297∗∗∗ −0.302∗∗∗ −0.285∗∗∗ −0.336∗∗∗ −0.338∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.100) (0.099) (0.081) (0.094) (0.093)
Market (γ) −0.047 −0.047 −0.048 −0.007 −0.007 −0.001
(0.073) (0.074) (0.075) (0.135) (0.133) (0.134)
Private info×Market (δ ) −0.038 0.018 0.020 −0.042 −0.005 −0.007
(0.112) (0.170) (0.164) (0.149) (0.166) (0.163)
BAF −0.072 −0.072 −0.088∗ −0.127 −0.125 −0.133
(0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.099) (0.098) (0.098)
BAF × Private info 0.022 0.130 0.144 0.100 0.167 0.168
(0.095) (0.131) (0.131) (0.119) (0.131) (0.129)
BAF ×Market 0.139 0.139 0.153∗ 0.189 0.187 0.194
(0.088) (0.088) (0.089) (0.166) (0.165) (0.165)
BAF ×Market × Private info −0.131 −0.248 −0.256 −0.190 −0.260 −0.261
(0.162) (0.232) (0.231) (0.193) (0.219) (0.217)
ρ1 0.168 0.168 0.118 0.123
(0.132) (0.127) (0.097) (0.088)
ρ1×Market −0.115 −0.117 −0.081 −0.088
(0.224) (0.211) (0.154) (0.137)
ρ1×BAF −0.219 −0.211 −0.149 −0.131
(0.210) (0.201) (0.145) (0.134)
ρ1×BAF×Market 0.238 0.225 0.154 0.142
(0.324) (0.316) (0.219) (0.205)
Repetition 1 0.101∗∗ 0.104∗∗
(0.045) (0.047)
Repetition 2 −0.034 −0.029
(0.049) (0.044)
β +δ −0.251 −0.279 −0.282 −0.327 −0.341 −0.345
p-value test β +δ = 0 0.009 0.042 0.031 0.006 0.009 0.007
p-value test |β +δ | ≤ |β | 0.365 0.543 0.549 0.390 0.487 0.483
γ +δ −0.086 −0.029 −0.028 −0.048 −0.012 −0.008
p-value test γ +δ = 0 0.310 0.851 0.847 0.459 0.903 0.927
Mkt−BDM [Public info, BAF] (τ) 0.092 0.092 0.105 0.182 0.181 0.193
p-value test τ = 0 0.054 0.055 0.018 0.048 0.048 0.032
Mkt−BDM [Private info, BAF] (φ ) −0.078 −0.138 −0.131 −0.050 −0.085 −0.076
p-value test φ = 0 0.463 0.360 0.400 0.516 0.412 0.468
Observations 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572
Table B.4: Ranking with bid-ask feedback.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
119
Price asset H Price asset L
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 97.729∗∗∗ 97.730∗∗∗ 96.020∗∗∗ 76.183∗∗∗ 76.183∗∗∗ 74.874∗∗∗
(2.253) (2.255) (2.489) (0.937) (0.938) (1.042)
Private info (β ) −5.717 −6.920 −7.131 6.304 6.710 6.570
(4.123) (4.712) (4.468) (4.253) (4.632) (4.451)
Market (γ) 3.371 3.371 3.269 −5.073∗ −5.073∗ −5.158∗
(4.989) (4.994) (5.030) (2.865) (2.868) (2.890)
Private info×Market (δ ) −14.947∗∗ −14.648∗ −14.588∗ −8.438 −7.669 −7.583
(7.233) (7.756) (7.471) (5.777) (6.486) (6.354)
BAF 1.202 1.204 0.918 −0.716 −0.718 −0.925
(5.371) (5.376) (5.313) (3.077) (3.083) (3.076)
BAF × Private info −4.844 −5.336 −4.934 −1.352 −2.194 −1.915
(6.643) (7.319) (7.057) (5.593) (6.184) (5.955)
BAF ×Market 6.023 6.023 6.304 5.470 5.471 5.577
(8.411) (8.420) (8.383) (4.787) (4.794) (4.761)
BAF ×Market × Private info −12.844 −12.044 −12.226 −12.605 −13.818 −13.979
(10.662) (11.304) (11.017) (8.029) (9.019) (8.924)
ρ1 2.434 2.431 −0.801 −0.754
(2.884) (2.341) (2.893) (2.681)
ρ1×Market −0.625 −0.624 −1.506 −1.532
(6.367) (5.908) (3.826) (3.456)
ρ1×BAF 0.751 1.252 1.708 1.519
(5.411) (5.066) (4.083) (3.697)
ρ1×BAF×Market −1.392 −2.005 2.400 2.643
(8.607) (7.981) (5.799) (5.422)
Repetition 1 5.997∗∗∗ 1.545
(1.773) (1.152)
Repetition 2 −0.256 2.715∗∗
(1.226) (1.062)
β +δ −20.664 −21.568 −21.719 −2.134 −0.959 −1.013
p-value test β +δ = 0 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.585 0.833 0.823
p-value test |β +δ | ≤ |β | 0.019 0.029 0.025 0.765 0.812 0.809
γ +δ −11.577 −11.278 −11.319 −13.511 −12.743 −12.741
p-value test γ +δ = 0 0.027 0.057 0.041 0.007 0.028 0.024
Mkt−BDM [Public info, BAF] (τ) 9.393 9.393 9.573 0.397 0.398 0.420
p-value test τ = 0 0.165 0.166 0.153 0.918 0.918 0.912
Mkt−BDM [Private info, BAF] (φ ) −18.398 −17.299 −17.241 −20.646 −21.090 −21.142
p-value test φ = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 1761 1761 1761 1653 1653 1653
Table B.5: Perfect aggregation with bid-ask feedback.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Asset H Asset L
Public information Private information Public information Private information
BDM 1.214 1.435 0.852 1.287
Market 1.389 1.683 1.345 1.658
Difference −0.175∗∗∗ −0.247∗∗∗ −0.493∗∗∗ −0.370∗∗∗
Observations 960 960 960 960
Table B.6: Average number of assets traded.
Note: Statistical significance is determined using a t-test between institutions under the same information
condition. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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B.5 Additional Figures
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Figure B.1: Average prices of both assets by institution and bid-ask feedback.
B.5.2 Simulation of Prices if All Traders are Price-sensitive
This subsection contains simulations illustrating the price dynamics in artificial samples of
only price sensitive traders. We focus on the sample of price-sensitive traders and ask how
prices would have looked like if only the price-sensitive traders were trading. To do so we
create a market price pt=1 from the bids and asks submitted in the first period t = 1, of
each repetition, by these traders only. We then simulate a price pt for all t > 1 by using the
average bids and asks of price-sensitive traders in periods following a price in the window
[pt−1− 2.5, pt−1 + 2.5].2 We do this exercise separately for assets H and L and for both
the treatments with public and private information to avoid sample selection biases in this
comparison. Figure B.2 reproduces Figure 2.1 by focusing on market prices in the full
2The reason that we use this window and not just the price pt−1 is that not all simulated prices also occur
in the experimental data. The window chosen ensures that at least one observation for each of the simulated
prices is generated. Also note that we cannot do this exercise for price-insensitive traders as, by definition,
they do not react to past prices.
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sample on the left (this part is identical to the right panel in Figure 2.1) and in the sample
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Figure B.2: Actual and simulated average market prices.
Note: Market prices for the whole sample (left panel) and simulated market prices for price sensitive traders only (right
panel). Prices of asset H (black) and asset L (grey) are represented under both Public information (solid line) and Private
information (dashed line).
The figure shows that the gap between market prices under public and private informa-
tion almost disappears for price-sensitive traders for asset H. For asset L the gap persists but
in the opposite direction, resembling the BDM treatment shown in Figure 2.1. Hence de-
spite the fact that the presence of so many price-insensitive traders should make it difficult
to learn for those who are price-sensitive, they are able to learn quite well. The predomi-
nant effect explaining the failure of information aggregation in the market seems to be the
direct effect of price-insensitive traders on the market price. However, price-insensitive
traders could also have an indirect effect on others’ ability to make correct inference from
prices, especially when their presence shifts prices “too much” (outside the range studied in
Figure 2.1). Comparing prices in the public information condition between the full sample
and that of price-sensitive traders shows only small differences. This suggests that the two
samples differ indeed mostly in their ability to learn from prices and not e.g. in preferences
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Appendix “The Causal Effect of Income Inequality on Attribution and Social Trust”
C.1 Additional Details Online Studies
C.1.1 Pre-test
We pre-tested a general population’s understanding of a number of different ways to illus-
trate income distributions. Participants (n = 176) were randomly shown either one of the
three income distributions depicted in Figure C.1. Subjects where told the picture repre-
sented the income distribution in a borough in England and were asked to pretend to be
the individual highlighted in red. We asked three questions in order to test participants’
understanding of the income distribution and their relative position within the borough.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure C.1: (a)Version 1, (b) Version 2, (c) Version 3. The distributions used in Survey I.
The first question asked “Compared to the richest person in the borough, how high is
your income?” Answer options were (i) equally high, (ii) more than half as high, (iii) less
than half as high but more than a third, (iv) less than a third as high but more than a fourth,
(v) at most a fourth as high and (vi) none of the above.
The second question asked “What is your relative position with respect to the population
in this borough?” with answer options (i) most of the population has a much higher income
than me, (ii) most of the population has a lower income than me, (iii) most of the population
is poorer than me (iv) most of the population has a slightly higher income than me and (v)
none of the above.
The third question asked “Which of the following statements best describes the image
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above?” with answer options (i) Only a small fraction of the population in the borough has
a high income. Most of the population has a low income level and I belong to this part;
(ii) Only a small fraction of the population in the borough has a low income. Most of the
population has a high income level and I belong to this part; (iii) A high fraction of the
population in the borough has a high income. Only a small portion of the population has
a low income level and I belong to this part; (iv) A high fraction of the population in the
borough has a low income. Only a small portion of the population has a high income level
and I belong to this part and (v) none of the above.
We accepted answers (iii)-(v) as correct in the first question, answers (iv) and (v) in the
second question and answer (i) in the third question. We found that respondents did not
understand Version 3 at all and they understood Version 1 somewhat better than Version 2.
C.1.2 Online Experiment: Belief in Meritocracy
This online experiment measured the effect of the prime on typical survey-based measures
of belief in meritocracy. Specifically, we conduct an online survey where we use the exact
same questionnaire and prime as in the lab and the exact same outcomes (measures of
belief in meritocracy) as in the Next Steps 8 survey. At the end of the survey we also ask
participants to indicate how risk averse and how competitive they are on a scale from 0-10.
Hence, as in the lab, we can make causal inference on belief in meritocracy, but unlike
the lab the outcome measures here are not incentivized. We fielded the survey online using
a large UK survey provider and restricted the sample to UK national (just as in the lab). We
have 194 respondents for the REL condition and 185 respondents for the INEQ condition.
No participants were dropped from the sample. Table C.1 shows some properties of this
sample and compares them to our lab samples and the Next Steps 8 samples.
C.1.3 Online Experiment: Inequality Prime
This online experiment investigated in more detail the effectiveness of the inequality prime.
In this survey we use ten different income distributions with levels of inequality ranging
125
NS 8 Lab Lab Online Online
sample
age 25.3 27.1 26.6 33.4 35.9
female 0.55 0.48 0.40 0.69 0.74
student 0.07 0.80 0.82 0.19 0.17
low income 0.57 0.39 0.30 0.56 0.61
high income 0.08 0.29 0.32 0.14 0.08
measurement
causal NO YES YES YES YES
incentivized NO YES YES NO NO
type of prime - REL INEQ REL INEQ
N 6906 114 114 194 185
Table C.1: Characteristics of Next Steps 8, Lab and
online experiment participants as well as types of
measurement of belief in meritocracy.
from complete equality to very high inequality (see Figure C.2). We again prime partici-
pants using one of these distributions (randomly selected) and ask them to indicate belief in
meritocracy using the same measure as in Next Steps 8. As these income distributions do
not really exist in the UK we emphasize that they are income distributions of a “hypotheti-
cal” borough in the UK. At the end of the survey we show them (a different) distribution,
again randomly selected, and ask them to indicate on a scale from 0,...,10 how unequal
they believe this society is. Again the survey was conducted online with a large UK sur-
vey provider and the sample was restricted to UK nationals. We had 331 respondents.
The mean age was 38.14 years (range 19,72), 66 percent were women, 11.5 percent were
students, 49.24% fall into the low income category and 14.5% in the high income category.
C.1.4 Online Experiment: Blame
This online experiment measured the effect of the primes on a non-incentivized measure
of blame. We used the exact same questionnaire and prime as in the lab. Afterwards we
describe to the participants hypothetical choices of player A and asked them how they
would distribute 15GBP between players A and B hypothetically. Hence the blame task is
also the same as in the lab with the difference that it was not incentivized. The reason we
chose this task is that it there is no established measure of blame used in general surveys.
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(a) INEQ 1 (b) INEQ 2
(c) INEQ 3 (d) INEQ 4
(e) INEQ 5 (f) INEQ 6
(g) INEQ 7 (h) INEQ 8
(i) INEQ 9 (j) INEQ 10
Figure C.2: The distributions used in Survey III.
At the end of the survey we also ask participants to indicate how risk averse and how
competitive they are on a scale from 0-10.
Hence, as in the lab, we can make causal inference on blame, but unlike the lab the
outcome measures here are not incentivized. We fielded the experiment online using a
large UK survey provider and restricted the sample to UK national (just as in the lab). We
have 107 respondents for the REL condition and 109 respondents for the INEQ condition.
No participants were dropped from the sample. Table C.2 shows some properties of this
sample and compares them to our lab samples and the Next Steps 8 samples.
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NS 8 Lab Lab Online Online
sample
age 25.3 24.6 23.7 35.2 35.6
female 0.55 0.44 0.48 0.64 0.75
student 0.07 0.87 0.86 0.21 0.18
low income 0.57 0.32 0.33 0.64 0.58
high income 0.08 0.31 0.30 0.07 0.10
measurement
causal NO YES YES YES YES
incentivized NO YES YES NO NO
type of prime - REL INEQ REL INEQ
N 6906 219 221 107 109
Table C.2: Characteristics of Next Steps 8, Lab and
online experiment participants as well as types of
measurement for Blame.
C.1.5 Online Experiment: Social Trust
This online experiment measured the effect of the prime on typical survey-based measures
of social trust. Specifically, we conduct an online survey where we use the exact same
questionnaire and prime as in the lab and the exact same outcomes (measures of social
trust) as in the Next Steps 8 survey. At the end of the survey we also ask participants to
indicate how risk averse and how competitive they are on a scale from 0-10.
Hence, as in the lab, we can make causal inference on social trust, but unlike the lab
the outcome measures here are not incentivized. We fielded the survey online using a large
UK survey provider and restricted the sample to UK national (just as in the lab). We have
292 respondents for the REL condition and 216 respondents for the INEQ condition. No
participants were dropped from the sample. Table C.3 shows some properties of this sample
and compares them to our lab samples and the Next Steps 8 samples.
C.2 Additional Details Lab Experiment
C.2.1 Experimental Instructions
Participants were provided with a paper sheet reporting the general information about the
experiment. Instructions for each part, were instead displayed on subjects screens prior the
beginning of the corresponding part.
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NS 8 Lab Lab Online Online
sample
age 25.3 27.1 26.6 34.0 35.1
female 0.55 0.48 0.40 0.66 0.63
student 0.07 0.80 0.82 0.19 0.25
low income 0.57 0.39 0.30 0.51 0.54
high income 0.08 0.29 0.32 0.14 0.14
measurement
causal NO YES YES YES YES
incentivized NO YES YES NO NO
type of prime - REL INEQ REL INEQ
N 6906 335 333 322 318
Table C.3: Characteristics of Next Steps 8, Lab and
online experiment participants as well as types of
measurement for Social Trust.
General Information
Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment. Please, read these instructions
carefully. These are identical for all the participants. Should you have any question, please
raise your hand. An experimenter will come to you and answer your questions. From now
on communication with other participants is not allowed. If you do not conform to these
rules we will have to exclude you from the experiment. Please do also switch off, or set to
off line mode, your mobile phone at this moment.
At the beginning of the experiment we will ask you some questions about yourself (e.g.
age, gender, etc.). These data will be used for the purpose of this experiment only, and will
be completely anonymous.
You will receive 1 GBP for filling in the initial questionnaire and 4 GBP for showing up
today. During the experiment you can earn more. All payments and payoffs will be ex-
pressed in british pounds (GBP).
All your answers and decisions will be treated confidentially.
The Experiment The main experiment consists of six parts in each of which you can
earn some money. How much depends on your decisions and those of other participants.
Detailed instructions for each part will be shown on your computer screen as the experiment
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proceeds. The order of the parts will be randomized
Your earnings At the end of the experiment one part will be randomly selected for each
participant. You will receive the amount of money you earned in this part. In addition,
you will be paid 1 GBP for completing the initial questionnaire and 4 GBP for showing up
today.
Participation Your participation to this study is completely voluntary. Choosing not to
take part will not disadvantage you in any way. You can withdraw from the experiment at
any time without consequences.
Confidentiality All your answers will be treated confidentially and only used for research
purposes only.
If you have any questions about these instructions or the experiment, then please raise your
hand now and someone will come and answer them.
Once everyone has finished reading the instructions and questions have been answered, the
experiment will start. At the beginning of each part you will receive detailed instructions,
and some control questions will appear on your screen that will allow you to test your
understanding of the instructions.
Part 1a
In this part, you will first perform three tasks:
• You will complete a short test consisting of 4 questions. For every correct answer
you earn 2 GBP. Your score (A) from this task is determined as follows:
A = number of correct answers.
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• You will perform a task in which you will have to count the number of 0’s in four
tables containing only 0’s and 1’s. For every table for which you report the correct
number of 0’s, you earn 2 GBP. Your score (B) from this task is determined as fol-
lows:
B = number of correct answers.
• You will toss a fair coin. Your will earn 0 GBP if “head” comes up and 10 GBP if
“tail” comes up. Your score (C) from this task is determined as follows:
C = 0 “if head” and C = 2 “if tail”.
Your overall score (S) will be calculated as a combination of the scores you earned in each
task, as follows:
S = A+B+C
Afterwards, we will randomly sort people in groups of ten and rank all participants by their
score S, where the highest score is ranked 1 and the lowest score 10.
Before knowing the results, we will ask you to guess your rank. The guesses are made
by specifying a range (between X and Y) in which you believe your rank belongs.
For this, you will be paid according to the accuracy of your guesses. A wrong guess
(your actual rank falls outside the specified range) yields nothing. A correct guess (your
actual rank lies within the specified range) yields the following:
(9− (Y −X)) ·2
Therefore, the smaller the specified range, the higher the earnings if the guess is correct, i.e
the true rank is within the specified range. However, a smaller range also increases the risk
that the guess is not correct, in which case you earn nothing.
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Example
Suppose your overall rank is 3, i.e. you scored the third-best performance S among the ten
people in your group.
If you guess X = 4 and Y = 6, your specified range is [4, 6]. Since your rank falls outside
the specified range you earn zero.
If you guess X = 1 and Y = 10, your specified range is [1, 10], the biggest possible range.
Since your rank lies in the specified range you earn (9−9) ·2 = 0 GBP.
If you guess X = 3 and Y = 8, your specified range is [3, 8]. Since your rank lies in the
specified range you earn (9−5) ·2 = 8 GBP.
If you guess X = 3 and Y = 5, your specified range is [3, 5]. Since your rank lies in the
specified range you earn (9−2) ·2 = 14 GBP.
If you guess X = 3 and Y = 3, your specified range is [3, 3], the smallest possible range.
Since your rank lies in the specified range you earn (9−0) ·2 = 18 GBP.
Your total payoff from this part will be determined with 50 percent chance by the perfor-
mance in the three tasks (S) and with 50 percent chance by the correctness of your guesses.
Part 1b
In this part, each of you will be randomly matched in groups of three participants. You will
not be told who these persons are either during or after the experiment nor will they be told
who the others are.
The three participants, including you, will be referred to later as player A, B, and C. Each
of you will be assigned one player type only. Thus, you can be either player A, B or C.
At the beginning of the task, the individual score (S) of each group member from Part 1a
will be combined together. Thus, the total amount will be the sum of the S scores of each
of the group members. Each player will then be asked to allocate this total amount among
the group members.
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For example, if you are player A you will have to decide how much to keep for yourself
and how much to allocate to player B and player C. Only one of your allocation decisions
will be selected at random with equal probability and implemented.
After the allocation decisions, each of you will be asked to guess how much the other group
members allocated to themselves. A correct guess will yield a bonus of 2 GBP.
Part 2
(The following instructions where provided on paper)
In this part, each of you will be randomly matched in groups of three participants. You will
not be told who these persons are either during or after the experiment nor will they be told
who the others are.
The three group members will be referred to later as A, B and C. Agent B does not make
any choice in this part and thus, is passive. Each of you will be assigned to one type only.
Thus, you can be either A or B or C.
At the first stage, A is asked to make an investment decision. In particular, A has to choose,
without costs, between a risky lottery or a safe alternative. The lottery and the certain
amount of the safe alternative are known to all players.
At the second stage, the decision of agent A and the outcome of the lottery are revealed to
all players. Further, the outcome of the investment of A will constitute the payoff of C.
After the outcome of the investment is observed, C is asked to divide 15 GBP between A
and B. The allocations to each agent can be between 0 and 15 GBP and together have to
total to 15 GBP or less. Note that money not allocated to the agents will not be kept by C.
Thus, the payoff for C will be determined by the outcome of the investment while for A
and B they will be given by the allocation of the 15 GBP decided by C.
Next, A will observe the allocation made by C while B will learn about this payment at the
end of the experimental session.
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Finally, both A and C will have to rate the other’s decision on a 1-10 scale ranging from
very bad to very good.
In total there will be ten choices made by players A and C, each time with a different in-
vestment decision for player A. Only one of those ten choices will be randomly selected
for the payment.
(More detailed instructions where provided on subjects screens following Gurdal et al.
(2013))
Part 3
In this part, each of you will be randomly matched in groups of three participants. You will
not be told who these persons are either during or after the experiment nor will they be told
who the others are.
Each of you has to perform the same task as in Part 1. Thus, you have to count the number
of 0’s in five different tables that contain only 0’s and 1’s. However, this time you will not
be paid for every correct answer you provide. Instead, the person in your group who pro-
vides the correct answer most often will be paid 10 GBP. If more than one group member
has the most correct answers then we will throw a coin to determine who wins the 10 GBP.
The other group members will receive 0 GBP.
Part 4
In this part we will ask you questions which require you to make choices involving wheels
of fortune. In every question you will be asked to choose between two different wheels,
each of which can deliver two monetary outcomes. From this part, you will earn the amount
of money you win from one of the wheels you choose. More precisely, at the end of this
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part we will randomly draw one of your choices. The outcome of the selected wheel of
fortune will constitute your payment from this part.
Figure C.3: Example of a wheel of fortune
This is an example of a wheel of fortune with 10 equal sized coloured zones. The wheel
is spun and equally likely to stop with the arrow in one of the zones. In this wheel, there
are 3 red zones and 7 blue zones. If the arrow ends in any of the red zones you receive 8
GBP. If it ends in any of the blue zones you receive 0 GBP.
Part 5
In this part we will ask you some questions about yourselves. You will receive 2 GBP for
completing all these questions.
1. How old are you?
2. Are you a student?
Yes:
• At what stage of your studies are you?
• What is your field of study?
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• What is your expected grade at graduation?
• Are you planning to continue with your studies? If yes, which options do you
plan to choose next term?
• What plans do you have for your career?
• What is your annual income expectation (in GBP) in ten years from now?
No:
• What is your field of work?
• What is your annual income expectation (in GBP) in ten years from now?
• How satisfactory are these different aspects of your life? Indicate the option
which best suits your situation.
– Life as a whole is
– My ability to manage my self-care (dressing, hygiene, transfers, etc.) is
– My leisure situation is
– My vocational situation is
– My financial situation is
– My sexual life is
– My partnership relation is
– My family life is
– My contacts with friends and acquaintances are
C.2.2 Income Questionnaire
Before commencing the main experiment, we will ask you some questions about yourself.
Please answer to these questions truthfully. Your answers will be used for the purpose of
this experiment only and will be treated confidentially.
1. How would you primarily characterize your social class?
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• Working class
• Lower middle class
• Middle class
• Upper middle class
• Upper class
2. What is your annual gross (parents’) household income?
• Less than 15.000 GBP
• Between 15.000 - 25.000 GBP
• Between 25.000 - 35.000 GBP
• Between 35.000 - 45.000 GBP
• Between 45.000 - 55.000 GBP
• More than 55.000 GBP
3. How much rent does your (parents’) household currently pay?
• Less than 400 GBP per month
• Between 400-600 GBP per month
• Between 600-800 GBP per month
• Between 800-1000 GBP per month
• Between 1000-1200 GBP per month
• More than 1200 GBP per month
• My (parents’) household lives in owned property







• More than 5









6. If you have to buy a new mobile phone, which price are you usually willing to pay?
• Less than 200 GBP
• Between 200-400 GBP
• Between 400-600 GBP
• Between 600-800 GBP
• More than 800 GBP
7. If you go on holidays abroad where are you most likely to go?
• I never go to holidays abroad.
• Spain, Portugal or Greece.
• Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy or France.
• Anywhere in Europe, and some non-European countries.
• Anywhere in the world.
8. About how much does your (parents’) household spend eating out every week?
• Less than 25 GBP per week
• Between 25-50 GBP per week
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• Between 50-100 GBP per week
• Between 100-200 GBP per week
• More than 200 GBP per week
9. Where were you educated?
• At a comprehensive
• A grammar school
• Private school, not boarding









2. Which image logically follows next?
Figure C.4
3. Which conclusion follows from the statements with absolute certainty? (i) None of
the stamp collectors is an architect; (ii) All the drones are stamp collectors.
• all stamp collectors are architects
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• architects are not drones
• no stamp collectors are drones
• some drones are architects
4. Tina who is 16 years old is four times as old as her brother. How old will she be





C.2.3.0.2 Task 1b and Task 3
Figure C.5 shows an example of a matrix used in Task 1b and Figure C.6 shows how the
coin toss was illustrated on the screen.
Figure C.5: Example of a Matrix for Task 1b and 3
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Figure C.6: Screenshot: Coin Toss.
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C.3 Sample Characteristics
Age Gender Student A B C S Risk Compet
high prime 2.149 0.018 -0.038 -0.235 0.039 0.210 0.013 0.085 -0.058
(2.717) (0.094) (0.075) (0.219) (0.192) (0.188) (0.345) (0.399) (0.092)
Constant 26.05*** 0.473*** 0.818*** 2.473*** 1.164*** 0.909*** 4.545*** 4.673*** 0.618***
(1.955) (0.0680) (0.0545) (0.157) (0.138) (0.135) (0.248) (0.286) (0.0668)
Observations 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 113 114
R-squared 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.004
Income Questionnaire Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
high prime -0.230 0.121 -0.167 -0.180 -0.368 -0.051 -0.238 0.028
(0.195) (0.327) (0.408) (0.260) (0.412) (0.311) (0.167) (0.132)
Constant 2.145*** 3.218*** 4.964*** 3.909*** 4.673*** 3.255*** 1.764*** 1.327***
(0.140) (0.235) (0.294) (0.187) (0.296) (0.224) (0.120) (0.095)
Observations 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114
R-squared 0.012 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.018 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.4: Balancing tests REL-MTB.
Note: Gender= 1 is female, student is a dummy indicating whether the participant is a University student, A, B and C are sub-scores in ability,
effort and luck task, respectively. S is the overall score in the task. Risk is our measure of risk aversion and Compet our measure of
competitiveness. Q1-Q8 are the questions of the income questionnaire.
Age Gender Student A B C S Risk Compet
high prime 1.725 -0.088 0.003 0.045 -0.175 -0.082 -0.212 0.359 -0.006
(1.506) (0.066) (0.045) (0.146) (0.155) (0.135) (0.266) (0.255) (0.0673)
Constant 23.65*** 0.487*** 0.867*** 2.372*** 1.425*** 1.027*** 4.823*** 4.761*** 0.460***
(1.053) (0.046) (0.031) (0.102) (0.109) (0.094) (0.186) (0.178) (0.047)
Observations 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221
R-squared 0.006 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.000
Income Questionnaire Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
high prime -0.157 -0.052 -0.205 0.059 -0.082 -0.114 0.010 -0.061
(0.145) (0.227) (0.290) (0.175) (0.319) (0.210) (0.129) (0.109)
Constant 2.407*** 3.664*** 5.363*** 3.681*** 4.619*** 3.327*** 1.832*** 1.478***
(0.102) (0.159) (0.203) (0.122) (0.223) (0.146) (0.0899) (0.0759)
Observations 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221
R-squared 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.5: Balancing tests REL-BMT.
Note: Gender= 1 is female, student is a dummy indicating whether the participant is a University student, A, B and C are sub-scores in ability,
effort and luck task, respectively. S is the overall score in the task. Risk is our measure of risk aversion and Compet our measure of
competitiveness. Q1-Q8 are the questions of the income questionnaire.
142
Age Gender Student A B C S Risk Compet
high prime 0.340 -0.098 -0.022 0.082 0.510** 0.384** 0.976*** 0.098 -0.151*
(2.551) (0.092) (0.071) (0.225) (0.206) (0.185) (0.356) (0.379) (0.089)
Constant 26.49*** 0.455*** 0.836*** 2.291*** 0.982*** 0.836*** 4.109*** 4.800*** 0.727***
(1.835) (0.066) (0.051) (0.162) (0.148) (0.133) (0.256) (0.273) (0.064)
Observations 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 113 114
R-squared 0.000 0.010 0.001 0.001 0.052 0.037 0.063 0.001 0.025
Income Questionnaire Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
high prime -0.015 0.080 0.485 -0.157 -0.477 0.137 -0.229 0.061
(0.202) (0.315) (0.400) (0.259) (0.458) (0.292) (0.185) (0.174)
Constant 2.473*** 3.564*** 5.091*** 3.818*** 5.291*** 3.473*** 1.873*** 1.600***
(0.145) (0.227) (0.288) (0.186) (0.329) (0.210) (0.133) (0.125)
Observations 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.013 0.003 0.010 0.002 0.013 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.6: Balancing tests INEQ-MTB.
Note: Gender= 1 is female, student is a dummy indicating whether the participant is a University student, A, B and C are sub-scores in ability,
effort and luck task, respectively. S is the overall score in the task. Risk is our measure of risk aversion and Compet our measure of
competitiveness. Q1-Q8 are the questions of the income questionnaire.
Age Gender Student A B C S Risk Compet
high prime -0.894 0.094 0.000 -0.091 0.171 -0.300** -0.221 0.044 -0.102
(0.941) (0.070) (0.046) (0.143) (0.157) (0.134) (0.254) (0.254) (0.066)
Constant 24.03*** 0.434*** 0.867*** 2.478*** 1.442*** 1.168*** 5.088*** 5.097*** 0.460***
(0.655) (0.048) (0.032) (0.099) (0.109) (0.093) (0.177) (0.176) (0.046)
Observations 219 219 219 219 219 219 219 219 219
R-squared 0.004 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.023 0.003 0.000 0.011
Income Questionnaire Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
high prime 0.023 -0.015 0.074 -0.030 0.040 -0.112 0.108 0.072
(0.143) (0.235) (0.294) (0.185) (0.329) (0.222) (0.129) (0.110)
Constant 2.071*** 3.478*** 4.991*** 3.823*** 4.611*** 3.168*** 1.779*** 1.381***
(0.099) (0.164) (0.205) (0.129) (0.229) (0.154) (0.089) (0.076)
Observations 219 219 219 219 219 219 219 219
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.002
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.7: Balancing tests INEQ-BMT.
Note: Gender= 1 is female, student is a dummy indicating whether the participant is a University student, A, B and C are sub-scores in ability,
effort and luck task, respectively. S is the overall score in the task. Risk is our measure of risk aversion and Compet our measure of
competitiveness. Q1-Q8 are the questions of the income questionnaire.
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C.4 Additional Results and Discussion
In this section we will discuss additional results, in particular the effect of the prime on
secondary outcomes that but might nevertheless be of independent interest. We start by
studying pro-social behaviour and then move to aspirations.
C.4.1 Pro-social behaviour
Is the increased level of social trust for those primed to a high relative position accompa-
nied by an increase in pro-social behaviour by the same group? There is an active literature
discussing how people’s relative position in society affects how pro-social they are. The
results in this literature are pretty mixed. Psychology literature working with highly con-
textualized situations has found that a higher relative position tends to decrease pro-social
behaviour (Piff et al., 2012). Cote et al. (2015) find that this difference is more pronounced
if there is a high degree of inequality in the area where the rich or poor person lives. This
effect is not found by Schmukle et al. (2019). Smeets et al. (2015) find a non-monotonic
effect with both millionaires as well as poor people being more pro-social than those in the
middle. Both Korndoerfer et al. (2015) and Andreoni et al. (2017) find a positive effect
which they argue is driven by the different marginal utility of money rather than funda-
mental differences in preferences. Trautmann et al. (2013) emphasize the important role of
contextual factors and suggest there is no simple answer to this question. Given this intense
debate it is interesting to briefly study differences in pro-social behaviour in our sample,
especially since we, unlike most studies above, can make causal inference on the role of
relative position on pro-social behaviour.
Appendix Table C.8 shows regression results where we regress the share of the pie
allocated to others on the prime, income category and controls in the same format as above.
We find that those primed to a high relative position are indeed more pro-social. They share
on average 53 percent of the pie compared to 46 percent for those who are primed to a low
relative position, a 15 percent increase. This difference is highly statistically significant
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Pro-Social Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
high prime 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.062** 0.058**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022)
medium income -0.016 -0.014 -0.015 0.006 0.023
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.041) (0.046)
high income -0.053* -0.046 -0.043 0.014 0.045
(0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.054) (0.056)
Constant 0.463*** 0.485*** 0.607*** 0.610*** 0.426** 0.439**
(0.015) (0.013) (0.075) (0.080) (0.148) (0.158)
Observations 335 335 335 334 334 334
R-squared 0.026 0.035 0.047 0.053 0.129 0.184
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.8: Pro-social behaviour REL treatments.
Note: Extra Income Controls are fixed effects from initial income questionnaire. The smaller set
includes questions 1-4, the larger set all eight questions. Other Controls are age, gender and
student status. The larger set also includes risk aversion, a competitiveness dummy, the size of
the total pie and overall score S.
Pro-Social Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
high prime 0.033* 0.033* 0.033* 0.034* 0.025 0.025
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018)
medium income 0.007 0.006 0.013 0.013 0.007
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.045) (0.042)
high income 0.009 0.011 0.008 0.028 0.037
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.044) (0.046)
Constant 0.516*** 0.516*** 0.387*** 0.452*** 0.493*** 0.462***
(0.016) (0.027) (0.051) (0.055) (0.075) (0.094)
Observations 333 333 333 333 333 333
R-squared 0.007 0.009 0.024 0.056 0.111 0.180
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.9: Pro-social behaviour INEQ treatments.
Note: Extra Income Controls are fixed effects from initial income questionnaire. The smaller set
includes questions 1-4, the larger set all eight questions. Other Controls are age, gender and
student status. The larger set also includes risk aversion, a competitiveness dummy, the size of the
total pie and overall score S.
(p < 0.0001) and robust to including additional controls. Hence, despite using priming
techniques like some of the literature identifying negative effects in very contextualized
situations (Piff et al., 2012) our results are in line withe positive effects identified in some of
the Economics literature, for example Andreoni et al. (2017) or Korndoerfer et al. (2015).
Appendix Table C.9 shows the effects of the inequality prime on pro-social behaviour.
Being primed to higher levels of inequality seems to make participants less pro-social. The
effect is, however, small statistically significant only at the 10% level.
145
C.4.2 Aspirations
We also collected data on aspirations. We asked participants about their expected income
in ten years from now and, if they were students, about whether they believe they will get
a good degree (2:1 or above in the UK)1, whether they want to continue further studies
after the BA and in which occupation they plan to pursue a career. These measures were
not incentivized. However, as the time elapsed between the prime and these questions was
relatively long we wouldn’t expect big effects. Indeed we find no effect of the prime on
any of the aspirations elicited in the lab. However we do find correlational evidence of a
negative association between income and the aspiration to get a good degree as well as a
positive association between income and expected income as well as the aspiration to do a
career in finance. These associations motivate us to dig a bit deeper into a possible causal
relationship.
As these measures are not incentivized, they can be elicited relatively easily in online
surveys. We hence conduct an online survey (n = 240) where after eliciting income using
our standard income questionnaire and then priming participants to a high or low relative
position using the exact same procedure as in our lab experiment, we immediately elicit
the following aspirations. The mean age of respondents in the survey was 34.58 years, the
share of women 65% and 22.3% were students. 49.39% fall in the low income category
and 15.51% fall in the high income category.
For students we elicit their expected income in ten years from now, whether they believe
they will get a good degree, whether they want to continue further studies after the BA and
in which occupation they plan to pursue a career, exactly as in the lab. For non-students we
also elicit their expected income in ten years from now and we ask whether they expect their
personal economic situation will improve over the next 5 years and whether they expect to
get a promotion in their job in the next 5 years. For full details see the questionnaire in
1In UK universities the following degree classification is widely used. First-Class Honours (70% and
above): a first class degree, usually referred to as a first or 1st, is the highest honours degree one can achieve.
Upper Second-Class Honours (60-70%), known as a 2:1 or two-one. Lower Second-Class Honours (50-60%),
a 2.2 or two-two. Third-Class Honours (40-50%) is the lowest honours degree achievable
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Appendix C.10.
Appendix Table C.10 shows that being primed to a high relative position has a positive
effect on future income expectations both for students and non-students. There are no other
statistically significant effects of the prime for non-students, but students primed to a high
relative position are more likely to believe they will get a good degree and are more likely
to indicate that they plan to continue further studies. Being primed to higher inequality
does not per se have an effect on aspirations (Appendix Table C.11). We also observe
several correlational effects with income. As expected, those with higher current income
(parents’ income) expect higher income in the future. They are also more likely to plan
further studies and a career in finance. Last, they are more likely to expect a promotion in
their current job.
Students Non-Students
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
degree study exp inc c finance c edu c NGO future promo exp inc
high prime 0.266** 0.405*** 0.437*** 0.073 -0.045 -0.020 -0.008 -0.022 0.131*
(0.126) (0.128) (0.150) (0.105) (0.085) (0.094) (0.065) (0.063) (0.071)
medium income 0.229 0.466*** 0.391** 0.145 0.053 -0.185* 0.021 0.225*** 0.629***
(0.140) (0.143) (0.167) (0.117) (0.095) (0.105) (0.073) (0.070) (0.079)
high income 0.190 0.155 0.863*** 0.291** -0.094 -0.123 -0.061 0.290*** 1.084***
(0.157) (0.160) (0.187) (0.131) (0.106) (0.118) (0.101) (0.097) (0.110)
Constant -1.075** 0.179 0.611 -0.470 -0.521 0.0406 0.819*** 0.397* 2.020***
(0.513) (0.522) (0.611) (0.429) (0.347) (0.385) (0.218) (0.209) (0.237)
Observations 53 53 53 53 53 53 187 187 187
R-squared 0.301 0.394 0.404 0.134 0.354 0.204 0.201 0.223 0.464
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.10: Aspirations depending on income and whether participants are primed to high relative position.
Note: Controls are age, gender, risk attitude and self-reported degree of competitiveness.
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Students Non-Students
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
degree study exp inc c finance c edu c NGO future promo exp inc
high prime -0.147 0.043 -0.048 0.035 0.341 -0.166 -0.001 -0.013 -0.069
(0.267) (0.279) (0.308) (0.150) (0.218) (0.240) (0.0730) (0.061) (0.082)
medium income -0.247 0.141 0.365 -0.009 0.101 -0.029 0.111 0.365*** 0.628***
(0.236) (0.247) (0.273) (0.132) (0.192) (0.212) (0.0790) (0.066) (0.0894)
high income 0.224 -0.368 0.984*** 0.217 -0.167 0.264 0.123 0.365*** 1.035***
(0.300) (0.315) (0.346) (0.168) (0.245) (0.270) (0.121) (0.101) (0.137)
Constant 1.321 -0.431 2.806*** 0.198 -1.400** 0.337 0.834*** 0.496*** 1.966***
(0.825) (0.884) (0.951) (0.462) (0.672) (0.742) (0.181) (0.151) (0.205)
Observations 30 29 30 30 30 30 183 183 183
R-squared 0.267 0.216 0.361 0.115 0.404 0.101 0.084 0.243 0.367
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.11: Aspirations depending on income and whether participants are primed to high inequality.
Note: Controls are age, gender, risk attitude and self-reported degree of competitiveness.
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C.5 Additional Tables
C.5.1 Additional Tables for Section 3
Social Trust EVS
(1) (2) (3)
medium income 0.153*** 0.148*** 0.113
(0.0487) (0.0488) (0.561)




Gini × med income 0.136
(2.066)
Gini × high income 2.685
(2.436)
Constant 0.291*** -0.037 0.074
(0.055) (0.228) (0.282)
Individual Controls YES YES YES
Region Controls NO NO NO
Observations 607 607 607
R-squared 0.044 0.047 0.049
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.12: Social Trust in the European Value
Survey.
Note: Individual controls are age, gender and religion fixed
effects. The region controls are population size, ethnic
diversity (share of white population) and the share of the
population living in an urban area.
C.5.2 Additional Tables for Section 3.4
-MTB -BMT
Belief in Meritocracy 3 min 78 min
Social Trust 15 min 90 min
Inclination to Blame 30 min 8 min
Table C.13: Approximate time
between prime and elicitation of
different outcomes.
Note: The measure includes the time until the
actual start of the task, i.e. includes time spent
reading task-specific instructions and
answering control questions.
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BIM Social Trust Blame
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
age 0.003 0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
gender 0.040 0.032 -0.001 -0.002 0.153 0.124 0.139
(0.066) (0.066) (0.017) (0.017) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137)
student 0.123 0.115 0.011 0.014 0.207 0.216 0.192
(0.159) (0.160) (0.037) (0.037) (0.255) (0.254) (0.254)
middle class -0.021 -0.024 -0.005 -0.005 -0.039 -0.048 -0.070
(0.105) (0.105) (0.028) (0.0290) (0.217) (0.217) (0.217)
upper class 0.164 0.194 -0.248*** -0.245*** -0.714 -0.694 -1.074
(0.297) (0.302) (0.094) (0.094) (0.967) (0.968) (0.972)
medium income 0.126 0.149 0.0212 0.023 0.134 0.200 0.194
(0.113) (0.113) (0.031) (0.031) (0.244) (0.245) (0.245)
high income 0.145* 0.139* -0.000 0.000 0.032 0.112 0.113
(0.083) (0.085) (0.022) (0.022) (0.175) (0.177) (0.177)
S 0.042** 0.008 -0.065* -0.063*
(0.021) (0.005) (0.037) (0.037)
luck 0.001 -0.012
(0.039) (0.010)
risk -0.013 -0.003 -0.037 -0.042
(0.016) (0.004) (0.039) (0.039)
competitiveness 0.120* 0.024 -0.113 -0.141
(0.072) (0.019) (0.153) (0.152)
Social Trust 0.014 -0.549*
(0.153) (0.286)
Belief in Meritocracy -0.019 0.264*
(0.018) (0.145)
Constant 0.121 -0.071 0.474*** 0.438*** -0.254 0.065 0.532
(0.242) (0.293) (0.060) (0.073) (0.451) (0.526) (0.533)
Observations 228 227 668 667 193 193 193
R-squared 0.024 0.059 0.014 0.021 0.025 0.063 0.065
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.14: Demographic and Experiment-based covariates of main outcomes in lab
experiment.
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C.5.3 Additional Tables for Section 3.5
Belief in Meritocracy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
high prime 0.179* 0.181** 0.191** 0.180** 0.190* 0.210*
(0.092) (0.089) (0.088) (0.088) (0.103) (0.122)
medium income -0.042 -0.047 -0.061 -0.267 -0.338
(0.107) (0.106) (0.110) (0.216) (0.239)
high income 0.278** 0.203* 0.147 0.0624 -0.118
(0.110) (0.113) (0.115) (0.254) (0.300)
Constant 0.364*** 0.296*** -0.00190 -0.156 -0.0890 0.212
(0.066) (0.085) (0.361) (0.403) (0.550) (0.680)
Extra Income Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES+
Other Controls NO NO YES YES+ YES+ YES+
Observations 114 114 114 114 114 114
R-squared 0.032 0.107 0.159 0.196 0.280 0.374
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.15: Persistence of Effect on Belief in Meritocracy at Step 2.
Note: Extra Income Controls are fixed effects from initial income questionnaire. The smaller set
includes questions 1-4, the larger set all eight questions. Other Controls are age, gender and student
status. The larger set also includes risk aversion, a competitiveness dummy and overall score S.
Belief in Meritocracy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
high prime 0.056 0.053 0.056 0.048 0.156 0.193
(0.093) (0.093) (0.094) (0.095) (0.102) (0.124)
medium income 0.116 0.119 0.103 -0.073 -0.119
(0.111) (0.113) (0.118) (0.214) (0.242)
high income 0.234** 0.215* 0.185 -0.071 -0.117
(0.114) (0.120) (0.124) (0.252) (0.303)
Constant 0.418*** 0.314*** 0.272 0.321 0.537 0.525
(0.067) (0.088) (0.384) (0.435) (0.545) (0.688)
Extra Income Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES+
Other Controls NO NO YES YES+ YES+ YES+
Observations 114 114 114 114 114 114
R-squared 0.003 0.040 0.045 0.062 0.289 0.357
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.16: Persistence of Effect on Belief in Meritocracy at Step 3.
Note: Extra Income Controls are fixed effects from initial income questionnaire. The smaller set
includes questions 1-4, the larger set all eight questions. Other Controls are age, gender and




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
high prime (β ) 0.122 0.145 0.153 0.224 0.211 0.136
(0.180) (0.180) (0.179) (0.183) (0.183) (0.222)
medium income 0.081 -0.064 -0.119 -0.142 -0.058
(0.201) (0.213) (0.219) (0.239) (0.315)
high income 0.499 0.586* 0.565 0.338 0.458
(0.347) (0.350) (0.357) (0.382) (0.464)
Constant -0.060 -0.058 -0.245 -0.338 -0.326 -1.255
(0.126) (0.144) (0.348) (0.509) (0.543) (0.782)
Extra Income Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES+
Other Controls NO NO YES YES+ YES+ YES+
Observations 107 107 107 105 105 102
R-squared 0.004 0.028 0.098 0.123 0.212 0.385
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.17: Survey measure of blame REL treatments.
Note: Extra Income Controls are fixed effects from initial income questionnaire. The smaller
set includes questions 1-4, the larger set all eight questions. Other Controls are age, gender
and student status. The larger set also includes risk aversion and a self reported
competitiveness measure.
Blame
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
high prime (β ) -0.102 -0.206 -0.189 -0.224 -0.234 0.007
(0.212) (0.215) (0.221) (0.227) (0.235) (0.298)
medium income 0.470** 0.418* 0.432* 0.405 0.354
(0.220) (0.231) (0.232) (0.245) (0.284)
high income 0.250 0.310 0.292 0.320 0.161
(0.370) (0.376) (0.385) (0.437) (0.544)
Constant -0.039 -0.184 0.203 0.160 0.064 0.997
(0.124) (0.142) (0.413) (0.528) (0.646) (0.934)
Extra Income Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES+
Other Controls NO NO YES YES+ YES+ YES+
Observations 109 109 109 108 108 107
R-squared 0.002 0.044 0.061 0.070 0.096 0.263
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.18: Survey measure of blame INEQ treatments.
Note: Extra Income Controls are fixed effects from initial income questionnaire. The smaller
set includes questions 1-4, the larger set all eight questions. Other Controls are age, gender




(a) REL Down Lo (b) REL Down Lo
(c) REL Down Lo (d) REL Down Lo
(e) REL Down Lo (f) REL Down Lo
(g) REL Down Lo (h) REL Down Lo
Figure C.7: The pictures show the upwards and downwards primes for the different income
categories as well as the primes used when relative position is not communicated.
(a) REL-MTB (b) INEQ-MTB
Figure C.8: Belief in meritocracy depending on rank. Best rank (= 1) on the left and worst rank
(= 10) on the right.
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(a) REL-MTB (b) INEQ-MTB
Figure C.9: How much does a participants rank depend on luck? Difference between actual overall
rank and average rank in ability and effort (y-axis) depending on participants actual rank (x-axis).
Three regions defined by cutoffs in how much beliefs on average effort and ability rank differ from
actual overall rank which split people into those with low and high belief in meritocracy.
(a) REL-MTB (b) INEQ-MTB
Figure C.10: CDF of blame.
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